Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can you elaborate on why you'd want to opt-out of DNS over HTTPS? I was under the impression that it was useful and good for privacy, but I may be misinformed.
I have a local DNS server to access servers and other resources on my network. DNS over HTTPS breaks this.
Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
161–168 of 168 posts
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#162Earlier quoted context omitted.
False dichotomy. Not only am I pretty sure Sonic isn't selling my DNS queries, I've already opted out of DNS over HTTPS. Refusing to respect the choices I've made is worse than not. Besides, unencrypted SNI means that if my ISP wanted to get the hosts I was looking at, they could.
Unencrypted SNI is fairly rare now.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#163Earlier quoted context omitted.
>Little Snitch Just FYI, DNS-resolutions do still occur BEFORE THE POPUP DIALOGUE TO CONFIRM/DENY CONNECTION (i.e. www.example.com gets resolved to 1.1.1.1 , but no connection is made to 1.1.1.1 until `Confirm` is selected). Add a PiHole to your network, you will not regret this time/$$$/investment.
Are you saying that DNS resolution bypasses software firewalls?
From the mDNS side of things, you could easily block if your firewall allows you to set up port based deny rules (in this case UDP/5353). This should resolve the privacy leak from the OP, though you may find that you lose expected functionality on your host and local network depending on whether you block inbound, outbound, or both.
Unicast DNS gets a bit trickier (even without considering DoH). Depending on browser and OS configuration, you won’t be talking to more than a handful of resolvers directly. Ideally, you allow communication with these resolvers and block all other DNS traffic. You definitely don’t want to set a rule that allows you to accept each and every query, so in that sense, DNS will be bypassing the firewall.
What’s better in this case is resolver with filtering capabilities, e.g., pihole.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#164On my macOS box, I run Little Snitch, a nice UI that can be set to ask local user for explicit permission before allowing a network request. https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html I’ve occasionally stumbled on it during remote logins, usually when an SSH session wants to download something new, like NPM requesting NodeJS bits. The text terminal SSH download will block; if I figure out it’s the Little S…
>Little Snitch Just FYI, DNS-resolutions do still occur BEFORE THE POPUP DIALOGUE TO CONFIRM/DENY CONNECTION (i.e. www.example.com gets resolved to 1.1.1.1 , but no connection is made to 1.1.1.1 until `Confirm` is selected). Add a PiHole to your network, you will not regret this time/$$$/investment.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#165Why should anyone care about this?
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#166Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#167A similar type of timing attack can be used to port scan your local machine (and other devices on your local network) from your browser. https://github.com/Flu1dTeam/PortScanner A while ago, eBay got caught doing this. https://blog.nem.ec/2020/05/24/ebay-port-scanning/
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#168Earlier quoted context omitted.
>Little Snitch Just FYI, DNS-resolutions do still occur BEFORE THE POPUP DIALOGUE TO CONFIRM/DENY CONNECTION (i.e. www.example.com gets resolved to 1.1.1.1 , but no connection is made to 1.1.1.1 until `Confirm` is selected). Add a PiHole to your network, you will not regret this time/$$$/investment.
Are you saying that DNS resolution bypasses software firewalls?