Earlier quoted context omitted.
The question is a bit complex than a simple reading of these files. Mac OS sandboxing allows dynamic extension of the sandbox, which would not be reflected in the profile (I'd bet Safari does more of this than Blink though). Also, as you mentioned, it's relevant to look at what's factored into separate processes, and how those processes are sandboxed. Safari's Network process has been networked since 2013, so I don't…
I don't keep up too much on Safari these days, so congrats on moving the network stack out of the content process. But looking at the current WebProcess seat-belt policy and what gets initialized, it looks like there's still far too much attack surface relative to Chrome. Things like audio/video capture and other permissioned Web APIs appear to be permitted directly inside the sandbox. And the GPU attack surface alon…
You're right that separate GPU process is a huge advantage for Chrome. Kudos on that, and we'll likely have to move in the same direction sooner or later.
Audio/video capture is temporary and not in currently shipping Safari. It was just the simplest path to getting WebRTC up and running. We plan to fix it before we ship. I agree with you that it's risky attack surface.
Also agree with you that we expose more mach services and for lots of them it would be better not to expose them. A tradeoff here is that Chrome (as I understand it) provides most of those facilities via brokers that are often not sandboxed themselves. It used to be many of those things were just done by the application process.
I suspect over time we'll see our respective sandbox models become more similar over time, especially on macOS.