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Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

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161–170 of 236 posts

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#161
post #156

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>This one gets a bug tracker entry. For now. A comment from the reporter on the bug tracker entry: >A more detailed explanation of this bug and the methodology to identify it will be written up in a forthcoming blog post when I find the time.

The iOS “deep dive” was a timed media push of a months-old problem right before a major Android release. They didn’t even try to obfuscate the timing or narrative. Blog post or not it’s pretty hard to top that.

[deleted]

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#162
post #129

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In Android land you can buy a phone where the bootloader can be unlocked and directly flash a pre-rooted ROM rather than relying on people exploiting security vulnerabilities like this.

But will it have Google play services? (and pass safety-net checks)

Safety net checks that the user does not have full control of their device, so why should those checks pass?

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#163
post #129

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In Android land you can buy a phone where the bootloader can be unlocked and directly flash a pre-rooted ROM rather than relying on people exploiting security vulnerabilities like this.

But will it have Google play services? (and pass safety-net checks)

It will have Play Services if you choose to install them. And yes, it can be made to pass safety-net by rooting using Magisk.

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#164

“It’s advisable that you don’t install apps from non-trustworthy sources, ” Unpopular opinion but this is why I prefer walled garden apple for my family then alternative.

> is why I prefer walled garden apple for my family

You can install family link, which blocks that option. It's a good option for parents to keep tabs on their kids - it shows you location, and which apps are installed.

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#165
I see that samsung s series is also affected. The thing about the samsung phones is that you can root them, but that basically breaks the KNOX (secure folder) functionality forever (efuse AFAIR). Couldn't this exploit be used to root the phones while preserving knox by not tripping the efuse?

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#166

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Kudos to Epic for using their power to attempt to break Google's Play Store hegemony, facepalms for unfortunately proving one of Google's (both legit and pretended) concerns on safety and security regarding acquiring apps from outside of the Play Store.

Hasn’t the entire argument been that Android’s permission system would have prevented this even if the app was installed outside of the store?

The Epic app installed other apps using a private Samsung API, so the apps were installed using the permissions of the Samsung Galaxy Apps Store app, which has permission to install other apps (on Samsung devices). There is nothing to stop a similar confused deputy vulnerability in the iOS App Store. The Android permission system prevents it from taking pictures or doing other things it was not granted permission to do.

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#167
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

SHOULD desktop apps be like this? :D

For most people yes. For programmers and experts no. But if it was toggle-able, I would toggle "sandbox everything, don't let anything not secure run, only allow trusted apps" in a heartbeat for work machines, my parents, and so on...

You could run everything in containers.

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#168
post #132
post #123

The bug is scaringly easy to trigger. It just takes four system calls, none of which are niche or take unusual arguments. int fd, epfd; struct epoll_event event = { .events = EPOLLIN }; fd = open("/dev/binder0", O_RDONLY); epfd = epoll_create(1000); epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event); ioctl(fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);

It's interesting that even such basic usage of binder is buggy. It's long been known that binder is horrible code, but I didn't know it was quite this bad. It's unfortunate that Google chose to use a custom IPC system, binder, for Android, instead of changing Android's design to better fit Linux. If binder was in use outside Android, I expect this bug would have been caught long ago and certainly would have been back…

Judging by how much Binder's "elegant design" of BeOS pedigree was praised, I was expecting it to be quite good.

I just had a look at binder.c and the ref counting and locking in general looks like a nightmare to maintain. This reminds me of how much I hate resource management in C.

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#169

To me, the biggest part of this story is: 1. Over two years ago, this was apparently detected automatically by the syzkaller kernel fuzzer, and automatically reported on its public mailing list. [1] 2. Over a year and a half ago, it was apparently fixed in the upstream kernel. [2] 3. It was apparently never merged back to various "stable" kernels, leading to the recent CVE. [3] So you might read that and think "Ok, p…

The biggest problem is that instead of vendors submitting drivers for their devices in the mainline kernel and profit for all the fixes being done there, everyone makes a fork and there continues to work. Obviously, when merging updates from mainline kernel in the forked one, something is discarded or lost.

Re: Google, Xiaomi, and Huawei affected by zero-day flaw that unlocks root access

#170
post #102

To me, the biggest part of this story is: 1. Over two years ago, this was apparently detected automatically by the syzkaller kernel fuzzer, and automatically reported on its public mailing list. [1] 2. Over a year and a half ago, it was apparently fixed in the upstream kernel. [2] 3. It was apparently never merged back to various "stable" kernels, leading to the recent CVE. [3] So you might read that and think "Ok, p…

The failures of the Linux core team to properly prioritize security is quite well known. A lot of people have poked the bear by trying to bring this up, also with specific real examples, and got a tongue lashing from the team and moved on to other things. I'm amazed the GRSecurity people have managed to do it for so long. Even if merging their stuff mainline legitimately wasn't practical, I've seen plenty of snark an…

There is no 'Linux core team'
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