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SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

chrislockard.net

171–180 of 305 posts

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What would it look like for the CA/B to "not survive that change"? I suspect when companies who are members actually realize what happened, CA/B members will be told to reverse the 47 day lifetime or be fired and replaced by people who will. This is a group of people incredibly detached from reality, but that reality is going to come crashing through to their employers as 2029 approaches. > Good. You may assume tha…

Who exactly in the CA/B member companies is going to demand that the 47-day lifetime be reversed, and why are they going to do that? If an org is tech-forward enough to have bothered setting up HTTPS for internal use cases on their own initiative, just because it was good for security, then they're not going to have major problems adapting to the 47-day lifetime. The orgs that will struggle to deal with this are the…

I think when Sundar and Satya start hearing about how their customers are losing billions of dollars because of some random people at their company called "certificate trust program leads" or whatever, there is going to be a lot of questions how those decisions got made and how to get them un-made.

Most of the other forum members either won't oppose longer lifetimes (every cert vendor would be happy) or will bow to the only two companies that matter.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"If it's not a public service, why should it have a certificate from a public CA?" Probably because making sure that clients trust the right set of non-public CAs is currently too much of a pain in the ass. Possibly an underrated investment in the security of the internet would be inventing better solutions to make this process easier, the way Certbot made certificate renewal easier (though it'd be a harder problem a…

> Probably because making sure that clients trust the right set of non-public CAs is currently too much of a pain in the ass. Possibly an underrated investment in the security of the internet would be inventing better solutions to make this process easier. I don't see a reason why that should be a problem to solve for public CAs and rest of the internet? Complaining about multi-perspective validation or lifetime is s…

Because right now, the CA/B Forum believes that they cannot just completely blow off the concerns of orgs that are having problems adapting to the new requirements because they have legacy tech investments that use the Web PKI for purposes it's not a good fit for. This causes them to move more slowly than the less conservative stakeholders would like. If those concerns were lessened, then the CA/B Forum would feel freer to move faster.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#173

Since the advent of LetsEncrypt, ACME, and Caddy I haven't thought about SSL/TLS for more than about an hour per year, and that's only because I forget the steps required to setup auto-renewal. I pay nothing, I spend a tiny amount of time dealing with it, and it works brilliantly. I'm not sure why many people are still dealing with legacy manual certificate renewal. Maybe some regulatory requirements? I even have a w…

As someone on the other side of the fence who lives primarily in IT land, this is far from a solved problem. Not every device supports SSH for copying certs across the network, some devices have arbitrary requirements for the certs themselves (like timelines, lack of SANs, specific cryptography requirements, etc), and signing things internally (so that they’re only valid within the intranet, not on the internet) does…

I feel like a lot of these requirements need to be really solved from first principles. What do you need these certificates for -- specifically, TLS certificates?

If the biggest issue is "we want to encrypt traffic" then the answer really should be something more automated. To put it another way, TLS certificates used to convey a lot of things. We had basic certs that said "you are communicating with the rightful owner of domain example.com" and we had EV certs that said "you are communicating with the rightful legal entity Example Org, who happens to own example.com" and so-on and so-forth.

But the thing is, we've killed off a lot of these certificate types. We don't have EV certs anymore. Let's Encrypt effectively democratized it to the point where you don't need to do any manual work for a normal "we want to encrypt data" certificate. I just don't understand what your specific requirements are, if they aren't directly "encrypt this traffic" focused, where you actually need valid certificates that work across the internet.

Put differently, if you're running an internal CA, you can push out your own certificates via MDM tools and then not worry about this. If you aren't running your own CA but you're implementing all of this pomp and circumstances, what are you trying to solve? Do you really need all of this ceremony for all of your devices and applications?

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#174
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…

There was an attempt doing it differently by CRL but it turns out certificate revoking is not feasible in practice on web scale. Now they are doing next plausible solution. Seems like 47 days is something they found out by let’s encrypt experience estimating load by current renewals but that last part I am just imagining.

CRL distribution at web scale is now possible thanks to work by John Schanck at Mozilla https://hacks.mozilla.org/2025/08/crlite-fast-private-and-co...

But CRL sizes are also partly controlled by expiry time, shorter lifetimes produce smaller CRLs.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#175

Looking at the changes going on in computing regarding the need for constantly updating certificates for a website, verified identity to develop mobile apps etc. it's clear there is a background push for control of everything such that when things are considered problems they can promptly be cut off from everything all at once.

Are 389-day certificates really that much less concerning from a censorship perspective than 47-day ones? Also, DNS is already much more censorable than the Web PKI, so I don't see how increasing reliance on the latter makes things worse.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

On the vulnerability ladder since SSL was introduced, how common and how disastrous have stolen or fraudulent certs really compared to other security problems, and by how much will these changes reduce such disasters?

Is this some sort of troll comment? I'm sure that you are perfectly able to do your own research, why are you trying to push that work onto some stranger on the internet?

Is this a troll article? The article asked basically the same question:

    I also wonder how many organizations have had certificates mis-issued due to BGP hijacking. Yes, this will improve the warm fuzzy security feeling we all want at night, but how much actual risk is this requirement mitigating?
Scope creep with diminishing returns happens everywhere.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#178

Since the advent of LetsEncrypt, ACME, and Caddy I haven't thought about SSL/TLS for more than about an hour per year, and that's only because I forget the steps required to setup auto-renewal. I pay nothing, I spend a tiny amount of time dealing with it, and it works brilliantly. I'm not sure why many people are still dealing with legacy manual certificate renewal. Maybe some regulatory requirements? I even have a w…

> Since the advent of LetsEncrypt, ACME, and Caddy I haven't thought about SSL/TLS for more than about an hour per year

I run a couple of low-stakes websites just for fun and manually updating certificates takes me about 10 minutes a year, and most of that is remembering how to generate the csr. Setting up an automated process gains me nothing except additional points of failure. Ratcheting the expiration down to 47 days is an effort to force everyone to use automation, which makes no sense for small hobby sites.

> I'm not sure why many people are still dealing with legacy manual certificate renewal

Not everyone is a professional sysadmin. Adding automation is another layer of complexity on top of what it already takes to run a website. It's fine for large orgs and professionals who do this for a living at their day jobs, but for someone just getting their feet wet it's a ridiculous ask.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#179
post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nothing stops you from using a self-signed certificate with a ridiculous expiration period for HTTPS between the reverse proxy and the device in question.

Except browsers and other software that are becoming hard-coded to block access to such devices. We used to use Firefox solely for internal problem devices with IP and subnet exclusions but even that is becoming difficult.

Use the self-signed cert between the proxy and the problem device; everything else talks to the proxy.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Who exactly in the CA/B member companies is going to demand that the 47-day lifetime be reversed, and why are they going to do that? If an org is tech-forward enough to have bothered setting up HTTPS for internal use cases on their own initiative, just because it was good for security, then they're not going to have major problems adapting to the 47-day lifetime. The orgs that will struggle to deal with this are the…

I think when Sundar and Satya start hearing about how their customers are losing billions of dollars because of some random people at their company called "certificate trust program leads" or whatever, there is going to be a lot of questions how those decisions got made and how to get them un-made. Most of the other forum members either won't oppose longer lifetimes (every cert vendor would be happy) or will bow to t…

Nothing even remotely similar to that happened on previous tightenings. Going from not a peep to enough outrage to overturn a decision this thoroughly debated all at once seems really unlikely. Also, what are the aggrieved enterprises going to do, threaten to move from GCP to AWS if Chrome doesn't do what they want? That's an empty threat and everyone knows it.
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