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Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

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Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#171
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My comment assumes that the IT department (including its executive) gets to make these sort decisions - why wouldn't they?

In many mature orgs, corporate IT rolls up to the CIO and security will roll up to the CISO The CISO and security ops will demand to be completely independent from corp IT, for legit reasons, as the security team needs to treat IT as potential insider threat actors with elevated privileges. They will also demand the ability to push out updates everywhere at any time in response to real-time threats, and per the previ…

Security should not, in general, have anything but awooga-awooga red lights and sirens break-glass write/change/delete/shutdown access to prod infrastructure or systems, or indeed anything that could compromise them. I’d argue that access to read or copy sensitive data is almost, but not quite as dangerous without extensive controls and internal monitoring too…

IMO there are no legit reasons except politics, empire building, NIH and toxic relationships for such a such a crazy state of affairs.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#172

Was anyone else surprised how little disruption they personally experienced? I had braced for impact that weekend. But all my flights were perfectly on time, all my banking worked, providers worked, and sites & resources were available. I don’t know if I somehow just have little exposure to Windows in my life or if there’s an untold resiliency story for the global internet in the face of such a massive outage. All I…

I was flying back to the US from Mexico on United the day after the meltdown. Reading the news, I was obviously quite concerned about how it was going to go (I was traveling with my 10 and 6 year old kids). Amazingly, everything went off without a hitch; not even the slightest delay.

I asked the guy at the luggage counter, and he said the day before was pretty crazy, but they had everything straightened out by the next day.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In many mature orgs, corporate IT rolls up to the CIO and security will roll up to the CISO The CISO and security ops will demand to be completely independent from corp IT, for legit reasons, as the security team needs to treat IT as potential insider threat actors with elevated privileges. They will also demand the ability to push out updates everywhere at any time in response to real-time threats, and per the previ…

> The CISO and security ops will demand to be completely independent from corp IT, for legit reasons, as the security team needs to treat IT as potential insider threat actors with elevated privileges. I always wondered: why should security ops not be a potential insider thread actor? In fact, if they were compromised, it would be even worse. Do we need two different security ops that monitor each other? :)

In most clustered systems, you need at least 3 observers, so that its a clear majority of systems can decide that the observer is not working as expected.

So I guess 5 security OPS teams in different regions of the world, and they can all call a vote if one of the teams is now 'bad' :)

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#174
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think they said it was a windows driver, not a normal application. Running crap in kernel mode does not end well on any OS.

Yes it is a driver which is signed and tested by Microsoft. Driver allows to run arbitrary unsigned code. Why is that allowed?

The Crowdstrike failure was not caused by running unsigned code.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#175
post #33

The takeaway from this article seems to be: buy crowdstrike shares, because major corps are unable to make any changes, and will continue to pay licensing fees for this "service" for the foreseeable future.

This is going to crush their sales pipeline and lead to at least a few attempting a migration off. Crowdstrike is unlikely to go out of business, but this is not a good time to buy.

Just depends how far the stock falls and at what point it's undervalued.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#176

While reading this I was struck with an interesting question: What risk does any particular software vendor pose to an industry at large? For example (making up numbers here): if 75% of all airline computers have croudstrike falcon installed that seems like a very concentrated risk. I actually wouldn't be surprised if we had this we would see really high concentrations of a small number of vendors in any industry.

The EU DORA regulation (Digital Operational Resilience Act for Financial Entities) has explicit provisions to avoid concentration risks. I heard a story that a bank was forced to use Google Cloud, because two other banks were already on AWS and Azure.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#177
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

More like: "...you want Microsoft to forbid you from running certain kinds of programs (with gaping security holes / processes) on your own machine" YES

> (with gaping security holes / processes) The problem is that you're assuming you can prove a program doesn't having security holes and bad processes.

You're moving the goal post waaaay far down. How about just following best practices? How about not allowing runtime code injection? Turns out security holes often have much in common, and with ways to mitigate them. Stop 100% of security holes? nah. Stop 99.9% of security holes? Yes and what an improvement.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#178
post #14

> For historical reasons, that area where almost everything executes is called “userspace.” It's an old term at this point, but I don't think the reasons for it being called "userspace" have changed or become outdated since then, so I wouldn't call them historic per se.

Why is it called "userspace" when all it runs is some Docker containers hosting a web frontend's server, and no human being ever telnets into it? Where's the "user" in that story? Where is the "user" when the machine is a Windows box stuffed behind a façade wall that displays airport directions, notifications, and ads on rotate?

I always understood "user" in "userspace" as "the user of the operating system kernel".

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#179
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a valid opinion and I don't know why you were downvoted (well other than the hacker news bubble mindset (or mindless-set). How is Microsoft not to blame, it's their product? We wouldn't blame a Toyota supplier for a failure in a car, but we somehow segment that in the software world?

> How is Microsoft not to blame, it's their product? Do you think Crowdstrike is a Microsoft product?

No. My point is that Microsoft allows the damn thing to be ran in kernel space. Mac, linux don't have this problem due to how THEY architected the system. Yes I think that puts Microsoft at blame.

Re: Why the CrowdStrike bug hit banks hard

#180
post #46

We blame car manufacturers for defects from suppliers, but we don't blame platform manufacturers (Microsoft) for holes in their architecture?

If I add a NOS kit to my car and it blows up my engine, is that Honda's fault?

Doesn't Honda say "don't do this or it's your fucking problem"
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