Theory of Computation wasn't around when all this "exciting" stuff was developed in Mathematics. Given their non-constructive nature "real" numbers are unsurprisingly totally incompatible with computation. Chaitin has a great paper on this and shows how Cantor's constructions were reflected a half-century later by Turing. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0411418 Except of-course, while "hyper-Turing" machines that can do m…
It is funny you say that when Turing defined Turing machines to compute real numbers (like π for example). In its original definition, a number was computable if its Turing machine did not stop. Which makes sense since π does not have a finite decimal expansion.
Today, we usually define Turing machines to decide problems and a problem is decidable if for every input its Turing machine stops with a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer. I guess this is what makes people think what you said in the quote above. Maybe this definition is more intuitive but this conclusion from it could not be more wrong.
Think about it for a second, if the computable numbers were countable there would be no uncomputable problem (Turing actually used the classic cantor diagonal argument to prove that there were uncomputable numbers)