The major problem with the built-in password managers is that they don't store more than the password. If there's a site that has security questions, I use LastPass to keep track of the security questions and my answers. I have to do this because I don't give real answers to security questions. A minor annoyance is that Safari will not let me treat sites which use multiple domains as equivalent. So Discount Tire uses…
> I think it's inevitable that LastPass will continue making life more difficult for free users and I may end up with a flat file or Apple Notes file to store the security questions and answers. Why not just pay for it? If it prevents a hack which impacts your finances, then its more than worth it and not worth the waste of your time trying to avoid paying them.
Password Managers
171–180 of 342 posts
Re: Password Managers
#172Passwords are a lost cause. This doesn't mean that you need to give up on using good practices, just don't go overboard trying to plug all the theoretical holes. It's not all or nothing, sometimes it's OK to be good enough. For everything important you oughta use 2FA anyway.
> Passwords are a lost cause. I never really understood this. Ed25519 keys use SHA-512 and are considered secure. They're still just long secrets, aren't they? What's to prevent me from using a similarly long, randomly generated secret as my password, using a different one for every site? Because that's what I'm doing with KeePass. Backing up the auth database/file and having enough redundancy in place, as well as ha…
No. I find it easiest to keep this straight in my head with a line from the U2 song "The Fly", "a secret is something you tell one other person". You're thinking of Ed25519 private keys, you mustn't tell those to anybody and they're minted as a pair with a public key you can tell to everybody.
> What's to prevent me from using a similarly long, randomly generated secret as my password
That's a Shared Secret. You tell the password to the remote web site. They have a copy of it, their permanent copy of it is likely hashed, but you send them a new, unhashed version of that same password to the site every single time you log in.
This makes all the difference in the world. Let's see that in action:
Suppose that Edward, who is Evil, has complete insight into everything stored by and every program running at Facebook for an hour. If someone logs into Facebook using a password, obviously Edward learns the password, it was sent to Facebook so they could check it was correct. So Edward can log in as any Facebook user who logged in while Edward's magical insight lasted? Right?
Nope. Facebook has WebAuthn. For WebAuthn users logging in involves public key cryptography. Facebook has a public key for those users but no private key. Edward can see that the users were properly authenticated, but he doesn't get a persistent credential because the persistent credential never left the user's grasp. He cannot log in as those users, only they can do that.
Re: Password Managers
#173Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is not true for the standalone version of 1Password.
It’s 100% true of the standalone version of 1Password because there is only one version of 1Password - the standalone version. Everything else interacts with it. Your secret key is still required to decrypt passwords via the desktop application (which is the only version - everything else interacts with this.)
Re: Password Managers
#174> I would recommend using the one already built into your browser. They provide the same functionality, and can sidestep these fundamental problems with extensions. I haven't used the browsers built-in password manager for years, so I don't know what features they have, but I find it hard to believe that they can provide the same functionality as a dedicated password manager. Some of the top features of dedicated pas…
Please don't put TOTP codes or back up codes in password managers. The whole point of 2FA is to have two factors protecting you. If you do that, you're back to 1 factor (your password manager master password).
Re: Password Managers
#175Re: Password Managers
#176I run the password generator in a terminal window, then copy and paste the password in to the site I am trying to log in to.
It’s a fairly complicated shell script, since it also has to deal with nonsense like stupid arbitrary password rules (e.g. Southwest considers an underscore to be a letter, and insists at least one non-letter non-number punctuation is in a password; some places require a password to be 8 characters or shorter; etc.) and also provides login information so I can also remember my username.
As recently as 5 or 6 years ago, there were issues with websites which wouldn’t let you copy and paste a password in to their password field; Firefox has always had a “ignore any Javascript which stops pasting” special rule in about:config I had to use. I haven’t seen one of those in a while; developers finally got a clue and realized that password managers exist.
One weakness this setup has is that anyone with the “master key” can get all of the password generated by the password generator. My workaround is to use a separate master key in a virtual machine for critical passwords, such as online banking ones.
Shameless plug time:
Re: Password Managers
#177As it looks like Tavis isn't hanging out and responding to comments here, I thought it'd be worth linking to a question and response he gave on Twitter as most comments revolve around this point. > @diractelda: Based on your thoughts, it seems a more accurate statement is "Don't use a password manager that interacts with your browser automatically unless it's the built in password system. Non-integrated password stor…
>> @colmmacc: Safari seems conspicuously absent from the list, but it has more users than Firefox or Edge. Is that deliberate? superficially it has the chrome problem solved and T1/T2 integration for the password manager across iOS and OS X.[1]
> @taviso: Well, it's deliberate because I don't know how it works, not because I think there's something wrong with it! It sounds reasonable from the docs, but I haven't looked at the implementation.[2]
As I said in thread, that’s a weird response given the opening paragraph of the article:
> I’ve spent a lot of time trying to understand the attack surface of popular password managers. I think I’ve spent more time analyzing them than practically anybody else, and I think that qualifies me to have an opinion!
I mean, I think Tavis is qualified to have an opinion regardless. But just blanket ignoring a competitor’s solution that addresses all of the problems in the article, while claiming to have more familiarity with the space than practically anyone else... that doesn’t sit well with me.
1: https://twitter.com/colmmacc/status/1401336209746673666?s=21
2: https://twitter.com/taviso/status/1401373666328203264?s=21
Re: Password Managers
#178I'm a little disappointed in the conclusion because there are more secure password managers out there that still offer the same level of convenience as the browser built-in password manager. Yes, if you use a password manager that's implemented entirely as a browser extension, you may as well use the browser's built-in password management features. However, if you're an advanced user and are comfortable using a separ…
And KeePassXC is open source and does not require cloud storage. So you can build from source and do not need to rely on any claims from the vendor on how the data is securely stored.
Re: Password Managers
#179Earlier quoted context omitted.
Please don't put TOTP codes or back up codes in password managers. The whole point of 2FA is to have two factors protecting you. If you do that, you're back to 1 factor (your password manager master password).
This isn't quite true. 2FA still protects you from password breaches (and weak passwords, though you shouldn't have those if you're using a password manager). Also, keeping 2FA codes in a syncable password manager is a huge boon for people who ever break/lose phones. Can't tell you how many people get locked out of their accounts because they lose their 2FA codes. As an alternative, companies have to have a 2FA-reset…
WebAuthn-based 2FA would; but AFAIK there isn't really a way to store WebAuthn keys in password managers at the moment.
Re: Password Managers
#180I do not use a browser-based password generator, because of the Javascript insecurity issues (edit: And because I’ve been using a system like this far longer than online password managers have existed). I use a shell script, with a small C program to handle the core cryptography, to generate secure passwords. I run the password generator in a terminal window, then copy and paste the password in to the site I am tryin…
openssl rand -base64 12
If a couple attempts at that doesn't generate a password that satisfies complexity requirements, add, remove, or change a character or two before pasting. Change 12 to a larger or smaller number to change the length of the generated pw.