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How to Disagree

paulgraham.com

171–180 of 238 posts

Re: How to Disagree

#171

As well as having a hierarchy of disagreement it seems to me useful to have a categorisation of statements (both in original essays, and disagreements with those essays). Such a categorisation might include: * [1] statements of how the world is. These are statements that can in principle be tested by experiment. e.g. "broken glass is good to eat" * [2] statements of how one would like the world to be. These obviously…

In economics they call type [1] positive and type [2] normative - the implication being that economics only deals with positive questions and tells us nothing about normative questions (how should the world be). When I studied a bit of sociology they took an approach borrowed from philosophy in categorising methods (and effectively split up type [1]): they were interested in how the theory (substitute argument here) addressed the questions of [a] what is the nature of the problem (ie ontology or how the world is), and [b] what can we know about it (ie epistemology). How you answer questions of type [b] determines whether type [1] statements can "be tested by experiment" - ie not everything that is in the world can "in principle be tested by experiment". For example, often whilst we can say that A is generally followed by B, and so infer that A at least partially causes B (whilst causation does not imply correlation we usually infer it does if we have some plausible mechanism in mind for why it should), but that in itself can not reveal precisely to us exactly why A causes B - ie how the mechanism works exactly. Most writers tend not to explicitly reveal their views on [b] and so we are left to infer them. As to identifying type [2] statements, the verbs "want", "should", "prefer" are dead give-aways but the problem lies when they are dropped from the sentence - eg cabalamat's example becomes "Everyone likes cats". Using [b], we can ask whether it is possible to know this, which might help identify it as a type [2].

Re: How to Disagree

#172

The style of argument you call "Ad Hominem" should really be called "Attacking the author's credibility". The original meaning of ad hominem was not attaching the author but rather appealing to the readers emotions rather than logic. Hence, "think of all the children who will starve due to biofuels", which contains the embedded assumption that biofuels will cause starvation but does not support that argument. In most…

You say "The original meaning of ad hominem was not attaching the author but rather appealing to the readers emotions rather than logic." I don't think you're right here; "Ad hominem" in Latin means "to the man", implying attacking the original author.

appealing "to the man", perhaps?

Re: How to Disagree

#173
post #7

I'm really looking forward to seeing this hierarchy applied as a meme on news.yc.

Perhaps it could also work as a help to peer review in academia, or even used to rate the standard of debate in journals?

Re: How to Disagree

#174
Speaking of disgreeing, I found a lot to disagree with in this article. But since I see many of my objections have already been stated by others adding comments, I will restrict myself to a few comments:

1) I have been surprised at what a _variety_ of definitions I have found the for terms PG uses to describe fallacies. People do _not_ agree on the definition for, say, "ad hominem". See, for example, the differing definitions on the following sites, which purport to give definitions for the major fallacies:

a) http://theautonomist.com/aaphp/permanent/fallacies.php#adhom

Ad hominem fallacy - (against the man). Ad hominem is the attempt to impugn an argument by attacking the arguer's character, motives, personality, intentions, or qualifications. b) http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mathew/logic.html#hom..., which gives not only a very different definition, but a much wordier one. c) http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43794

No two give the same definition!

2) That " u r a fag" is NOT equivalent to " The author is a self-important dilettante." has already been mentioned by others, and it hardly requires more substantiation.

3) I am by no means convinced that the proposed hierarchy of disagreement even sets an "upper bound". There is too much overlap, the boundaries are vague (as has already been pointed out by others), and it is much, _much_ too easy to make your argument _look_ like DH6, when it is really nothing like it.

Surely this is a common experience. I have often seen some public speaker make a rousing speech to encourage people to do something, yet the _entire_ speech had only either exhortation or fallacious arguments, yet his intended audience swallowed it whole, taking it for a DH6 level refutation.

4) Finally, it is too easy to sink to a low level of non-argument, lower than even DH1, without fitting into any of these categories. If you don't know how to do this, go into advertising; you will learn quickly;)

Re: How to Disagree

#175
post #156

Great article. Paul provides a useful illumination of the issue. The great medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas operated at level DH6, often with devastating effect. He would formulate and state the argument he planned to refute with clarity, depth, accuracy, and precision. He often would make his opponent's case better than the opponent had done! I believe his secret was that he was humbly interested in the truth wher…

Aquinas wasn't quite so thorough in all his works. It's mostly the Summa Theologica which is so rigorous. I agree with the application however, for one to brook disagreement with another, one should usually understand the subject better than that person. This implies understanding your opponent's arguments better than your opponent. If don't understand your opponents arguments better than he, who are you to say that…

I am glad that people are thinking of Aquainas in this connection. In fact, I _still_ think his book on logical fallacies is one of the best. For example, he is the _only_ one to get the defintion of "amphigology" right.

Unfortunately, when you look at the link where you can find it online at http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/dp3.html, you will see why so few people still read this book:(

Re: How to Disagree

#176
post #59
post #6

Mind if I extend your Disagreement Hierarchy? DH-1. Flamebaiting. This is when you preempt that with which you would disagree by stating your case in such a way as to elicit quick disagreement (in the form of DH0 to DH6). Usually done by noticing a subset of all data, forming a hypothesis to explain only that subset, and presenting it as a conclusion. Often done without even realizing it. The relational database mode…

I considered making DH-1 be physical violence...

You could make that DH0.

Re: How to Disagree

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think there's more from Schopenhauer than just a list of methods. In his Eristic Dialectic, he described a system of stratagems, see http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eristische_Dialektik (unfortunately, this hasn't been translated to english yet). The 38 Methods are said to have been added merely to provide examples. It is also interesting that he wrote the manuscript around 1830, but never published it. It was first p…

The original title of Schopenhauer's “Art of Controversy” could be more accurately translated as “The Art of being always Right” (Die Kunst, Recht zu behalten). The reason why he described those stratagems was to prove his point: that the goal of a controversy is not finding the truth. According to him, it was like a fight where you just want to win. PG advocates for controversies that help find the truth. Thus he ma…

I'll assume "To Schopenhauer, real arguments are actually fallacies, because mere humans have other goals than the truth" is an accurate summary of Schopenhauer's viewpoint. In that case, I _still_ have to say this is just a more thanaverage level of sophistication for a form of solipsism. But I cannot see it any other way than as solipsism.

That alone is reason enough to reject it. But here is another reason: his point about other goals is irrelevant. Why? Because though yes, we "mere humans" have other goals, at least _some_ of the time, those other goals require that we get to the truth of some matter. And those are precisely the fields of endeavor where rational argumentation still has some influence in our confused and irrational society.

That said, we _do_ have to take great care: the dishonest dissemblers who strive so hard to deceive us are _legion_, the honest reasoners who wish to persuade us of the truth by legitimate means are rare gems. But they have not disappeared completely yet.

Re: How to Disagree

#178

I wish more people wrote stuff like this. There are a million writing books on grammar and style, but god forbid someone ever write something about what makes good ideas...

As mascarenhas already posted, Aristotle spent quite a bit of time on the topic, and his ideas are still studied, though perhaps not as widely as they should be.

Yet Whitehead says that even Aristotle's writings are mere "footnotes to Plato". So perhaps we should be spending more time with Plato's instead.

Re: How to Disagree

#179

Paul, I like your DH scale. Something too little appreciated: the DH1 argument: Dr XXX is wrong because he's a tool of the YYY industry is an "ad hominem" argument but so is Dr XXX is right because he's a Distinguished Prof at ZZZ University. People who can't understand an argument are reduced to "who ya gonna believe?" Then we begin to hear about sources of funding, motivation, nationality, religion etc. I'm glad to…

Ah, another example of how A"ad hominem" is misused;) Please see my other reply listing three different sites using three different definitions of "ad hominem". None of those definitions support your example. Rather, saying it is so because "he's a distinguised prof" is an appeal to authority, which is not _always_ a fallacy.

Re: How to Disagree

#180
post #77

Well, the main problem with this essay is that sometimes mocking someone's argument is the best way to disagree with it. The parody of PG's last essay on having a boss was highly effective at this: http://www.jsequeira.com/blog/2008/03/24.html Is this a lower form of disagreement than DH6? Most definitely, however, the English language has a rich tradition of satire and mockery going back at least as far as Jonathan…

Depends on what you mean by "the best way to disagree". If you are preaching to the choir (and most disagreements on the web fall into this category), then mocking is the best way, because it entertains, whereas the alternative does nothing at all. But if you care about making someone understand your argument for the first time, why would you put extra layers on it, which will have to be unwrapped to get to the inner…

You ask, "why would you put extra layers on it, which will have to be unwrapped to get to the inner logic?".

There are two possible reasons:

1) you know your audience is not that logical to begin with, and need to be lured by illogical appeals to emotions etc.

2) you know they could be persuaded by logical argument, but need help summoning up the will to persist in following it. In that case, you mix logic with entertainment and exhortation. But you must mix carefully, to keep from falling into the trap of merely luring by illogical appeals (or even seeming to do this). Unfortunately, few have the patience for this, so many take the easy way, (merely luring).

Plato took course 2) often in his dialogs. Augustine did the same in both sermons and treatises. Aristotle never did, at least not in his surviving works (his dialogs are lost).

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