Live data from Hacker News

SVB Hall of Shame

svbhallofshame.wordpress.com

181–190 of 307 posts

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#181
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You're right, but it is entirely prisoner's dilemma. But part of what makes that whole bit of game theory interesting is that it has a lot more complexity then just the simple version. Yes in a plain prisoner's dilemma betray can make sense, but in an iterated prisoner's dilemma that's no longer true. That's been part of the debate around the whole debacle, for much of SV's history it was very much iterated, it was…

I don’t understand how the iterated prisoner’s dilemma makes a difference. If you are a founder who withdrew all your company’s money, then your reputation is neutral or perhaps positive. You saved your company. You did “whatever it takes”. These are good qualities in a founder. If you are a founder who left your company’s money in SVB, nobody is going to give you a medal for that. Instead it exposes you to questions…

The VCs were also playing the game, though. How do you feel that iteration looks for them?

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#182

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But there's this endless array of explainers saying they don't- https://www.google.com/search?q=banks%20don%27t%20lend%20dep...

You need to re-read those articles. They don't say banks "don't lend depositor funds" At least the first couple on that page explain that banks don't "need" depositor money to lend and in fact they generally lend out money they borrow from a central bank since their loan outlay tends to outpace their deposits. But outside of the central bank reserve requirements the banks are free to loan our or otherwise invest thei…

...banks don't "need" depositor money to lend...

This seems like one sort of thing, in which money that used to be in a depositor's pocket is now in the bank and available for lending.

...and in fact they generally lend out money they borrow from a central bank...

This seems like another sort of thing, in which money that previously did not exist has been created by the Fed changing a number in a spreadsheet so it's now available for lending.

You might point out that in our system, these different-seeming things are essentially the same. If so, you're really agreeing with GP.

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you are solvent, in principle, you can get a loan from another bank to cover illiquidity. Yes, runs can kill any bank, but insolvency killed SVB first.

I don't think that's true? SVB was insolvent because they had to sell bonds at a massive loss in order to cover illiquidity that was a problem due to the bank run .

They’ve been insolvent for some time. The bank run didn’t cause the insolvency, the bank run exposed it, and laid it bare.

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#184
post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As individuals they couldn’t stop the bank run happening, so pulling out their money was the rational thing to do. If all the depositors could have got together in a room, they could all have agreed to keep their money in. That coordination wasn’t possible though.

This is incorrect. such coordination was possible and did happen, only in the opposite direction. A relatively small group of VC firms effectively did coordinate the depositors very effectively to organize except it was to take money out Saying coordination wasn’t possible is therefore incorrect. And had it not occurred, getting people to keep their money in would have been a moot point, the whole thing a non issue.

Coordinating action in one direction can be trivial while coordinating in the opposite is nearly impossible. It takes years of engineering and construction to build a dam but only a few critical mistakes to break it down. The same amount of water is involved in either case, but it's a lot harder to hold it back than it is to let it loose.

Bank runs are the same way.

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#186

> The board was asleep at the switch. They are now unemployable. That's not really how this works. The CAO of the bank was CFO of Lehman. People in these positions just get credit for the fact that they had a front row seat for this sort of financial implosion, so they can (theoretically) help whoever else's board they join avoid that sort of thing. > But those players within the venture capital community who were si…

Wasn't it in the best interest of everyone's best interest to avoid having such high amounts of uninsured deposits?

Was it a requirement or recommendation to concentrate cash in SVB, and why?

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#187
Shame is toxic, but the issue is critical for startup's and worth discussing.

Depositors making individual decisions? Ok.

Funds advising their companies? Ok, but it really hides the agency: deciders are in the funds (what CEO would refuse that advice?), but the companies are the responsible actors.

Now, would it matter if most of those funds were responding to their investors, say, Saudi's or Russians or the Chinese Communist Party, or to a consortium of friends who had shorted the bank? Most would say it does matter, but AFAICT it's perfectly legal, and no outsider would ever know the difference.

Market self-regulation, insurance, and investment diversification all depend on agents acting independently in their own interests, say, of making money.

Once agents are coordinating, or colluding, or have other dominant strategic interests, market self-regulation fails. And everyone else, who reasonably relied on the market behaving stochastically or in response to economic forces, loses.

One might hope that if this were all good, the response to a wall of shame would be a wall of honor, with transparency around decisions. But confidentiality is a key feature for any investment firms, so the best we'll get are retrospective letters of intent.

Aside from bad actors, the irony is that high federal rates means more risk-taking from banks, not less. SVB assets were good and safe, albeit not worth much (as the auction is showing).

I would have no problem with new rules saying that firms with assets big enough relative to the bank needed to schedule major withdrawals in advance. There's really no other reason than a bank run to move $100M emergently. (There'll be a secondary market for large urgent transfers, but it won't cost much, securitized with a pending transfer.)

So: yes the system is susceptible to bad actors, and there's no good way to respond without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Really society's only defense is that the wealthy are getting wealthy enough legally that there's no real need to go all-out.

Aside from the moral hazard of covering bank risks, there's another moral hazard in creating opportunity and incentive for an already-confidential and largely unregulated industry to collude. It might push good investors into combines with bad actors, amplifying ill effects.

What's shameful really is that these systemic gaps are relatively obvious to thousands of the involved engineer/MBA/JD's, but everyone greedily grabs their local maxima, instead of insisting the system work right. That's where I'd welcome leadership, some way to reduce coordination costs.

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#188
post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Since they can loan out much more than they get in deposits that’s not strictly true right? You can have 10 house loans for every house sized deposit (or something similar).

You are confused about how fractional reserve works. The 10x multiplier is on the bank's equity. For every dollar of home loan there is a dollar or more of deposits. The multiplier effect of fraction reserve occurs over iterated loans and depositing. The fraction term comes in because the bank can lend out a fraction, less than 1, of deposits.

This is incorrect. Fractional reserve lending means that they can keep a fraction of deposits as reserve and loan out the rest. This necessarily means they are not fully covered in times of large withdrawals.

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#189
This comes off as a strawman job.

There was no grand conspiracy ahead-of-time to cause a run.

It would be dumb on the part of investors and VCs to not facilitate moving vast sums of their money to safer places in an orderly fashion.

OTOH, there existed an opportunity to steer cash in directions favorable to the influencers after SVB was already sinking.

So I don't see any evidence it was anything other than mismanagement by growing too big too quickly and betting on riskier financial instruments than should've been allowed.

Re: SVB Hall of Shame

#190
post #107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ok, I'm starting a new bank and everyone will be able to withdraw all at once, bank runs will be a thing of the past, your interest rate will be 0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000125%

A positive interest rate? That's a no brainer steal. Basically you're saying you'd pay the customer for the privilege of not being able to use their money... A bank that keeps 100% funds as reserve to accommodate any withdrawal pattern not only cannot give any interest, it would need to _charge you_ a maintenance fee to cover the costs of holding your money as well as charge you a per-transaction fee to cover the cos…

Sounds like a postal banking system proposal to me. Can you rewrite this in the form of legislation, please?
Post reply on HN