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Google Safe Browsing incident

statichost.eu

171–180 of 183 posts

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#171

It's generally good advice, but I don't see that Safe Browsing did anything wrong in this case. First, it sounds like they actually were briefly hosting phishing sites: > All sites on statichost.eu get a SITE-NAME.statichost.eu domain, and during the weekend there was an influx of phishing sites. Second, they should be using the public suffix list ( https://publicsuffix.org/ ) to avoid having their entire domain tagg…

Yes, its generally good advice to keep user content on a separate domain.

That said, there are a number of IT professionals that aren't aware of the PSL as these are largely initiatives that didn't exist prior to 2023 and don't get a lot of advertisement, or even a requirement. They largely just started being used silently by big players which itself presents issues.

There are hundreds if not thousands of whitepapers on industry, and afaik there's only one or two places its mentioned in industry working groups, and those were in blog posts, not whitepapers (at M3AAWG). There's no real documentation of the organization, what its for, and how it should be used in any of the working group whitepapers. Just that it is being used and needs support; not something professional's would pay attention to imo.

> Second, they should be using the public suffix list

This is flawed reasoning as is. Its hard to claim this with a basis when professionals don't know about this, a small subset just arbitrarily started doing this, and seems more like false justification after-the-fact for throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Security is everyone's responsibility, and Google could have narrowly tailored the offending domain name accesses instead of blocking the top-level. They didn't do that, and worse that behavior could even be automated in a way that the process could be extended and there could be a noticing period to the toplevel provider before it started hitting everyone's devices. They also didn't do that apparently.

Regardless, no single entity should be able to dictate what other people perceive or see arbitrarily from their devices (without a choice; opt-in) but that is what they've designed these systems to do.

Enumerating badness doesn't work. Worse, say the domain names get reassigned to another unrelated customer.

Those people are different people, but they are still blocked as happens with small mail servers quite often. Who is responsible when someone who hasn't been engaged with phishing is being arbitrarily punished without due process. Who is to say that google isn't doing this purposefully to retain their monopolies for services they also provide.

Its a perilous torturous path where trust cannot be given because they've violated that trust in the past, and have little credibility with all net incentives towards their own profit at the expense of others. They are even willing to regularly break the law, and have never been held to account for it. (i.e. Google Maps WIFI wiretapping).

Hanlon's razor is a joke intended as a joke, but there are people that use it literally and inappropriately to deceitfully take advantage of others.

Gross negligence coupled with some form of loss is sufficient for general intent which makes the associated actions malicious/malice.

Throwing out the baby with the bath water without telling anyone or without warning, is gross negligence.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> My point is primarily that Google has too much power over the internet. That is probably true, but in this case I think most people would think that they used that power for good. It was inconvenient for you and the legitimate parts of what was hosted on your domain, but it was blocking genuinely phishing content that was also hosted on your domain.

Every website operator employee worth their salary in this area would have told the site's operator this beforehand, and could have avoided this incident. Hell, even ChatGPT could tell you that by now. The word that comes to mind is incompetence on someone's part, but I don't know of the details on particularly who was the incompetent one in this situation. Thankfully, they've learned a lesson about the situation and…

I disagree, as a professional in this field for over a decade.

For this to be a legitimately backed statement, professional's would have needed to know about the PSL. This is largely unmet.

For it to be met, there would need to be documentation in the form of RFC's and whitepapers in industry working groups which would be needed. This didn't happen.

M3AAWG only has two blog post mentions, and that's only after the great layoffs of 2023, and only that its being used by volunteers and needs support. No discussion about organization, what its being used for, process/due process, etc.

It wholly lacks the needed outreach to professionals in order to make such a statement and have it be true.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#173
post #4
post #2

It feels like unless you're one of the big social media companies, accepting user content is slowly becoming a larger and larger risk.

It always was. You're one upload and a complaint to your ISP/Google/AWS/MS away from having your account terminated.

I second this for personal sites. Having run forums and chan sites without a CDN I found that not only is this true, it is 100% automated. The timing in emails to VPS/Registrars matches the times their scripts would crawl my sites and submit illicit content, screenshot it and automatically submit the screenshots to the VPS/server/registrar providers. That was incentive enough for me to take my sites private / semi-private. I would move them to .onion nodes but that's just too slow for me. I have my own theories as to what groups are running these scripts to push people to CDN's but no smoking gun.

Corporations are a little safer. They have mutually binding contracts with multiple internet service providers and dedicated circuits. They have binding contracts with DNS registrars. Having been on the receiving end of abuse@ they notify over phone and email giving plenty of time to figure out what is going on. I've never seen corporate circuits get nuked for such shenanigans.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's fine if you personally didn't know that. But if I'm paying for a service, I expect the provider to understand basic security best practices that have been industry standard for 20+ years. And if they don't, they should be hiring people who do. XKCD 1053 is not a valid excuse for what amounts to negligence in a production service.

Author here. What kind of security negligence are you referring to? What would be a specific attack vector that I left open? Regarding the PSL - and I can't believe I'm writing this again: you cannot get on there before your service is big enough and "the request authentically merits such widespread inclusion"[1]. So it's kind of a chicken and egg situation. Regarding the best practice of hosting user content on a se…

Eric, I think it appropriate to mention, and I'd like to point out the lack of any real documentation (reaching a professional level) related to PSL on the professional working groups touching on these things (i.e. M3AAWG).

There are only two blog posts on M3AAWG in 2023 where it had been used silently (apparently for years), but was calling for support. I would think if it were an industry recognized initiative it would have the appropriate documents/whitepapers published on it in the industry working group tasked with these things. These people are supposed to be engineer's after all. AFAIK this hasn't happened aside from a brief-after-action with requests for support which is highly problematic.

When there is no professional outreach (via working group or trade group), its real hard to say that this isn't just gross negligence on google's part. M3AAWG has hundreds if not thousand's of whitepapers each hundreds of pages. A single blog post or two that mention it insufficiently, won't rationally negate this claim supporting gross negligence.

Why do I mention Gross negligence?, when coupled with loss, it is sufficient in many cases to support a finding of 'malice' without specific intent (i.e. general intent), especially when such an entity has little/no credibility, but is overshadowed by power/authority that is undeserved. Deceitful people that reasonably should know the consequences will go bad, often purposefully structure towards general intent to avoid legal complications and the legal system has evolved. I am not a lawyer, but this paraphrase about gross negligence/general intent/malice did come from a lawyer, its not meant or intended for use as legal advice in paraphrase form, so standard IANAL disclaimer applies. If the that is needed, consult a qualified professional for a specific distinction on this.

The company is more than technically capable of narrowly defining blacklists and providing due process and appropriate noticing requirements.

The situation begs questions of torturous interference, and whether the PSL is being used as an anti-competive mechanistic moat to prevent competitors from entering the market by imposing additional cost arbitrarily on competitors that is assymetric to the costs such companies have with competing services (as oligopoly/monopoly).

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#175
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's hard to get that point because you're conflating two different stories. Folks around here are generally uneasy about tracking in general too, but remove big brother monitoring from Safe Browsing and this story could still be the same: whole domain blacklisted by Google, only due to manual reporting instead. "Oh, but a human reviewer would've known `*.statichost.eu` isn't managed by us"—not in a lot of cases, not…

Sure, and sorry for being so unclear. The point of my post was meant to be a) Google has this enormous cannon, is this "right"? And b) they will use it to kill anything bigger than a mosquito. But you're right, complaining about big tech surveillance didn't help with making that point at all.

> But you're right, complaining about big tech surveillance didn't help with making that point at all.

I disagree. Everyone with a brain is thinking it. Its important to address what your audience may be thinking especially given the other factors in this which I've mentioned in other responses related to gross negligence.

Technical capability exists to narrowly define blacklists, and they chose a gross negligence route (baby with bathwater), without providing notice.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You are right, of course. I'm not sure if those of you who disagree with me think that Safe Browsing did its job (which it did!), that Safe Browsing is a good thing (which it maybe is, but which I slightly disagree with), or that it's ok that Google monitors everything everyone does. The last point is actually the one I'm trying to make.

There should be a concept, sort of an inverse of tragedy of the commons, for the positive feedback loop of many users providing big data to a company that can use that data to benefit many users. From spamblocking that builds heuristics fed by the spam people manually flag in GMail to Safe Browsing using attacks on users' Chrome as a signal to their voice recognition engine leapfrogging the industry standard a few ye…

> There should be a concept....

There is. It is called ponzi, and its illegal, but in most cases its become indirect enough in the consequences without proper guard rails/accountability that its now allowed by most publicly traded business today (through clever deception).

Generally, it involves three phases:

1st: Front-loaded benefits in CapEx funding meeting customer/investor expectations regardless of cost.

2nd: Inflection point of momentum where CapEx falls off, a brief period where income meets costs.

3rd: Enshittification - momentum/acceleration reverses to the negative, failure of services as the system is continually hollowed out and cost exceeds income.

This is seen in the S-growth or S-adoption curves in business starting to become visible towards the late 1970s and progressively increasing exponentially thereafter in time.

Most companies jettison (sell/off or merge) or close down services before they hit the 3rd stage where the service objectively can be seen as unprofitable by associated investors. The ones that don't are state-funded apparatus.

This concept drives almost everything we see today in modern society and in the market there are parallels and indirect consequences fully described back in the 1950's by Mises with regards to money-printing regardless of its form (i.e. debt that is not reserve backed (Basel3), synthetic shares, paper warrants (Comex), Bonds (with reporting loophole hold to maturity), flier miles, credit card rewards, etc).

The structure and its flaws remain foundationally intractable. This is how you profit and grow bigger off destroying the market. Eventually consolidation leaves state apparatus in place of a market.

No market can compete with slave labor, which is what state-funded apparatus use indirectly through money-printing/currency debasement. Its not considered a tax, and its not given willingly. Its extracted labor.

Those that have lived through these times see the drastic reduction of options in available products that have naturally sieved to the point where shortages are now regularly occuring (for those with a discerning eye). There are a lot of moving factors, but the structure and their inevitable trends are well known structures, at least in certain circles.

In seriousness, the totality of Socio-economic collapse is more probable than a lot of other potential futures, as a result of this. Collapse has happened many times throughout history in relation to money-printing.

Always before, we were not in ecological overshoot for our population, let alone being in this state for 2 full generations. Catton/Malthus paint a grim picture of the outcomes but no one of action pays attention to these things. Its all largely drowned out by the noise of bots.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Every website operator employee worth their salary in this area would have told the site's operator this beforehand, and could have avoided this incident. Hell, even ChatGPT could tell you that by now. The word that comes to mind is incompetence on someone's part, but I don't know of the details on particularly who was the incompetent one in this situation. Thankfully, they've learned a lesson about the situation and…

I disagree, as a professional in this field for over a decade. For this to be a legitimately backed statement, professional's would have needed to know about the PSL. This is largely unmet. For it to be met, there would need to be documentation in the form of RFC's and whitepapers in industry working groups which would be needed. This didn't happen. M3AAWG only has two blog post mentions, and that's only after the gr…

I mean, it's a very big field, and it's easy enough for me to armchair quarterback and call it a skill issue without being vulnerable and putting my own credentials into question. There's a whole big world of things to know about making and running websites, and I'll readily admit I don't know everything. I don't do a lot of CSS or website SEO or run ad campaigns, so someone experienced there will run circles around me.

Putting user generated content on its own domain is more on the security side of things to know about running a website, and our industry doesn't regulate who's allowed to build websites. Everyone's got their own set of different best practices.

Regardless of the exact date that GitHub moved which kinds of user generated content (UGC) over to which domain/domains, I do expect a curious webdev in 2025 to have used GitHub and to have wondered enough about it to ask what's up with stuff coming from eg raw.githubusercontent.com at some point in their web browsing career to ask Google about it. They should have walked away with the idea that they're putting UGC on a separate domain intentionally for security stuff, even if they never hear mention of the PSL or how exactly it works and is implemented. The /r/webdev post you'll find links to a GitHub blog post that gives a lot of detail as to why they did that, and that doesn't mention the PSL once.

It's fair to point out the PSL isn't common knowledge. I would agree that it isn't. I don't think it's necessary, however. All it takes is being a user of GitHub and a modicum of curiosity. I expect anyone that call themselves a webdev in 2025 to be able to explain to me what git and GitHub is and why they're different. They don't need to know where git came from but I don't think I'm being unreasonable in asking that much. From there, I expect someone to be able to make up an answer as to why there's raw.githubusercontent.com during an interview and mumble something about security, even if they can't give specific details about cookies and phishing and how that all works.

It's possible I'm being unreasonable here but I don't think I am. This isn't knowledge that takes attending W3C meetings about web browser standards to have come across. Regardless of if I am or not though, everyone who's come across this thread should now know that UGC goes in its own domain, even if they can't give details as to why.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a direct consequence of centralization of services. We're doing this to ourselves.

You say "we" like it is the population of internet users. They have no choice in this other than to use whatever sites are available. It is the megaEvilCorps that are doing it to us. They start with a novel idea that is rewarded by lots of users. They then decide to weaponize their site against us to become money printing machines. They then use that money to buy up any competition which artificially limits the end u…

It seems like you wanted to ask a question but avoided using question marks so there isn't much I can do here.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#179

It's generally good advice, but I don't see that Safe Browsing did anything wrong in this case. First, it sounds like they actually were briefly hosting phishing sites: > All sites on statichost.eu get a SITE-NAME.statichost.eu domain, and during the weekend there was an influx of phishing sites. Second, they should be using the public suffix list ( https://publicsuffix.org/ ) to avoid having their entire domain tagg…

Yes, its generally good advice to keep user content on a separate domain. That said, there are a number of IT professionals that aren't aware of the PSL as these are largely initiatives that didn't exist prior to 2023 and don't get a lot of advertisement, or even a requirement. They largely just started being used silently by big players which itself presents issues. There are hundreds if not thousands of whitepapers…

I'm not sure what to tell you. I'm a professional with nearly two decades of experience in this industry, and I don't read any white papers. I read web publications like Smashing Magazine or CSS Tricks, and more specifically authors like Paul Irish, Jake Archibald, Josh Comeau, and Roman Komarov. Developers who talk about the latest features and standards, and best practices to adopt.

The view that professionals in this industry exclusively participate in academic circles runs counter to my experience. Unless you're following the latest AI buzz, most people are not spending their time on arXiv.

The PSL is surely an imperfect solution, but it's solving a problem for the moment. Ideally a more permanent DNS-based solution would be implemented to replace it. Though some system akin to SSL certificates would be necessary to provide an element of third-party trust, as bad actors could otherwise abuse it to segment malicious activity on their own domains.

If you're opposed to Safe Browsing as a whole, both Chromium and Firefox allow you to disable that feature. However, making it an opt-in would essentially turn off an important security feature for billions of users. This would result in a far greater influx of phishing attacks and the spread of malware. I can understand being opposed to such a filter from an idealistic perspective, but practically speaking, it would do far more harm than good.

Re: Google Safe Browsing incident

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree, as a professional in this field for over a decade. For this to be a legitimately backed statement, professional's would have needed to know about the PSL. This is largely unmet. For it to be met, there would need to be documentation in the form of RFC's and whitepapers in industry working groups which would be needed. This didn't happen. M3AAWG only has two blog post mentions, and that's only after the gr…

I mean, it's a very big field, and it's easy enough for me to armchair quarterback and call it a skill issue without being vulnerable and putting my own credentials into question. There's a whole big world of things to know about making and running websites, and I'll readily admit I don't know everything. I don't do a lot of CSS or website SEO or run ad campaigns, so someone experienced there will run circles around…

I agree this isn't knowledge that takes a lot. The problem is these companies don't explain why they do what they do, in fact a lot of security stuff along these lines in the past has been tight-lipped secrecy bound stuff. You can wonder, but the answer isn't out there unless you know an insider willing to break a broadly worded NDA (not gonna happen, and some are quite broad).

The idea to segment certain types of traffic to different domains isn't that new. For example segmenting certain mail servers by marketing or transactional types into subdomains was done as far back as 2010, but it wasn't explained in whitepapers until around 2016 or 2017, where there was already gathered irrefutable evidence that reputational systems had been put in place and the rules for those damaged people running small email servers who were being illegitimately blocked from delivery; for years with no recourse or disclosure just imposed cost.

Once they published the whitepapers on that, professionals were on board because they specified what they were looking for, and how it should function. Basic Engineering stuff that people who manage and build these systems need to know to interoperate.

These things need professional outreach that standardizes it in some form or another, that's not a one-off blog post imo, and that must fully specify function, requirement, feedback mechanisms, and expectations of how its supposed to work; basic engineering stuff.

The PSL is just the same thing all over again. Big Tech just starts doing something silently that directly imposes cost on others, they don't say what they are doing. Then when it becomes too costly they try to offload it to others calling for support, though if they only do halfsies in a blog post buried in noise, they are only looking for plausible deniability.

The benefit in doing this is in anti-competitive behavior.

Incidentally, while separating subdomains for email servers has been standard practice for awhile now, recently these companies once again changed the reputational weights for things, and they aren't talking. Now its a whole domain as a single reputational namespace not just breakage at the subdomain (bb.aa.com.). No outreach on that as far as I've seen.

There are ways to do things correctly, and then there are ways to do things anti-competitively and coercively. The incentives matched to the outcomes point to which one that happens to be.

How you do something is more important than that you did something in these cases.

If you as a company don't do professional outreach about such changes or standards, and you arbitrarily choose to require something that isn't properly disclosed punishing everyone that hasn't received disclosure; that in my mind is a fair and reasonable case for either gross negligence (for general intent to prove malice) or tortuous interference with third-party companies businesses.

That question which you mentioned about asking in an interview (iirc) was actually asked in an Ignite interview, but was cut out from the recordings later, and the answer was we can't talk about what other departments are doing. They may have followed-up on that elsewhere but I never saw anything related to it.

It is critically important to know the reasons why things are structured a certain way or happen; in order to be able to interoperate. This is and has been known and repeated many times since the adoption of OSI & TCP in the 80s/90s with regards to interoperability of systems.

Blindly copying what others do is a recipe for disaster and isn't justifiable in terms of cost, and competent professional's don't roll the dice like that on large projects of that caliber of expense.

This stuff isn't straight forward either. Like knowing where the reputational namespace stops, what the ramp-up time (dm/dt) is for volume metrics to warm up a server at each provider, and objective indicators associated with when you go above that arbitrarily designed rate. (hint: non-deterministic hidden states) If it takes a month to perfectly warm a new server up without reputational consequences by an insider that knows, that's extra cost imposed on the company by that platform (whom you are competing against for email services).

No disclosure means starting over every time trying to guess at what they are doing, and having breakage later when they change things.

> reddit...

A lot of professionals no longer use reddit anymore because its a bot filled echo chamber that wastes valuable time.

Moderators there often remove posts regularly for simple disagreement, conflicts of interest, or to remove access to detailed solutions or methodology.

For an example of all that's wrong there, look to that CodingBootCamp reddit. There's a guy that's a moderator there that's been, in all probability, using a bot to destroy a competitors reputation and harass them for years, attacking the owners, execs, and going so far as to harass and stalk their children; while violating the Moderator Code of Contact. Crazy and toxic stuff. ---

You can't ever meet professional standards if you don't communicate or properly disclose interop requirements when complex systems are involved.

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