The author ignores that behind the downfall of SVB was a climate of excess liquidity on the markets, a bonanza created by the authorities that made SVB see itself with a glut of funds. Now, SVB, loaded with money, could have tried loaning it like crazy, but instead, decided to go the conservative way and buy bonds. Someone could argue that they could have foreseen that this abundance of liquidity in the markets, alon…
> But in the end, even if we could argue that SVB should have been more prescient, it is clear that the root cause of the problems is the actions of the government and the FED. No. SVB hid market to market losses by saying "these securities are held to maturity so I don't have to realize losses". THAT is the source of the problem. Not all banks did this. Sure excess liquidity was necessary for this behavior to be pos…
All major US banks - and all or virtually all US banks in general - have assets that are designated as held to maturity. Continuously marking all assets to market would create massive swings in banks' income and obscure the real gains and losses from their operations.
SVB probably had a somewhat longer asset duration and somewhat lower book yield than US banks on average, since its deposit base grew so quickly in a low interest rate environment in 2020-2021. It also had a higher share of uninsured deposits. But nothing that SVB did was categorically different than other banks, and in the absence of a government backstop, I'm not convinced that any US bank would fare much better if faced with a similar volume of deposit outflows. "Magically" transforming long-dated assets into short-dated liabilities wasn't any kind of malfeasance on SVB's part - it's just how banking works.