Earlier quoted context omitted.
What's to stop me (possible hover CSR, co-worker, whatever) from simply reading a high-profile customer's password and transferring all their million dollar domain names to me later that night when I get home from work? I have a pretty good memory. I bet I could remember 5-10 simple passwords and email addresses without writing anything down. Chances are the idiots use the same password for their email anyways. Muaha…
Industry secret - at the most basic level, registrar and registry staffers don't need access to a customer account to manipulate a domain name. We've implemented tons of controls to manage who can do what, etc. but relying on customer passwords to safeguard domain names from internal tampering isn't really a great tactic.
Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
171–180 of 190 posts
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#172Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#173> Very quickly, our customer service team was inundated by requests from people that weren’t receiving the email, found the process confusing, and a myriad of other related requests. Wait a second, so customers wont receive an email with a password reset link, yet they'll receive an email with a plain text password? I guess it's possible, but interesting.
It's not that they don't get the email so much as they don't understand it. Where I work, I make a new account for someone, then send them a password reset email asking them to create a password for themselves, and a personal email writteden by me explaining exactly what they need to do (go to this other email, click the link, enter your new password twice, hit enter, then log in) and I still have 1 in 4 result in su…
Wouldn't hiring a writer and a designer for a day to re-design the e-mail so that it's more obvious and easy to understand be a better solution than storing passwords in plain text?
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#174"Very quickly, our customer service team was inundated by requests from people that weren’t receiving the email, found the process confusing, and a myriad of other related requests. " What I read - Because we aren't smart enough to create an automated password recovery that works, you should now trust that we are smart enough in network security to safeguard your passwords. Also, these guys mention that they were rec…
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#175Whenever I call up MediaTemple for support, they always ask me my password for verification. Does that mean they also store passwords in plaintext? (serious question)
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#176Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fwiw, let me share some of the less predictable consequences of what could happen if your pwd database is hacked, and why it's important to use bcrypt, PBKDF2, or scrypt to secure your users passwords. ( http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/ ) I was one of the folks whose email and password were compromised in the recent MtGox.com bitcoin exchange attack. Until then I had been using a three-tier passwor…
I agree with you wholeheartedly. Unfortunately, there will always be a few services that will store passwords in plain text. Would unique email addresses for each service have helped your situation at all? For example: Facebook email: uniqueemail1@gmail.com (forwards to your real email) Facebook password: password1 Hover email: uniqueemail2@gmail.com (forwards to your real email) Hover password: password1 Bank email:…
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#177Earlier quoted context omitted.
"...to give our CSRs a completely effective way to handle inbound password requests in cases where customers no longer had access to their email account." I personally don't see how having the plain-text passwords help in the case where the person owning the account doesn't have access to their email account. Since they don't have access, you can't exactly email them their password.
Most of our customer inquiries come in over the phone.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#178Earlier quoted context omitted.
Industry secret - at the most basic level, registrar and registry staffers don't need access to a customer account to manipulate a domain name. We've implemented tons of controls to manage who can do what, etc. but relying on customer passwords to safeguard domain names from internal tampering isn't really a great tactic.
What about the same scenario, but instead of altering domain records, a CSR logs into the customer's e-mail account, or bank account, and starts wreaking havoc?
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#179Earlier quoted context omitted.
Disclaimer: I am an ex-DH intern and my information is only as good as August 2010, but it is likely to still be accurate. At the very least, DH does not store passwords as plaintext, but it's only very marginally better than that. Passwords are stored using a custom-rolled symmetric encryption algorithm created by... I never found out if it was a founder or just one of the earlier admins, but that doesn't really cha…
I can confirm that they're still doing this. I recently had a conversation with their support staff about it and I don't think they'll be changing it any time soon. I like Dreamhost, but if they don't change this I'll probably bail.
Is it worry that they are lax in security elsewhere?
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#180Earlier quoted context omitted.
What about the same scenario, but instead of altering domain records, a CSR logs into the customer's e-mail account, or bank account, and starts wreaking havoc?
What? If it's the same scenario then the CSR does not and never did have the password, they just have domain control panels. The whole point is that they can't do that.