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New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

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Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#171
post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you weren't aware, containers aren't a security boundary. Things like bubblewrap are.

Semantics make hard assertions about "containers" worthless. It depends on what one means by a container exactly, since Linux has no such concept and our ecosystem doesn't have a strict definition.

[deleted]

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Wouldn't Android's kernel have most of the hardening steps / disabled features described in GP's comment?

No. Things like eBPF, strace, and packet filtering are enabled. Android uses SELinux and other facilities to limit the amount of code the kernel will allow to access these features. Big difference from their being compiled out of the kernel entirely as the OP suggests is necessary.

Worse, cannot disable eBPF due to too many packages demanding it.

Namely, nft tables and its filtering.

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#173
post #160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whenever a complex system is rewritten, there are a lot of bugs and regressions in it.

All the rewriters are offended by the truth.

Yup, hence why the downvotes. :( I thought it was a no-brainer, but I guess not.

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#174
post #147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

OpenDoas is used by default by Alpine linux for example.

I remember last time I installed it, there was neither sudo nor doas preinstalled.

sudo was officially depreciated in 3.15 and moved to community in the next release https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/tsc/-/issues/1

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#175

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It's permissively licensed, unfortunately. Well damn that's a shame. I just hate it when people let others use their work in a way they choose, that happens to be less restrictive than my own personal choices. /s of course.

Worked out for Linux, which remains a largely open, collaborative ecosystem. Meanwhile all the BSDs are good for are as less-good Linuxes that can be shoved into proprietary products. Google is choking out AOSP, which they can do because of Android's "less restrictive" license. Copyleft licenses are demonstrably better for open source projects in the long run. We've had enough time to prove that out now.

I'm not even going to point out the hundreds of counter examples to your argument.

You clearly didn't understand my point: I'm not arguing about whether GPL is better than MIT or BSD or even SSPL/etc.

My point is that if someone else chooses to release their software with less restrictions on it than I would choose, that's literally none of my business.

They wrote the fucking thing, they get to choose how it's fucking licensed.

Plenty of organisations (and thus people) skip using GPL licensed software due to inability or unwillingness to be bound by it's terms.

I'm still waiting for the day the GPL camp says they're not going to use things like OpenSSH, Apache, Nginx, Postgres, Python, Ruby - because they're too fucking permissive.

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's certainly an interesting standpoint. I use both privately and professionally and while I accept that security-wise (even with selinux) they feel lacking , feature-wise they far exceed Windows I use as my other is except in gaming experience. I wish I had something like GrapheneOS on desktops (yes I know about Qubes)

There is https://grsecurity.net/ but it's not free. It's developed by people with much more experience defending against attackers than all of the other projects combined.

Looks like grsecurity has a different view of ethics than I do.

Just searching grsecurity on HN turns up some interesting stuff.

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#177

Awww. I was just about to gloat about Slackware avoiding another round of security holes due to its long avoidance of PAM, but it got introduced in 2020. :-( It looks like some software projects are now entirely reliant upon PAM for authentication and don't support shadow passwords anymore. What a travesty. It's sort of like what happened with Systemd, where so many apps now entirely depend on Systemd, you can't run…

[dead]

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yet people use container based isolation all the time in practice and the sky doesn't fall. Also, every security domain in an Android systems shares a kernel, yet Android is one of the most secure systems out there. Sure, it uses tons of SELinux, but so what? It still has a shared kernel, and a quite featureful one at that. I don't buy the idea that we can't do intra-kernel security isolation and so we shouldn't care…

Ironically Ubuntu 24 now blocks users from accessing namespaces because that kernel interface had a bunch of local privilege escalations, breaking programs that want to use them for isolation.

For the last 10 years or so, namespaces in Linux were the source of the absolute hightest number of local privilege escalations and sometimes even arbitrary code executions in kernel space. Building a kernel without user namespace support has been goto-advice for multiuser systems for almost as long. Ubuntu is just late to the game because they mostly have server or single-user-desktop customers.

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#179

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> A big part of the difference is that the BSDs are designed by a governing committee While I cannot agree nor disagree on the quality of BSDs (haven't used one in 20 years), I find it funny that in this case a design by committee is proof of quality. I guess it's better than design by headless chicken which is how the Linux user-space is developed. Personally, I am a big fan of design by dictatorship, where one guy…

> While I cannot agree nor disagree on the quality of BSDs (haven't used one in 20 years), I find it funny that in this case a design by committee is proof of quality. I don't think "design" is correct word: organized, managed, or ran perhaps. > The FreeBSD Project is run by FreeBSD committers, or developers who have direct commit access to the master Git repository.[1] The FreeBSD Core Team exists to provide directi…

Similar to Debian's governing structure.

Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yet people use container based isolation all the time in practice and the sky doesn't fall. Also, every security domain in an Android systems shares a kernel, yet Android is one of the most secure systems out there. Sure, it uses tons of SELinux, but so what? It still has a shared kernel, and a quite featureful one at that. I don't buy the idea that we can't do intra-kernel security isolation and so we shouldn't care…

If you weren't aware, containers aren't a security boundary. Things like bubblewrap are.

What to you think bubblewrap is, if not a container runtime?
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