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My $500M Mars rover mistake

chrislewicki.com

171–180 of 361 posts

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#171

I'll add my story here for posterity: My first job out of university, I was working for a content marketing startup who's tech stack involved PHP and PerconaDB (MySQL). I was relatively inexperienced with PHP but had the false confidence of a new grad (didn't get a job for 6 months after graduating - so I was desperate to impress). I was tasked with updating some feature flags that would turn on a new feature for all…

They fired you for that array_reverse mistake?

Yep, I was put on PIP with impossible success criteria (no issues raised in PRs by senior engineers and no issues in code deployed to production - even if it was reviewed by senior engineers & QA) and fired (for failing that criteria) in 2 weeks.

I worked there for ~8 months in total.

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#172
post #159
post #146

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And the engineers designing safety mechanisms for nuclear weapons probably think you have it easy.

Yep, that's fair! But my understanding is the default behaviour of most nuclear weapons (other than Hiroshima-style ones) is "blows itself to pieces without detonating the nuclear part", rather than "vapourises everyone within a mile". Everything needs to go right for a nuclear weapon to actually blow up with a significant yield.

Yeah, luckily they seem to have a pretty well sorted failure mode.

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#173
> And I still remember the shock when Project Manager Pete delivered the decision and the follow-on news: ‘These tests will continue. And Chris will continue to lead them as we have paid for his education. He’s the last person on Earth who would make this mistake again.’

I wonder whether Pete had followed this 1989 general aviation/accident analysis story:

> When he returned to the airfield Bob Hoover walked over to the man who had nearly caused his death and, according to the California Fullerton News-Tribune, said: "There isn’t a man alive who hasn’t made a mistake. But I’m positive you’ll never make this mistake again. That’s why I want to make sure that you’re the only one to refuel my plane tomorrow. I won’t let anyone else on the field touch it."

-- https://www.squawkpoint.com/2014/01/criticism/

(The incident above led to the creation and eventual mandated use of a new safety nozzle for refueling, which seems like a better long-term solution than having the people who've nearly killed you nearby to fuel your plane indefinitely: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Hoover#Hoover_nozzle_and_H...)

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#174

I am a Mechanical/Aerospace engineer.... I wish my scariest stories 'only' involved a potential bricking of a main computer on an unmanned $500M rover. No... I was the senior safety-crit signoff on things carrying human lives. I had to look over pictures of parts broken from a crash and have the potential feeling of 'what-if that's my calculation gone wrong'. My joint that slipped. My inappropriate test procedure inv…

I sincerely hope there are more people like you in the aerospace industry and less like those who conceived, implemented and signed off the 737 MAX's MCAS at Boeing...

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#175
Unrelated to the content of the article, but is the cover image AI generated? Looks kind of like DALL-E style output to me but it's hard to be sure.

(Also, I know I'm breaking the rule "Please don't pick the most provocative thing in an article or post to complain about in the thread." My defense is this is less of a complaint and more just plain curiosity!)

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You should never blame the individual for organizational failures like this. I see two process issues: 1. The plug was allowed to be connected backwards. Either this should be impossible or this hazard should be identified and more than one human should verify orientation 2. In use tools like multimeters should never be disconnected. At worst you get problems like this at best you annoy whoever was using it Blaming i…

You can't apply process thinking here, where the scenario is custom testing a unique probe, and you don't know what other constraints are in play (for example, the reason for the plug design). If NASA were sending these things to Mars by the dozen, then you can start to formalize things like test procedures and look for places mistakes can happen. But in this scenario, you're just disempowering your staff by not lett…

The one process part that can be controlled and jumped out from the first paragraphs is not letting people touch billion dollar equipment at the tail end of a 12-hour shift.

If you are putting people in a situation with absolutely no safeguards, you can’t have them go into it fatigued.

I’m guessing the people working on that team also weren’t getting great sleep by the discussion of high stress and long hours. Recipe for disaster.

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#177
post #166

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm surprised that group therapy for engineers doesn't exist or maybe I just can't find it. I don't work in anything high stakes myself though have often been an ear to those who do in aviation or rail. I believe that it can be quite hard sometimes if you have empathy and don't take the "Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? That's not my department" approach." Perhaps some peer support group (poss…

Profession induced trauma is finally getting taken seriously in the medical setting, another high stakes field. Group therapy for doctors and nurses is finally becoming a thing, but unfortunately it is completely dependent on being employed by an organization that cares about it.

[deleted]

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#178
I cost my company about 5 times my yearly salary once, long ago. I sampled an enormous amount of seismic data at 2ms instead of the proper 4ms. This was back when we rented IBM our mainframes for a pretty penny. The job ran for the entire weekend and Monday morning I was summoned by management, informed of my error, and asked, "You won't ever do that again will you?" and sent back to work.

Knowing that you are allowed to fail, but are very much expected/required to learn from your failure, makes for rather a good employee, in my experience.

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#179
post #140

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One place I worked (some 20 years ago) had a policy that any time you run a sudo command, another person has to check the command before you hit enter. Could apply the same kind of policy/convention for anything in production.

I'm not sure this doesn't just lead to blind rubber-stamping unless this is done very very rarely

I guess most of the common task are scripted / automated. Running a "raw" sudo command should be very very rare.

Re: My $500M Mars rover mistake

#180

I am a Mechanical/Aerospace engineer.... I wish my scariest stories 'only' involved a potential bricking of a main computer on an unmanned $500M rover. No... I was the senior safety-crit signoff on things carrying human lives. I had to look over pictures of parts broken from a crash and have the potential feeling of 'what-if that's my calculation gone wrong'. My joint that slipped. My inappropriate test procedure inv…

> I had to look over pictures of parts broken from a crash and have the potential feeling of 'what-if that's my calculation gone wrong'. Does it inevitably come down to that for someone? I mean even if its a detail that a procedure couldn’t have caught, someone is responsible for forming good procedures. I suppose there could be several factors. But it seems like ultimately someone is going to be pretty directly resp…

For what it's worth, I strongly disagree -- the group as a whole (and especially its leadership) is responsible for the policies they decide to institute, and the incentives they allow to exist. For example, in this article's story the author is apparently working >80 hour weeks directly manipulating the $500M spacecraft two weeks before it launches. Do we really think they are "directly responsible" for the described mistake? I think a root cause analysis that placed responsibility on any individual's actions would simply be incorrect -- and worse, would be entirely unconstructive at actually preventing reoccurrence of similar accidents.

I think this is furthermore almost always true of RCAs, which is why blameless post-mortems exist. It's not just to avoid hurting someone's feelings.

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