OCSP doesn't seem like the right protocol for this. Apple should probably just ship you a list of hashes of revoked certificates once a day, and should do the check locally. (Obviously, the global certificate database is too big to send to every user, but Apple should be able to determine the subset of certificates they trust, and the even smaller subset of those that are revoked or compromised.) To me, it sounds lik…
Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
181–190 of 355 posts
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#182Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you catch malware in the wild you don’t want to wait half a day for the cache to expire. Negative responses are typically cached for short periods of time. Can you imagine if people cached NXDOMAIN for half a day and someone creating a record had to wait 12 hours for it to go live because someone queried it?
> If you catch malware in the wild you don’t want to wait half a day for the cache to expire. But if you have a cached OCSP response for the cert of a malware author, then you've already launched their app, so it's probably too late.
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#183While other posts on this topic are too alarmist, this one is way too Apple apologetic for my taste. * There is no information on how often the validation happens. All this investigation concludes is that it doesn't happen when closing and immediately re-opening an app. Is it every week? Every reboot? Every hour? If it's less, that's essentially the same as doing it on every launch. * There is no justification for se…
> [article] editing your /etc/hosts file. Personally, I wouldn’t suggest doing that as it prevents an important security feature from working. Exactly the apologetic that you are talking about. Everyone has a different security update cadence (e.g. patch Tuesday for Microsoft), but each application launch is not a reasonable one. Given Apple's recent propensity for banning developers who stand against them (whether y…
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#184Earlier quoted context omitted.
Notarization was IMO the first big step towards this. To this day I have not heard anyone, neither devs nor users, wanting this feature. And to devs it has only costed misery and money.
Customers, for the most part, don't even know or care it exists. But customers will find value in it when Apple is able to quickly disable malware if it proves necessary. As for developers... I mean, how much of a big deal is it, really? I looked at the documentation and it didn't seem like a huge hassle. It even looks like it is automatable in your CI/CD processes via `altool` and `stapler`.
I do imagine that some people would go for that bargain, but it strikes me as short-sighted.
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's explained in the article, there's a loop if you want to verify a certificate and you need the certificate to verify the certificate
You can do unauthenticated TLS, which is no worse than plaintext HTTP, and foils passive listeners by providing privacy. You could also trust your existing trusted certs (prior to OCSP update) when doing the OCSP update, which, again, is no worse than plaintext HTTP. Apple knows this. They have cryptography experts. Taken in context with their backdooring of their e2e messenger and collaboration with military intelli…
What would this ‘count’ as?
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#186Earlier quoted context omitted.
Especially where money is involved.
IMO especially when stock holders wanting a monetary return on investment are involved. I give my money to the FSF every month, because they provide value to me, but not because I expect them to surreptitiously extract it from others and give it to me as cash dividends.
I wish we could do away with the whole "public company" thing - just imagine how much better Facebook, Google, and countless other companies (yes, Apple too) would be if they were private, and more accountable to their users.
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#187Earlier quoted context omitted.
> [article] editing your /etc/hosts file. Personally, I wouldn’t suggest doing that as it prevents an important security feature from working. Exactly the apologetic that you are talking about. Everyone has a different security update cadence (e.g. patch Tuesday for Microsoft), but each application launch is not a reasonable one. Given Apple's recent propensity for banning developers who stand against them (whether y…
Apple hasn’t banned any developers who stand against them.
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#188Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think there were aspects of PRISM that required cooperation from providers like Google. Like the NSA would send queries to them and they would return emails or what have you that match those queries. Though of course this “cooperation” is required by law.
If there's a court order, (FISA: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveilla... , or otherwise) companies have to comply. So I don't really see how one can blame a any company for that.
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#189Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If you catch malware in the wild you don’t want to wait half a day for the cache to expire. But if you have a cached OCSP response for the cert of a malware author, then you've already launched their app, so it's probably too late.
Plenty of kinds of malware are harmful each time they are launched, not just once.
Re: Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look
#190While other posts on this topic are too alarmist, this one is way too Apple apologetic for my taste. * There is no information on how often the validation happens. All this investigation concludes is that it doesn't happen when closing and immediately re-opening an app. Is it every week? Every reboot? Every hour? If it's less, that's essentially the same as doing it on every launch. * There is no justification for se…
Call home features can be spoofed by a poisoning type of attack upstream in various forms.
This is not bullet proof and a cop-out with a poor solution for security.
You know who has effective call home features? Vendors that sell to major enterprises. It is a natural progression and a particularly nasty environment to live within.
If they are legitimately trying to protect the brand through force or merely forcefully controlling the app ecosystem... it's an abusive relationship to be in.
The fact this is not configurable without dead lettering the route is all they need to do to show tethering is something they consider as a viable security measure.
I'll pass.