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Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

hudsonrock.com

171–180 of 235 posts

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#171
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Absolutely the case for me. I don't give Snowflake much here, but Hudson Rock sells this exact type of "protection" and so far including BBC, no other independent verification? This from the GP's link does it: “should have bought protection from Hudson Rock could have saved them this one”

We should thread carefully on this one. It might be that they genuinely geeked out. Hudson reputation would forever be scarred (badly) if they tried to manipulate the narrative. Going down this hole also means we discredit the perpetrator, even if he did specifically reach out to Hudson. Just wanted to say this so we don’t immediately jump to conclusions.

It's the first time I heard from Hudson and they didn't start out great reputation wise for me

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#173

I don't work for Snowflake but I spend a lot of time working with them and their SE organisation. When working and building demos with clients, SEs create demonstration environments on the same $400 Snowflake demo accounts anyone can. To build demos the client would grant access to that SE. The SE would take some of the data to the demo environment and then work on it. This is further confirmed by the name of the env…

[flagged]

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#174
post #165
post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where are the blocked ip’s from? Also rapeflake? Hesitant to google that

Snowflake published these rules earlier today - https://community.snowflake.com/s/article/Communication-ID-0...

Ahh thanks!

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#175

I don't work for Snowflake but I spend a lot of time working with them and their SE organisation. When working and building demos with clients, SEs create demonstration environments on the same $400 Snowflake demo accounts anyone can. To build demos the client would grant access to that SE. The SE would take some of the data to the demo environment and then work on it. This is further confirmed by the name of the env…

Just because there isn’t a “novel exploit” doesn’t mean this isn’t a big deal. Snowflake is susceptible to their SE’s having credentials stolen. These credentials can bypass MFA. And per the article, they have no expiry. That’s strikes one, two, and three. Snowflake’s security practices lead to a situation where their customers are either required, or at minimum encouraged, to share access to broad datasets with Snow…

Having spent a lot of time in the Snowflake ecosystem, a few things to understand.

Snowflake is both a platform and a database. Customers can implement any level of security within the system. For example, when Snowflake introduced OAuth functionality, they put a lot of pressure for us to implement it in our tool. We're small enough and they are a significant partner so we priortised and got it into our platform so that a customer CAN implement it if they want too.

The keyword here is CAN. As a platform with database functionality, Snowflake allows customers to implement any level of security for access. So each instance of Snowflake https://XX123456.us-east-1.snowflakecomputing.com/ security is independent. So let's answer some questions

* "Was this a production breach", No, this was not a production breach. This is not when hackers went into the Azure and were able to elevate credentials and see all accounts.

* "But doesn't Snowflake use MFA", yes and on INTERNAL systems and the ability to connect to the PROD environment of SF it would absolutely have that. However, every customer has the ability to configure a user's credentials for access in their instance https://XX123456.us-east-1.snowflakecomputing.com/. Likely, the SE was granted access to the client's instance through the use of a user name and password.

* "But why not use MFA then Snowflake", this comes back to Okta. You have to create a trust relationship between providers. That's easy when you are only talking about your own employees. They all sit in your same directory. However, to set up a separate trust relationship for another domain, well now we have to get the security team of the client involved. All this so that someone can take a little bit of data and move it into another environment in order to do a demonstration. Not likely.

* "Well that just sounds stupid, my application has SSO enabled." True, but as also a database - Snowflake has to account for entire ecosystem that don't even support SSO-OAuth. For example, two major products that do not support SSO connections to Snowflake: Azure Machine Learning and Zapier. Both only support user name / password connections to Snowflake. So if you were an SE trying to show the value of Snowflake and its integration with AzureML; the ONLY way you could do that would be through user name / password functionality.

The issue in all of this is we are so used to thinking of SaaS as just an application. Databases have to support all sorts of application weirdness. Here is my gut thought on how this went down.

* The SE was working with multiple clients. These clients in an effort to save time and not wanting to have their security team involved and try and create a trust relationship with Snowflake went ahead and created a user name and password for the SE into the client environment vs setting up SSO. Again, this is ONLY controlled by the client.

* The SE at some point had active access to multiple instances of Snowflake to their various clients; with various levels of access depending upon the skill and fastidiousness of the client when they created the account for the Snowflake SE into their account. Again, how the SE is connecting to Snowflake is the same way any other user and application are doing so. I know this for a fact as SEs have to create their own throwaway demo instances https://XX123456.us-east-1.snowflakecomputing.com/. SEs don't have access into the backend of Snowflake.

* At some point this SE had malware installed on to their computer. At this point, this person was cooked and any customer who had given them access to the environment.

As for Hudson Rocks, they can go f themselves for doxing the SE. It was quite trivial to find who this person was and based on the Snowflake announcement they no longer have a job. That person was having an awful week already, now there name is out there. So again, F Hudson for doxing. It would have been easy to blind them out of the exchange (they did the hacker), but did not do so for the victim.

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#176
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There’s something missing here. From what the Hudson Rock article shows, they were able to use an SE’s creds to access their demo account. This is not a customer account and shouldn’t (but of course could) contain sensitive info. It’s not clear to me how this snowballed into a larger breach. Perhaps customers had granted this SE access to their accounts and the data within. Or perhaps there’s a deeper hack. But this…

I was just going to post the same thing. The files that they show in the screenshots are things like PROGRESSIVE_BID_CHANGE_202405271129.csv. Looks suspiciously like the Snowflake Sales Engineer's data for their job role closing a deal with Progressive, not Progressive's own data. And there's no reason to think that a SE would have broad access to customer data. There may be some overlap, but I doubt it contains sens…

You’re thinking “bid” is in reference to Snowflake bidding for progressive as a client?

I’d say thats not likely, I work in fintech and the first thing this filename indicates to me is a CSV feed of market data for bid prices (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bid_price)

This is a common type of dataset a firm would dump into a datalake to use as reference data lookups against other more sensitive data (for pricing trades, etc.)

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#177
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's also possible that the firm is being trolled by the "threat actor."

Are you trying to say that the threat actor is just going up to firms they're trying to extort and telling them lies ? Criminals just going around lying to people? Don't they know that's against the law?

I mean, most people aren't criminals... what are the odds of someone being a DOUBLE criminal!?

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#178
post #173

I don't work for Snowflake but I spend a lot of time working with them and their SE organisation. When working and building demos with clients, SEs create demonstration environments on the same $400 Snowflake demo accounts anyone can. To build demos the client would grant access to that SE. The SE would take some of the data to the demo environment and then work on it. This is further confirmed by the name of the env…

[flagged]

assuming seeing “dicks” upset you, and you think “cunts” would upset someone else, this seems less like equality and more like an attempt at hurting others due to hurt.

or are you truly glad?

Re: Hacker confirms access through infostealer infection [withdrawn]

#180

Hudson Rock exposing the name of the employee whose credentials were stolen shows me that Hudson Rock is not a serious company. I hope Snowflake is supporting her.

Snowflake’s blog about this incident mentions “former employee”. If she was actually fired as a result of this, I would hope that the entire security organization also went with her.
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