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Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

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171–180 of 569 posts

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#171

LiteLLM maintainer here, this is still an evolving situation, but here's what we know so far: 1. Looks like this originated from the trivvy used in our ci/cd - https://github.com/search?q=repo%3ABerriAI%2Flitellm%20trivy... https://ramimac.me/trivy-teampcp/#phase-09 2. If you're on the proxy docker, you were not impacted. We pin our versions in the requirements.txt 3. The package is in quarantine on pypi - this block…

Is it just in 1.82.8 or are previous versions impacted?

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Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So... I'm working on an open source technology to make a literal virtual machine shippable i.e. freezing everything inside it, isolated due to vm/hypervisor for sandboxing, with support for containers too since it's a real linux vm. The problems you mentioned resonated a lot with me and why I'm building it, any interest in working to solve that together?: https://github.com/smol-machines/smolvm

What would the advantage of this be compared to using something like a Firecracker backend for containerd?

firecracker does not run on macos and has no GPU support

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#174

LiteLLM maintainer here, this is still an evolving situation, but here's what we know so far: 1. Looks like this originated from the trivvy used in our ci/cd - https://github.com/search?q=repo%3ABerriAI%2Flitellm%20trivy... https://ramimac.me/trivy-teampcp/#phase-09 2. If you're on the proxy docker, you were not impacted. We pin our versions in the requirements.txt 3. The package is in quarantine on pypi - this block…

The decision to block all downloads is pretty disruptive, especially for people on pinned known good versions. Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all launched with `uv run`

Are you sure you are pinned to a “known good” version?

No one initially knows how much is compromised

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#175

LiteLLM maintainer here, this is still an evolving situation, but here's what we know so far: 1. Looks like this originated from the trivvy used in our ci/cd - https://github.com/search?q=repo%3ABerriAI%2Flitellm%20trivy... https://ramimac.me/trivy-teampcp/#phase-09 2. If you're on the proxy docker, you were not impacted. We pin our versions in the requirements.txt 3. The package is in quarantine on pypi - this block…

The decision to block all downloads is pretty disruptive, especially for people on pinned known good versions. Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all launched with `uv run`

You should be using build artifacts, not relying on `uv run` to install packages on the fly. Besides the massive security risk, it also means that you're dependent on a bunch of external infrastructure every time you launch. PyPI going down should not bring down your systems.

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#176
post #129

We just can't trust dependencies and dev setups. I wanted to say "anymore" but we never could. Dev containers were never good enough, too clumsy and too little isolation. We need to start working in full sandboxes with defence in depth that have real guardrails and UIs like vm isolation + container primitives and allow lists, egress filters, seccomp, gvisor and more but with much better usability. Its the same requir…

This is the security shortcuts of the past 50 years coming back to bite us. Software has historically been a world where we all just trust each other. I think that’s coming to an end very soon. We need sandboxing for sure, but it’s much bigger than that. Entire security models need to be rethought.

I've been thinking the same thing. And it's somewhat parallel to what happened to meditation vs. drugs. In the old world the dangerous insights required so many years of discipline that you could sort of trust that the person getting the insight would be ok. But then any idiot can get the insight by just eating some shrooms and oops, that's a problem. Mostly self-harm problem in that case. But the dynamic is somewhat similar to what's happening now with LLMs and coding.

Software people could (mostly) trust each other's OSS contributions because we could trust the discipline it took in the first place. Not any more.

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#177

We just can't trust dependencies and dev setups. I wanted to say "anymore" but we never could. Dev containers were never good enough, too clumsy and too little isolation. We need to start working in full sandboxes with defence in depth that have real guardrails and UIs like vm isolation + container primitives and allow lists, egress filters, seccomp, gvisor and more but with much better usability. Its the same requir…

> We just can't trust dependencies and dev setups. In one of my vibe coded personal projects (Python and Rust project) I'm actually getting rid of most dependencies and vibe coding replacements that do just what I need. I think that we'll see far fewer dependencies in future projects. Also, I typically only update dependencies when either an exploit is known in the current version or I need a feature present in a lat…

> In one of my vibe coded personal projects (Python and Rust project) I'm actually getting rid of most dependencies and vibe coding replacements that do just what I need. I think that we'll see far fewer dependencies in future projects.

No free lunch. LLMs are capable of writing exploitable code and you don’t get notifications (in the eg Dependabot sense, though it has its own problems) without audits.

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#178
post #68

This is bad, especially from a downstream dependency perspective. DSPy and CrewAI also import LiteLLM, so you could not be using LiteLLM as a gateway, but still importing it via those libraries for agents, etc.

I'm surprised to see nanobot uses LiteLLM: https://github.com/HKUDS/nanobot LiteLLM wouldn't be my top choice, because it installs a lot of extra stuff. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43646438 But it's quite popular.

I completely removed nanobot after I found that. Luckily, I only used it a few times and inside a docker container. litellm 1.82.6 was the latest version I could find installed, not sure if it was affected.

Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#179
post #28

Thank you for posting this, interesting. I hope that everyone's course of action will be uninstalling this package permanently, and avoiding the installation of packages similar to this. In order to reduce supply chain risk not only does a vendor (even if gratis and OS) need to be evaluated, but the advantage it provides. Exposing yourself to supply chain risk for an HTTP server dependency is natural. But exposing yo…

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Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised

#180
I wonder at what point ecosystems just force a credential rotation. Trivy and now LiteLLM have probably cleaned out a sizable number of credentials, and now it's up to each person and/or team to rotate. TeamPCP is sitting on a treasure trove of credentials and based on this, they're probably carefully mapping out what they can exploit and building payloads for each one.

It would be interesting if Python, NPM, Rubygems, etc all just decided to initiate an ecosystem-wide credential reset. On one hand, it would be highly disruptive. On the other hand, it would probably stop the damage from spreading.

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