Live data from Hacker News

New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

predictors.fail

181–190 of 365 posts

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In practice probably not, as long as general population keeps it enabled. I mean, looking at effort required, it's not worth spending time exploiting spectre these days, because virtually everyone is protected. If you're not likely to be directly targeted, "herd immunity" will work.

If just visiting a webpage with some JS will let them do ACE on even 0.1% of visitors, hackers are probably still motivated enough to try it. But I vaguely remember these kinds of vulns can be patched in-browser for a perf hit instead of taking the hit system-wide, which sounds like an ok compromise. Edit: Arbitrary memory access, not ACE

>hackers are probably still motivated enough to try it.

The amount of actual exploit crafting that is needed to actually do something meaningful with a hack is pretty much not worth doing for any financial reason. The only time this happens now is when state funded actors or prominent groups with lots of manpower really want to take down an individual person.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#182
post #171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We had the tech in the 80's for the browser to facilitate popup authentication with process isolation. It's this niche and esoteric tech called IPC[1], so niche that one really can't blame Apple for not hearing about it. It truly boggles the mind as to how all the other browsers pull it off. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter-process_communication

To be fair, there wasn't that much sensitive web content around in the 80s to leak (primarily due to the web not yet existing, nor browsers), so it's only fair that browsers didn't consider using IPC for site isolation back then.

The point of my rather facetious comment is that IPC a well known thing (I struggle to even call it "tech") that has been around for 30-40 years. I don't understand why Apple needs people to make excuses for them, but this excuse would render Apple vastly more incompetent than neglecting to separate browser tabs in 2025.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#183

If I understand correctly, this also affects Asahi Linux, right?

Yes. They even used Asahi Linux to develop their techniques on as it gave better access to cpu controls. The exploit was tested on Safari (IE not a Linux fault but a CPU one).

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#184
post #159
post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Other browsers do site isolation, why can’t Safari? (:

Safari definitely does use site isolation (if you check "Activity Monitor", you'll find Safari processes named after the sites they're displaying) in almost all cases. window.open, in some constellations, is an exception, because the opening and opened sites have an explicit communication facility available to them, unless at least one of the two explicitly opts out of it. As far as I'm aware, Safari also correctly i…

> Safari definitely does use site isolation (if you check "Activity Monitor", you'll find Safari processes named after the sites they're displaying) in almost all cases.

From the FAQ:

"For leaking secrets, both SLAP and FLOP are confined to the address space they are trained in. As pointed out by iLeakage, Safari lacks Site Isolation, a measure used to enforce that two different webpages not from the same domain can never be handled by the same process. Thus, in Safari it is possible for an adversary's webpage to be handled by the same process (and thus address space) with an arbitrary webpage, increasing the attack surface including LAP- and LVP-based exploits.

On the other hand, although Chrome is equipped with Site Isolation, we demonstrate that it is not a perfect mitigation. We show the real-world existence of corner cases, where two subdomains of the same site can be merged into one process, again leading to LAP- and LVP-based attacks."

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#185
post #171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To be fair, there wasn't that much sensitive web content around in the 80s to leak (primarily due to the web not yet existing, nor browsers), so it's only fair that browsers didn't consider using IPC for site isolation back then.

The point of my rather facetious comment is that IPC a well known thing (I struggle to even call it "tech") that has been around for 30-40 years. I don't understand why Apple needs people to make excuses for them, but this excuse would render Apple vastly more incompetent than neglecting to separate browser tabs in 2025.

Browsers are incredibly complex, and moving them to an IPC model is not easy. Essentially, you need to ensure "same process like", performant JavaScript interoperability in some cases, often (but not always) due to backwards compatibility.

Firefox has shared a lot about their efforts in moving there. If you're curious, there are a lot of blog posts and internal design docs under their project name "Project Fission".

But yeah, the fact that both Chrome and Firefox have managed to do so does leave Apple looking slightly bad here.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why not a choice? Individuals could choose a "secure" browser or browser mode that provides increased protection from such attacks or a "compatible" one that is less likely to break old websites.

> Individuals could choose a "secure" browser or browser mode that provides increased protection from such attacks or a "compatible" one that is less likely to break old websites. And then we get thousands of posts whining about Safari being broken because it is "not like Chrome" and developers moaning that their unsafe pet API is not supported. Web developers are never going to play ball.

idunno, as a professional web dev since 1998, I don't understand why Google, Apple and Mozilla are trying so hard to make the web browser like a complete OS (I technically understand why, I just think it's ridiculous). The amount of obscure APIs being added just boosts the surface area for vulnerabilities and makes low-resource web browsing nearly impossible. You either get "a web browser that works" or "a web browser that can load almost nothing", and basically nothing in between. I had to stop using Firefox on my old ThinkPad because after opening a few windows, it churns the CPU so hard it's not usable for a solid minute+. Let that finish up, and I have to wait again if I dare to open another page. i5-3220m, 8gb of RAM (where the OS uses like 200mb of RAM)... there's no excuse for this to not be able to browse the web.

Some fun examples of "your browser is an OS on top of your OS":

The Screen Wake Lock API provides a way to prevent devices from dimming or locking the screen when an application needs to keep running. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Screen_Wake...

The Web Serial API provides a way for websites to read from and write to serial devices. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Serial_...

The Window Management API allows you to get detailed information on the displays connected to your device and more easily place windows on specific screens, paving the way towards more effective multi-screen applications. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window_Mana...

The Compute Pressure API is a JavaScript API that enables you to observe the pressure of system resources such as the CPU. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Compute_Pre...

(my thesis is, not all web developers want this stuff, and usually when I talk to people in the industry they agree, it's excessive)

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#187
post #184
post #159

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Safari definitely does use site isolation (if you check "Activity Monitor", you'll find Safari processes named after the sites they're displaying) in almost all cases. window.open, in some constellations, is an exception, because the opening and opened sites have an explicit communication facility available to them, unless at least one of the two explicitly opts out of it. As far as I'm aware, Safari also correctly i…

> Safari definitely does use site isolation (if you check "Activity Monitor", you'll find Safari processes named after the sites they're displaying) in almost all cases. From the FAQ: "For leaking secrets, both SLAP and FLOP are confined to the address space they are trained in. As pointed out by iLeakage, Safari lacks Site Isolation, a measure used to enforce that two different webpages not from the same domain can…

Yes, in some special cases, which both embedded/opened and embedding/opening websites can avoid by setting the appropriate HTTP headers/HTML attributes.

Of course it would be better if Safari would do the same thing as Chrome and Firefox and just provide a separate process for all contexts, including those that can communicate per specifications. But there's something sites can do today to avoid this potential information leak.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Individuals could choose a "secure" browser or browser mode that provides increased protection from such attacks or a "compatible" one that is less likely to break old websites. And then we get thousands of posts whining about Safari being broken because it is "not like Chrome" and developers moaning that their unsafe pet API is not supported. Web developers are never going to play ball.

idunno, as a professional web dev since 1998, I don't understand why Google, Apple and Mozilla are trying so hard to make the web browser like a complete OS (I technically understand why, I just think it's ridiculous). The amount of obscure APIs being added just boosts the surface area for vulnerabilities and makes low-resource web browsing nearly impossible. You either get "a web browser that works" or "a web browse…

Well, for better or worse, the web is an application platform these days.

I consider it pretty great, since the alternative is installing native apps for things I'm using exactly once or very rarely.

There's a case to be made though that maybe these things should only be available to PWAs, which is what Apple is already doing for some functionality on iOS, including push notifications.

Post reply on HN