Live data from Hacker News

Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

arxiv.org

181–190 of 321 posts

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are two camps, evident in this thread. one camp is 'its just a statistical model, it cant possibly know these things' The other camp (that I'm in) sees that we might be onto something. We humans are obviously just more than a statistical model, but nonetheless learning words and how they fit together is a big part of who we are. With LLMs we have our first glimpse of 'emergent' behaviour from simple systems sca…

From the two camps the one that says we "might" be onto something is the more intelligent and reasonable opinion. First your camp doesn't deal in absolutes. It doesn't say absolutely chatGPT is sentient. It only questions the possibility and tries to explore further. Second a skeptical outlook that doesn't deal with absolutes is 100% the more logical and intelligent perspective given the fact that we don't even know…

[deleted]

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#182
post #33

This highlights one of the types of muddled thinking around LLMs. These tasks are used to test theory of mind because for people, language is a reliable representation of what type of thoughts are going on in the person's mind. In the case of an LLM the language generated doesn't have the same relationship to reality as it does for a person. What is being demonstrated in the article is that given billions of tokens o…

How do I know my thoughts aren't statistical noise?

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#183
post #159

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'll dig up a source in a bit, but there is a critical period of development in which a child must be exposed to language, or they will fail to develop the very core skills that you're suggesting are innate abilities in a person regardless of their upbringing. This is exactly how you learned everything you know; your parents talked to you. Language grants you the ability to define concepts in the first place, without…

> the very core skills that you're suggesting are innate abilities in a person regardless of their upbringing I have made no such claim. > This is exactly how you learned everything you know; your parents talked to you. This is not even remotely close to being correct. > Language grants you the ability to define concepts in the first place There is a vast literature in cognitive science that disagrees with you.

Feel free to point me to something specific, like this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_deprivation

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#184
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Defining what "knowing" is would be useful, yes, and analytic philosophers in epistemology do argue about this. One attribute that's classically part of the definition of "knowing" is that the thing which is known must be true. LLMs are pretty bad at this, but perhaps that can be fixed. But I would challenge you to imagine the situation the LLM is actually in. Do you understand Thai? If so, in the following, feel fre…

Generally I don't buy these arguments which require embodiment, because they don't seem to align well to what else I know about my world. Rather than your Thai text example, let's consider a friend of my sister H. H has been profoundly blind from birth. Not "legally blind" with the world a blur, her eyes actually don't work. Direct lived experience of a summer day is to her literally just feeling warmth on her face f…

I don't think embodiment is required to understand a lot of stuff. But language is how we talk about the world, and non-linguistic concepts have to be grounded in an exposure to something other than language. I think there's an argument to be made that DALLe "knows" more about a lot of words than a pure language model bc it can relate phases to visual concepts. But I do think for many concepts, understanding also proceeds from interaction. This doesn't necessarily need to be physical. I similarly think code generation tools need access to interpreters etc to "understand" the code they're generating. Embodiment is not relevant to all concepts.

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#185
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Defining what "knowing" is would be useful, yes, and analytic philosophers in epistemology do argue about this. One attribute that's classically part of the definition of "knowing" is that the thing which is known must be true. LLMs are pretty bad at this, but perhaps that can be fixed. But I would challenge you to imagine the situation the LLM is actually in. Do you understand Thai? If so, in the following, feel fre…

Let me respond with an analogy of my own. Imagine you are a scientist on an alien world. The aliens primary experience the world through magnetic fields. They live deep in the atmosphere of a hot Jupiter like planet and rarely touch anything and have no eyes. Still they are intelligent beings and so quickly they are able to establish communication with you. A computer translates and you both have to become a bit more…

My intuition is that the difference between GP's analogy and the Chinese room is in computing power of the system, in the sense of Chomsky hierarchy[0] (as opposed to instructions per second).

In the Chinese room, the instructions you're given to manipulate symbols could be Turing-complete programs, and thus capable of processing arbitrary models of reality without you knowing about them. I have no problem accepting the "entire room" as a system understands Chinese.

In contrast, in GP's example, you're learning statistical patterns in Thai corpus. You'll end up building some mental models of your own just to simplify things[1], but I doubt they'll "carve reality at the joints" - you'll overfit the patterns that reflect regularities of Thai society living and going about its business. This may be enough to bluff your way through average conversation (much like ChatGPT does this successfully today), but you'll fail whenever the task requires you to use the kind of computational model your interlocutor uses.

Math and logic - the very tasks ChatGPT fails spectacularly at - are prime examples. Correctly understanding the language requires you to be able to interpret the text like "two plus two equals" as a specific instance of " "[2], and then execute it using learned abstract rules. This kind of factoring is closer to what we mean by understanding: you don't rely on surface-level token patterns, but match against higher-level concepts and models - Turing-complete programs - and factor the tokens accordingly.

Then again, Chinese room relies on the Chinese-understanding program to be handed to you by some deity, while GP's example talks about building that program organically. The former is useful philosophically, the latter is something we can and do attempt in practice.

To complicate it further, I imagine the person in GP's example could learn the correct higher-level models given enough data, because at the center of it sits a modern, educated human being, capable of generating complex hypotheses[3]. Large Language Models, to my understanding, are not capable of it. They're not designed for it, and I'm not sure if we know a way to approach the problem correctly[4]. LLMs as a class may be Turing-complete, but any particular instance likely isn't.

In the end, it's all getting into fuzzy and uncertain territory for me, because we're hitting the "how the algorithm feels from inside" problem here[5] - the things I consider important to understanding may just be statistical artifacts. And long before LLMs became a thing, I realized that both my internal monologue and the way I talk (and how others seem to speak) is best described as a Markov chain producing strings of thoughts/words that are then quickly evaluated and either discarded or allowed to be grown further.

--

[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chomsky_hierarchy

[1] - On that note, I have a somewhat strong intuitive belief that learning and compression are fundamentally the same thing.

[2] - I'm simplifying a bit for the sake of example, but then again, generalizing too much won't be helpful, because most people only have procedural understanding of few most common mathematical objects, such as real numbers and addition, instead of a more theoretical understanding of algebra.

[3] - And, of course, exploit the fact that human languages and human societies are very similar to each other.

[4] - Though taking a code-generating LLM and looping it on itself, in order to iteratively self-improve, sounds like a potential starting point. It's effectively genetic programming, but with a twist that your starting point is a large model that already embeds some implicit understanding of reality, by virtue of being trained on text produced by people.

[5] - https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yA4gF5KrboK2m2Xu7/how-an-alg...

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#186
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

this is mind blowing to me. can anyone with more knowledge on the topic explain how ChatGPT is demonstrating this level of what seems like genuine understanding and reasoning? Like others I assumed that ChatGPT is gluing words together that commonly occur together. This is way more than that.

There are two camps, evident in this thread. one camp is 'its just a statistical model, it cant possibly know these things' The other camp (that I'm in) sees that we might be onto something. We humans are obviously just more than a statistical model, but nonetheless learning words and how they fit together is a big part of who we are. With LLMs we have our first glimpse of 'emergent' behaviour from simple systems sca…

I think there's more nuance. It's hard applying tests designed for humans to a model that can remember most of the useful text on the internet.

Imagine giving a human with a condition that leaves them without theory of mind weeks of role-play training about theory of mind tests, then trying to test them. What would you expect to see? For me I'd expect something similar to ChatGPT's output: success on common questions, and failures becoming more likely on tests that diverge more from the formula.

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#187
post #33

This highlights one of the types of muddled thinking around LLMs. These tasks are used to test theory of mind because for people, language is a reliable representation of what type of thoughts are going on in the person's mind. In the case of an LLM the language generated doesn't have the same relationship to reality as it does for a person. What is being demonstrated in the article is that given billions of tokens o…

I wonder every time I see this take what it would mean under this definition of knowing things for a machine learning algorithm to ever know something. I find that especially important because to every appearance we are a machine learning algorithm. I don’t know how different the sort of knowing this algorithm has to the sort of knowing a human has, but you’re far more confident than I am that it’s a difference of ki…

We can probe issues like what do language models know and what they understand in several ways. One is through an understanding of the process it’s following. Another is through seeing how that leads to its responses. Then thirdly by looking at the kinds of errors it makes. Using multiple axes of approach like this we can triangulate in on what it’s doing and what it understands.

In terms of how it works, that’s well known and hardly worth repeating in depth, but to summarise it calculates a probability for the next word in a sequence based on a massive training set of human language word sequences.

So what kind of output do they produce? If you ask what it likes to do on the weekend, GPT3 will say generally something about how it likes to spend time with family and friends, because that’s what it has in it’s training set. GPT3 doesn’t have a family, or friends, it doesn’t hang out. It talks about itself because its training set includes people talking about themselves, but it has no concept of self or what it is. It’s a text generator function. It can write a poem about the warm sun on its face, but it doesn't have a face or feel the sun. It’s just regurgitating stuff people wrote about that.

Newer systems like ChatGPT have guard rail functions that catch things like this and say it’s a language model, but the guard rails don’t change the nature of what it is, they’re just overrides.

So what kind of errors do they make? They can be trivially tricked into talking utter nonsense, or say sensible things in absurd contexts. Here’s an example where someone asked ChatGPT if it spoke Danish, and it replied that no it can’t speak Danish, it’s an English language model , etc. except here’s the kicker, it gave the reply in perfect Danish.

https://www.reddit.com/r/GPT3/comments/zb4msc/speaking_to_ch...

Again they’ve now added guard rails for this failure mode as well. Nevertheless the basic problem persists in the architecture. It’s doesn’t have a clue what anything means, beyond calculating word probabilities. This means if you know how they work, you can craft text prompts that expose how ludicrously unaware they are. This ability to expose their weaknesses demonstrates that we do genuinely understand how they function and what their limitations are.

So I agree yours is a very reasonable question and it’s not trivial to answer satisfactorily, but we can triangulate in using multiple lines of approach on what these things are or are not. As the guard rails become more complete the failure modes will get harder up find, but they’re still there in the core implementation, they’re just being papered over. There’s not going to be a simple answer. We need to look deeper at the mechanisms and functions of these things. The same goes for human brains of course, we’re just scratching the surface of those too. But while I agree we are neural systems and share some characteristics with LLMs and Alphazero and such, Alphazero isn’t an LLM, and we aren’t either of them. One day we will create something as sophisticated and maybe even as genuinely conscious as ourselves and the questions you ask will be important guides, but these things are a long, long way from that.

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#188
post #146

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your Thai text generator example seems like a reformulation of the "Chinese Room" thought experiment, except you're running the system using a single human brain instead of many. I'm not sure that makes a difference. The human running the system doesn't understand Thai, but perhaps that system itself does.

I agree that the system of OpenAI, ChatGPT, and a user entering text on their website taken together may contain knowledge of "what a bag is, what a person is, what popcorn and chocolate are", etc. I do not agree that the LLM on its own "knows" what any of those things are.

Seems like that's a consequence of the philosophical semantics of the word "know", not really a statement about the demonstrable capabilities of the LLM. In other words, why does it matter?

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#189
post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

By "pointing" I don't mean pointing your finger, the universal version of "pointing" involves your eyes, shoulders and the rest of your body. (Think of a how a hunting dog points... Plenty of times I've seen cats point out things to other cats not to mention to me.)

Those behaviors could be better described as "looking" and "facing", couldn't they? Pointing means something pretty specific to humans, especially when we're talking about human-animal interactions.

I'd agree with GP here - pointing with a finger is a very specific variant, that's arguably cultural in nature. More fundamentally, pointing is about communicating to the other being they should focus their attention elsewhere, and where that elsewhere is. "Looking"/"facing" and associated body language is a more common form of doing this, and humans too do it and recognize it, even if no fingers are being moved.

Re: Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models

#190
What this shows is flaws in the test, not that ChatGPT3 has a theory of mind.

ChatGPT3 does not even have a theory of physical objects and their relations, nevermind a theory of mind.

This merely shows that an often useful synthesis of phrases statistically likely to occur in a given context and grammar-checked, will fool people some of the time, and a better statistical model will fool more people more of the time.

We can figure out from first principles that it has none of the elements of understanding or reasoning that can produce a theory of mind, any more than the Eliza program did in 1966. So, when it appears to do so, it is demonstrating a flaw in the tests or the assumptions behind the tests. Discouraging that the researchers are so eager to run in the opposite direction; if there is confusion at this level, the general populace has no hope of figuring out what is going on here.

Post reply on HN