Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just to nitpick, I don't think that formula is valid. We're primarily interested in "unrelated" wolf attacks, but it counts the total fatalities, not the total number of fatal incidents. If we count each fatal attack as only one incident, regardless of the casualties, we get 2^-258 instead. But of course we also need to take into account where the 6-member team lives. If they all live in West Bengal, India, the consi…
There was an organization devoted to reintroducing wolves to the northeastern US, but I don't believe they found it politically feasible. However, I have seen (and photographed) something I called a coyote, but others insisted was a wolf. It has been asserted that coyotes tend to evolve to resemble wolves, when there are none in an ecosystem.
SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
161–170 of 210 posts
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#162Earlier quoted context omitted.
This turns out to be wrong; for a 6-member programming team, that probability is about 2⁻²⁴⁵, which is about 2⁸⁵·³ times less likely than an accidental 160-bit SHA-1 collision: http://canonical.org/~kragen/sw/dev3/rpn-edit#3_8_0_1_0_0_0_... Aside from being bullshit, it's also irrelevant, since we're discussing a collision being generated on purpose, not by accident.
Just to nitpick, I don't think that formula is valid. We're primarily interested in "unrelated" wolf attacks, but it counts the total fatalities, not the total number of fatal incidents. If we count each fatal attack as only one incident, regardless of the casualties, we get 2^-258 instead. But of course we also need to take into account where the 6-member team lives. If they all live in West Bengal, India, the consi…
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#163Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#164For the ones interested, you can use SHA-256 today. Warning: Still in experimental mode. # .gitconfig file [extensions] objectFormat = sha256
Does GitHub support this?
[1]: https://github.community/t/support-for-sha-256-hashes/157493...
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#165> The technique that the researchers developed is quite complex and required two months of computations on 900 individual GPUs.
I wonder how much money in Bitcoin they would have made if they had used those hashes to mine instead. Speaking of which, it would be funny if they were pretending to do security research but added a secret backdoor to mine bitcoin instead, somehow exporting those hashes or using the partial results of SHA-1 calculations (BTC isn't SHA-1). I'm just joking, but I wonder if that's possible. If anyone is Machiavellian e…
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#166Earlier quoted context omitted.
Random collisions in 160-bit space are incredibly unlikely. This is talking about intentional collision, and means that it's entirely feasible for someone with significant compute power to create a git commit that has the exact same hash as another git commit. This could allow someone to silently modify a git commit history to e.g. inject malware or a known "bug" into a piece of software. The modified repository woul…
Looks like there's a migration plan for git to SHA-256: https://git-scm.com/docs/hash-function-transition/
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#167My idea is a different hash construction, which is 2D construction, which has a infinite internal state and infinite output length. Each row and each column also has a sequence number input, and then there are two mixing up functions (each of which has a finite input and output of equal size than the input); part of the result is propagated horizontally and part of it vertically, so each cell has two inputs and the i…
1. How is infinite internal state and output size possible? There has to be some actual limit for internal state, at least, right? Or else you’ll just run out of memory?
2. Wouldn’t a larger output size risk leaking data? The chance of collision becomes lower, but it also seems to toy with what I understand about why we use cryptographic hashes without ridiculous output size.
3A. What happens if you want a 1 MB hash of a 1 KB file?
3B. How predictable does a super long hash become?
At what point is it no longer a one-way hash?
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#168Earlier quoted context omitted.
You'd also need the actual patch to survive future commits, especially without introducing any merge conflicts
Commits aren't patches. They contain the whole tree. Retroactively changing a commit can't possibly introduce conflicts with other commits on top of it, the worst it can do is introduce big funny-looking diffs.
The problem would be if a clone doesn't fetch the new version of the patch and generates a new commit that would conflict with the modified commit. You're changing the base all the future diffs are based off of. It might just jumble the source essentially corrupt the file, but I'm not sure.
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#169Earlier quoted context omitted.
Looks like there's a migration plan for git to SHA-256: https://git-scm.com/docs/hash-function-transition/
Last updated in 2017. What is the current status of this?
Re: SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
#170Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah I don't think any of these proposed attacks work without write access to the repo, at which point the game is already pretty much over already.
There's plenty of workflows where untrusted people have their proposed changes audited and then written to a git repo
If I'm looking at a PR which contains a hash collision with code that does a `sudo rm -rf --no-preserve-root /` and I don't accept the malicious code, the hash collision becomes irrelevant.