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Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

help.hover.com

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Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's to stop me (possible hover CSR, co-worker, whatever) from simply reading a high-profile customer's password and transferring all their million dollar domain names to me later that night when I get home from work? I have a pretty good memory. I bet I could remember 5-10 simple passwords and email addresses without writing anything down. Chances are the idiots use the same password for their email anyways. Muaha…

Industry secret - at the most basic level, registrar and registry staffers don't need access to a customer account to manipulate a domain name. We've implemented tons of controls to manage who can do what, etc. but relying on customer passwords to safeguard domain names from internal tampering isn't really a great tactic.

What about the same scenario, but instead of altering domain records, a CSR logs into the customer's e-mail account, or bank account, and starts wreaking havoc?

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#172
post #49
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

ARGH! I just confirmed this. So disappointed. I've changed it now to be completely unique but I wouldn't be surprised if it's logged somewhere.

Change the other places you used the old one.

Change all passwords that are non-unique.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#173
post #37

> Very quickly, our customer service team was inundated by requests from people that weren’t receiving the email, found the process confusing, and a myriad of other related requests. Wait a second, so customers wont receive an email with a password reset link, yet they'll receive an email with a plain text password? I guess it's possible, but interesting.

It's not that they don't get the email so much as they don't understand it. Where I work, I make a new account for someone, then send them a password reset email asking them to create a password for themselves, and a personal email writteden by me explaining exactly what they need to do (go to this other email, click the link, enter your new password twice, hit enter, then log in) and I still have 1 in 4 result in su…

> It's not that they don't get the email so much as they don't understand it.

Wouldn't hiring a writer and a designer for a day to re-design the e-mail so that it's more obvious and easy to understand be a better solution than storing passwords in plain text?

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#174
post #45

"Very quickly, our customer service team was inundated by requests from people that weren’t receiving the email, found the process confusing, and a myriad of other related requests. " What I read - Because we aren't smart enough to create an automated password recovery that works, you should now trust that we are smart enough in network security to safeguard your passwords. Also, these guys mention that they were rec…

Ten million minutes is approximately nineteen years. That might indeed be a usability problem.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#175

Whenever I call up MediaTemple for support, they always ask me my password for verification. Does that mean they also store passwords in plaintext? (serious question)

I read your post as "Every time I call up MediaTemple for support, I give my password to a random homeless man."

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#176
post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Fwiw, let me share some of the less predictable consequences of what could happen if your pwd database is hacked, and why it's important to use bcrypt, PBKDF2, or scrypt to secure your users passwords. ( http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/ ) I was one of the folks whose email and password were compromised in the recent MtGox.com bitcoin exchange attack. Until then I had been using a three-tier passwor…

I agree with you wholeheartedly. Unfortunately, there will always be a few services that will store passwords in plain text. Would unique email addresses for each service have helped your situation at all? For example: Facebook email: uniqueemail1@gmail.com (forwards to your real email) Facebook password: password1 Hover email: uniqueemail2@gmail.com (forwards to your real email) Hover password: password1 Bank email:…

But then even if you remember the password, you'd still need to remember the right unique email id for each service.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"...to give our CSRs a completely effective way to handle inbound password requests in cases where customers no longer had access to their email account." I personally don't see how having the plain-text passwords help in the case where the person owning the account doesn't have access to their email account. Since they don't have access, you can't exactly email them their password.

Most of our customer inquiries come in over the phone.

Assuming you verify users over the phone securely, why not just reset their passwords for them with a one-time use, temporary password? Surely that's not much harder for the end-user to deal with, and then you needn't store their password...

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Industry secret - at the most basic level, registrar and registry staffers don't need access to a customer account to manipulate a domain name. We've implemented tons of controls to manage who can do what, etc. but relying on customer passwords to safeguard domain names from internal tampering isn't really a great tactic.

What about the same scenario, but instead of altering domain records, a CSR logs into the customer's e-mail account, or bank account, and starts wreaking havoc?

What? If it's the same scenario then the CSR does not and never did have the password, they just have domain control panels. The whole point is that they can't do that.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#179
post #168

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Disclaimer: I am an ex-DH intern and my information is only as good as August 2010, but it is likely to still be accurate. At the very least, DH does not store passwords as plaintext, but it's only very marginally better than that. Passwords are stored using a custom-rolled symmetric encryption algorithm created by... I never found out if it was a founder or just one of the earlier admins, but that doesn't really cha…

I can confirm that they're still doing this. I recently had a conversation with their support staff about it and I don't think they'll be changing it any time soon. I like Dreamhost, but if they don't change this I'll probably bail.

Can you explain why you would leave over that? As long as you are aware of it and use a unique password how does it impact you? They would have to have a very specific and unnoticed breach that gets database and key.

Is it worry that they are lax in security elsewhere?

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What about the same scenario, but instead of altering domain records, a CSR logs into the customer's e-mail account, or bank account, and starts wreaking havoc?

What? If it's the same scenario then the CSR does not and never did have the password, they just have domain control panels. The whole point is that they can't do that.

I mean the scenario posed by Gigabytecoin, in which a CSR can read my password in plain text.
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