Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem with internal CAs is also that it's really hard to add them on some OSes now. Especially on android since version 7 IIRC, you can no longer get certs into the system store, and every app is free to ignore the user store (I think it was even the default to ignore it). So a lot of apps will not work with it.
> The problem with internal CAs is also that it's really hard to add them on some OSes now. Especially on android since version 7 IIRC That's because the purpose of certificate pinning is to protect software from the user. Letting you supply your own certificates would defeat the purpose of having them.
.INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
171–180 of 290 posts
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#172I'm still peeved they let google take over .dev when they knew tons of us used that in the older days for dev environments.
to be fair, ".dev" is not a full word, unlike INTERNAL or EXAMPLE. You're free to petition them to reserve .DEVELOPMENT, though, of course.
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#173Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can't you have a limited wildcard? Something like *.for-testing-only.company.com?
Yes, but then you are putting more information into the publically logged certificate. So it is a tradeoff between scope of certificate and data leak. I guess you can use a pattern like {human name}.{random}.internal but then you lose memoribility.
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#174Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's some every packet shall be encrypted, even in minimal private VPCs lore going on. I'm blaming PCI-DSS.
Blame leaked documents from the intelligence services. No one really bothered until it was revealed that organisations like the NSA were exfiltrating unencrypted internal traffic from companies like Google with programs like PRISM.
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#175Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can't you have a limited wildcard? Something like *.for-testing-only.company.com?
Yes, but then you are putting more information into the publically logged certificate. So it is a tradeoff between scope of certificate and data leak. I guess you can use a pattern like {human name}.{random}.internal but then you lose memoribility.
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#176Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#177Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Are there any good reasons to use a TLD like .internal for private-use applications, rather than just a regular gTLD like .com? That assumes you are able to pay to rent a domain name, and keep paying for it, and that you are reasonably sure that the company you're renting it from is not going to take it away from you because of a selectively-enforced TOS, and that you are reasonably sure that both yourself and your…
If you control the DNS resolution in your company and use an internal certificate authority, technically you don't have to rent a domain name. You can control how it resolves and "hijack" whatever domain name you want. It won't be valid outside your organization/network, but if you're using it only for internal purposes then that doesn't matter. Of course, this is a bad idea, but it does allow you to avoid the "rent"…
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#178Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The problem with internal CAs is also that it's really hard to add them on some OSes now. Especially on android since version 7 IIRC That's because the purpose of certificate pinning is to protect software from the user. Letting you supply your own certificates would defeat the purpose of having them.
Protect the software from the user? Why are you giving them the software then?
Software that isn't like that is in a minority, and most of it is only used to build software that is like that.
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#179Can we get .local or .l added for private-use applications too?
Re: .INTERNAL is now reserved for private-use applications
#180Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hoping datacenter to datacenter links are secure is how the NSA popped Google. Turn on crypto, don’t be lazy
Pretty sure state-level actors sniffing datacenter traffic is literally the very last of your security issues. This kind of theater actively harms your organization's security, not helps it. Do people not do risk analysis anymore?
Seriously, your statement is demonstrably wrong. That's exactly the sort of traffic the NSA actively seeks to exploit.