Earlier quoted context omitted.
I found this nice presentation about Godel's theorems. https://youtu.be/HeQX2HjkcNo?t=895 "There is no proof for the statement with Godel-number g". What I'm struggling with is trying to understand if self-reference can be formally represented by some symbol. Can it? Godel's proof seems to rely on a trick that allows a formal system to talk about itself but is that possible? There would need to be a symbol for that a…
Not every picture of a pipe is a pipe but it's at least conceivable that an actual working pipe can be constructed out of something which happens to be a picture of a pipe. Similarly Godel isn't proving that all statements in a system are paradoxically self-referential. Only that given any system of sufficient complexity, one can conceivably be constructed. In any event, all of our mathematical proofs are predicated…
That's my question. It seems that adding "self reference" to the system makes it more complicated than it would be otherwise. So it's not just a system with enough complexity to let you do arithmetic. You need a system with enough complexity to also do self-reference. And I would say and think that self-reference is complicated.
Do we need self-reference in any other areas of mathematics, than Godel's and related proofs?