Are the Mysteries of Quantum Mechanics Beginning to Dissolve?

Glad to hear it. I'm not an expert on these topics, so it's probably best to be skeptical on this. You may find the paper and some of the names I've mentioned (ie: Carrol) worth reading/ listening to.

> Some truths are the result of co-constraint.

This is a fine claim to make and it's not totally insane or unheard of. The concept of simultaneous causality, for example, is definitely something people argue.

> Reality must have this form of being.

This is a claim, and a fine one to make. It's still a claim though. I think it's worth reminding you that I haven't actually said anything other than that it's not really reasonable to assert things like randomness not being scientific, or that all things have a cause, etc - that most physicists probably disagree with that is notable. It's your position that those claims are true, and that's fine, but it's just notable that you're plainly asserting rather controversial claims.

> (2) It cannot be determined by infinite regress, because there is no where beyond reality to regress. And obviously

FWIW you can actually just say that you accept infinite regress. That'd be fine. You would have some other metaphysical commitments there, but it's a move you can make.

> Contradictions are contradictions regardless of priors.

You can also just reject the law of non-contradiction. Or I could. Or you have to assert it.

> in terms of being (1) self-consistent, (2) consistent with hosting a region with what we know of our local physics, and (3) to avoid simply being a circular argument, demonstrate that alternatives to the explanation necessarily are contradictory.

It's probably notable that all of these are just assertions. Consistency is a property that you're claiming. (2) seems reasonable. (3) I'm not sure of. And again, law of non-contradiction would have to be shown as being necessary. Neither of us is right or wrong, which is sort of my point - these are valid metaphysical theories.

Your view is not unreasonable. A lot of people hold to the strong PSR, it's just notable that it's controversial.

> I think it is fair to say, while some may believe a theory of everything with unexplained brut facts can be valid (some things being just what they are), few or none would be unsatisfied with a theory that demonstrated all facts were well determined, was consistent, could be shown to be compatible with our region of reality, and could not be altered without creating a contradiction.

Sure. A theory with no axioms would be desirable. But also, like, we wanted that in mathematics and accepted that it was impossible too. Would we have preferred otherwise? Well yeah. But we know it's not the case.

I think that's fine. I'm actually sort of agnostic about it myself. I find nothing particularly striking about brute facts or contingencies, certainly it's not magical to me, but I wouldn't say that they're logically necessary. I find it a bit interesting to consider.

> I think contradiction is a category error for primitives of reality. Conservation is the right view.

It may be interesting as a thought exercise to wonder if non-contradiction could be an emergent property. It would certainly make for an interesting model for the beginning of the universe.

> I expect logic to be necessary for us to reason about primitives. But that logic is the wrong way to think of basis elements. Those are very different things.

I think this would probably be contentious, I think most people believe that logical values are basically "necessary". I don't really know though.

I will perhaps spend some time reflecting on the concepts you're referring to with regards to logic and primitives. I'm not really familiar enough with that sort of grounding or reduction.

> Well thanks for pushing me, I am sure I have taken up enough of your time. But, I am now aware of more philosophical viewpoints on the big questions!

I think that's a very good outcome, thank you for pursuing that, it's always interesting to reflect on such topics, to me at least.

Any theory of reality must have full closure. Meaning what happens when two constraints/structures collide depends on the two components, but that there is always a definite result, and it is the solution to conservation.

It isn't just that reality doesn't or can't ever "contradict" itself, but that contradiction dodging doesn't happen either. Bolted on contradiction avoidance, isn't needed when there is closure. Mixing up logic as tool, with logic as inherent reality is a category error. Things cancel, reduce, etc. All operations that happen locally where structure connects. They don't produce potential solutions, then winnow them down. We do that.

Thats what we do when we don't completely understand something, or we only have partial knowledge. Not scenarios that reality operates in. Entirely different.

> I think this would probably be contentious, I think most people believe that logical values are basically "necessary". I don't really know though.

Unknown is obviously a factor of notation, or our knowledge. Its dual is contradiction. Those concepts are foundational in terms of our ability to analyze things we only have partial knowledge of, or may be describing incompletely or inaccurately. Analysis needs that meta-level to handle all the provisionalism inherent in conjectural knowledge.

What is true, what is not?

What don't we know?

What have we incorrectly assumed?

We cannot operate on provisional/conjectural knowledge without all four of those concepts. (We rarely actually operate with just boolean true/false logic, even if unknown/contradiction are handled implicitly instead of explicitly, which only works in trivial systems. Which makes the major proofs of fundamental limitations' dependency on an excluded middle a bright red flag.)

Logic is how we analyze arbitrary structures. In that sense it is universal. Whether the artifacts we analyze have any resemblance to logic or not. We traverse them with logic as an external scaffolding that allows us to represent and operate directly on our understanding of the artifact.

Keeping those things separate sheds a lot more light on things like mathematical and computational limits. I.e. the weaknesses of starting with logic in Russell's Paradox and Gödel's theorems, instead of structure-agnostic reduction, are pretty stunning. Of course a system fundamentally restricted to true/false, without explicit "either/unknown/undetermined" or "both/contradiction/overdetermined", can't be consistent or complete.

Analysis without the four possible states of analysis inherently breaks. Whether that is a Russell set ("a set that includes all sets that don't include themselves", given sets are defined as boolean mappings), or a Gödel system (a Boolean mathematical system can't consistently handle something as simple as, "this system will say this statement is false"). Not how both of these examples pull the means of analysis into the contradictory statement loop. A set, in a set system. The mathematical system, into analysis of itself. So analysis as the subject. True, false, unknown and contradiction need to all be first class values in any study of analysis.

How would you feel if I sent you an email? I have a question but asking offline works better.

If you change your mind email me. I am collecting a few people for informal feedback on a series of essays and programming concepts. Noticed you have a Rust background which is relevant.