If you're attending a large-scale protest, it's likely that the cell-towers (or stingrays) won't be able to handle everyone who is connected anyways, so worth planning to use apps that can chat over P2P WiFi or Bluetooth together with the rest of your friends. This also allows you to continue using Airplane Mode the entire time, while being able to communicate with people nearby. Alternatively, investing in walkie-ta…
Burner phones aren't safe. Security through obscurity worked with the 1990s cell network but not with today's vast logging/geolocation tagging.
The protester's guide to smartphone security
181–190 of 246 posts
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#182> However, in this situation it may make more sense to disable biometric authentication. In Face ID, there's a setting that requires direct eye contact in order to open your phone. Highly recommend enabling this when feeling insecure about someone forcing you to open your phone (if it's not already on by default) because it means somebody forcing you to open your phone with Face ID can be easily defeated by simply cl…
While this is good info, it should also be known that in the USA, a judge (maybe and police officer?) can legally command you to unlock your phone via biometrics, but they cannot legally command you to unlock via password or passphrase. “Legally command” = command you to do something with the force of law, and legally punish you if you resist
In contrast, "the device opened in response to the same fingerprint/face that the suspect has" is a form of world-evidence which doesn't infringe on your mind, much like "the key found in your pocket unlocked the safe."
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#183Earlier quoted context omitted.
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Thankfully this attitude didn't set in during the civil rights movements of the 60s! Or we might still have had separate white and black bathrooms. If we keep following such advice we may again have special water fountains and schools for those other people.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#184Earlier quoted context omitted.
Burner phones aren't safe. Security through obscurity worked with the 1990s cell network but not with today's vast logging/geolocation tagging.
Can you still buy phones with sim cards that don't require ID to get working? Not in Europe, UAE or Australia.
In Estonia, you could buy a prepaid SIM card in a convenience shop a few years ago, without any sort of ID verification. Not sure if that’s still an option but I think it’s not a priority there. You can then use it all over the EU.
And of course, buying a phone without a contract doesn’t require ID either.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Briar runs P2P over Tor so they can't collect data, even if they should want to. That makes the common, dangerous, naive assumption that the implementation is secure. Correct, complete, secure implementations are very hard. (It also assumes the design is secure, which is impossible to tell based on that limited information. P2P is not any more secure than over the Internet: In fact, it's easier to identify (there a…
It...depends. If you're not technical, signal is hands down the best solution. If you have a group that's going to something and you are willing to take some extra steps, something like matrix/briar/simplex/whatever setup with a self hosted instance provides you with the knowledge that all the infrastructure is under your control and that the feds just aren't going to have the time to sit down and figure out how this…
> the feds just aren't going to have the time to sit down and figure out how this shit works.
They have resources many orders of magnitude larger than you. The NSA has tens of billions of dollars per year and five or six figures of personnel. It's you who don't have time.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#186Earlier quoted context omitted.
Burner phones aren't safe. Security through obscurity worked with the 1990s cell network but not with today's vast logging/geolocation tagging.
Can you still buy phones with sim cards that don't require ID to get working? Not in Europe, UAE or Australia.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#187> If you lose your phone, you may be able to locate or wipe your phone remotely depending on the model... > Please be aware of the legal consequences of these actions. Wiping your device or revoking online account access could lead to obstruction of justice or destruction of evidence charges in some jurisdictions. This can be really serious. It is far better to never have/collect/obtain data in the first place.
It got me curious; lets say I go to a protest, lose my phone and wipe it remotely. I couldn't possibly know who exactly got it (since I lost it) so if I remote wipe it while in police custody, could they really get you for "obstruction of justice" for example? Wouldn't that require intent?
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#188If you're attending a large-scale protest, it's likely that the cell-towers (or stingrays) won't be able to handle everyone who is connected anyways, so worth planning to use apps that can chat over P2P WiFi or Bluetooth together with the rest of your friends. This also allows you to continue using Airplane Mode the entire time, while being able to communicate with people nearby. Alternatively, investing in walkie-ta…
Absolutely best idea is to make an encrypted PDA & play forensic scientist by recording everything. 1. Get a Google Pixel 9, 9 Pro, or 9 Pro XL smartphone (Cellebrite-proofn at time of writing). 2. Verify images & GOS. 3. Disable biometrics & wireless connections. 4. Memorize with Anki or your own head a new, NIST-compliant passphrase with ≥ 8+ words. 3. Get a cover for the smartphone. 4. Buy EMI tape and electricall…
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#189Earlier quoted context omitted.
Once the phone is on, they can tie it to a person with geolocation. Either directly if you do it at home, or indirectly when traveling in a vehicle associated with you.
The rule is that you don’t use your burner phone at home, you use it when you are at the protest.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#190Earlier quoted context omitted.
The rule is that you don’t use your burner phone at home, you use it when you are at the protest.
If you have two phones both turned on and they both move around similarly, they can be associated later.
This is all well documented
https://www.offgridweb.com/preparation/burner-phone-basics-h...