161–170 of 205 posts
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this does not align with.. well.. anything ive read about DOGE
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> Valadon said he reached out because the owner in this case wasn’t responding and the information exposed was highly sensitive. obviously leaking the credentials itself is crazy, given that its (a contractor to) CISA, but to not respond when notified? crazy crazy. but wait! it gets worse somehow " “AWS-Workspace-Firefox-Passwords.csv” — listed plaintext usernames and passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems " w…
This is mentioned in the article but it stood out enough to call it here.
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the discourse on hacker news has gotten very bad. why are we having this stupid conversation, where you say it would be weird for the people who you are mad about to do the obvious thing to solve the problem you are mad about? i agree that they don't have evidence of how the training data is prepared, but that's a separate issue from, are they going to make obvious mistakes? the LLMs have never hallucinated a key tha…
> the discourse on hacker news has gotten very bad. why are we having this stupid conversation On this we are agreed. But I can't parse any meaning out of the rest of your paragraph.
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Do you have any examples ? It's the first time I hear about replacing API keys
This can be done in Azure using Entra (OAuth). I don't have API keys, or passwords of any kind, anywhere in the stack. Infrastructure - https://dev.azure.com/byteterrace/Koholint/_git/Azure.Resour... Server - https://dev.azure.com/byteterrace/Koholint/_git/Web.Function... Client - https://dev.azure.com/byteterrace/Koholint/_git/Web.Portal
{OrgName}/{ProjectName}/Repos/Files/{RepoName}Earlier quoted context omitted.
But then you need creds to access AWS SSM, Vault, etc., and those end up getting stored the same way the actual creds you needed were being stored, and you're back at square one.
Nah you can get machine creds automatically via the metadata service when running inside AWS. Nothing need be on disk.
If the LLM can run any code it writes itself, it can retrieve those credentials. It's just one `curl` away. If you don't let it run `curl`, but you let it run `python`, it can just run a Python script that fetches it using `requests`. Or a Node script that calls `fetch`.
Point is, if creds are accessible programmatically, the LLM can and may try to retrieve them if it thinks it needs them.
I think one thing that people are sleeping on is passing a ton of secrets to OpenAI and Anthropic or your OpenRouter by having a .env or secrets on disk in your repo, but not checked in Your LLM will happily read the entire file, ship it off to be training data for future versions of ChatGPT, and not raise any flags, because let's be fair it was on ok thing to check if all the env vars were set, or it you had set up…
> Cursor automatically ignores files in .gitignore
...
>While Cursor blocks ignored files, complete protection isn't guaranteed due to LLM unpredictability.
[Antigravity appears to just _do_, not _try_)[https://antigravity.google/docs/strict-mode]
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Nah you can get machine creds automatically via the metadata service when running inside AWS. Nothing need be on disk.
That's still not any better. If the LLM can run any code it writes itself, it can retrieve those credentials. It's just one `curl` away. If you don't let it run `curl`, but you let it run `python`, it can just run a Python script that fetches it using `requests`. Or a Node script that calls `fetch`. Point is, if creds are accessible programmatically, the LLM can and may try to retrieve them if it thinks it needs them…
Automatic retrieval, instead of keeping them on disk, is what makes short lived credentials possible.
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good thing we know DOGE has been trying to exfil all US Gov data like all gov employees, or all SSNs under a previous administration I'd assume CISA was doing a dirty dangle, but given how corrupt and incompetent this administration is, to include firing lots of CISA, this may just be a legit fuckup.
When negligence is so bad that it looks like sabotage from a hostile agent, then criminal investigations are needed to learn more about the people who did it, the others who enabled it, and deter similar future acts. DOGE did a lot of bad things, but it didn't force anyone to commit credentials to a repo, disable scanners to get away with it, and then make the repo public.
It doesn't though. There's no actual evidence for anything beyond negligence. The "sabotage" angle is just speculation in the vain hope that surely people this stupid don't work for the US government.
I think one thing that people are sleeping on is passing a ton of secrets to OpenAI and Anthropic or your OpenRouter by having a .env or secrets on disk in your repo, but not checked in Your LLM will happily read the entire file, ship it off to be training data for future versions of ChatGPT, and not raise any flags, because let's be fair it was on ok thing to check if all the env vars were set, or it you had set up…
I've noticed recently that at least Claude will try its best not to read your env files. You really need to push it in the prompt if you want it to read and access your DB for example.
Assuredly it's not fool proof but it does have safeguards in place.
Ideally you also opt out of training although that doesn't keep it out of the vendor's logs/telemetry.
Short lived credentials, injected identity, and hardware backed tokens are the real solution.