Earlier quoted context omitted.
The question is what "complex" means. Complex for us doesn't mean it's complex for LLM. And vice-versa. So I wouldn't value this approach at all.
I disagree. Much of what makes software complex for us, makes it complex for LLM just as well. E.g: - a very large codebase - a codebase which is not modularized into cohesive parts - niche languages or frameworks - overly 'clever' code
Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
171–180 of 230 posts
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#172Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Taken to an extreme, the end result is a dark forest. Sorry, how does that work?
since the suggestion is that the new security bug finding LLMs will increase protection because it will have access to the full source code then, the dark forest fear would be, if it is possible for an attacker to get all the source the attacker will be in a better position. This seems wrong however, as it ignores the arrow of time. The full source code has been scanned and fixed for things that LLMs can find before…
I don't see the connection.
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#173Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#174> Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we’re building pyramids from bricks) Would it? I’m old school but I’ve never trusted these massive dependency chains. That’s a nit. We’re going to have to write more secure software, not just spend more.
Your wall should be made of a small number bricks you bet your life on.
All the rest goes inside.
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#175There's still the question of access to the codebase. By all accounts, the best LLM cyber scanning approaches are really primitive - it's just a bash script that goes through every single file in the codebase and, for each one and runs a "find the vulns here" prompt. The attacker usually has even less access than this - in the beginning, they have network tools, an undocumented API, and maybe some binaries. You can d…
Primitive? I'd say simple and thorough.
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#176Security was always about having more money/resources. Using more tokens is just another measure for the same.
Some previous post, which I cannot verify myself, stated that mythos is not as powerful as it seems to be as the same bugs could be found using much smaller/simpler models and that the method is the key part.
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#177Earlier quoted context omitted.
It’s a good thing to keep in mind, but LLM + scaffolding is clearly superior. So if you just use vanilla LLMs you will always be behind. I think the important thing is to avoid over-optimizing. Your scaffold, not avoid building one altogether.
It's wild to me that a paragraph or 7 of plain English that amounts to "be good at things" is enough to make a material difference in the LLM's performance.
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#178Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#179There's still the question of access to the codebase. By all accounts, the best LLM cyber scanning approaches are really primitive - it's just a bash script that goes through every single file in the codebase and, for each one and runs a "find the vulns here" prompt. The attacker usually has even less access than this - in the beginning, they have network tools, an undocumented API, and maybe some binaries. You can d…
Worse, "attackers no longer break in, they log in", so the supply chain attacks harvesting credentials have been frightening
Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now
#180Earlier quoted context omitted.
Tokens can also be burnt on decompilation.
Another asymmetric advantage for defenders - attackers need to burn tokens to form incomplete, outdated, and partially wrong pictures of the codebase while the defender gets the whole latest version plus git history plus documentation plus organizational memory plus original authors' cooperation for free.
Ha
>for free.
Haha, it is more complicated in reality