Earlier quoted context omitted.
> the Supreme Court did its job to give effect to a more specific Act of Congress (the FAA) over the more general policy in a different statute (the NLRA). Disagree with your ipse dixit labeling. The FAA is broad and general, at least according to SCOTUS precedent, covering all contracts between all parties, covering all types of conduct in all industries, as long as "commerce" is involved. In contrast, NLRA § 7 was…
I agree that the characterization of which is more specific is the hairiest part. To me, the main issue is that the NLRA Section 7 does not address contracts specifically. One can imagine lots of things that have an incidental effect on exercising the right to bargain collectively; I don't think the NRLA can be read as preempting all of those things.
I dunno about that — my guess is that Congress intended a heavy presumption: Anything that materially diminishes the right to concerted action is unlawful. I know, materiality will often be hotly contested. Here, though, an employer's ability to unilaterally take away one of employees' key enforcement weapons, viz., the class action, seems pretty freakin' material.