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Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

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Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tor is slow because every packet has to be routed through several random servers distributed all over the world with multiple layers of crypto at every pass. Even with plenty of top-of-the-line inner and exit nodes you will still see substantially more latency than just sending packets directly.

That wouldn't be as big an issue if all the nodes were very well connected, like positioned near big peering points, but they're not.

The "distributed all over the world" part would still be just as much of an issue; the speed of light puts a substantial lower bound on the total latency.

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#162

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ultimatest super-goal: make anonymity the default stance and socially accepted norm. Do with anonymous browsing what WhatsApp did with E2E encryption. Force big data suckers to invent new business models for exploiting our data without breaching our privacy.

Likely actual result: Firefox will become increasingly irrelevant. If Tor is going to be a built-in feature of Firefox, most employers are going to flag it as malware. This is a ridiculously dumb thing on so many levels -- promote privacy by directing your network traffic to "volunteer" proxy services?

Why would they do that? employers could still spy on you before the data gets on the tor network...

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#163

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ultimatest super-goal: make anonymity the default stance and socially accepted norm. Do with anonymous browsing what WhatsApp did with E2E encryption. Force big data suckers to invent new business models for exploiting our data without breaching our privacy.

I can't read this article because I'm at work, but unless they managed to solve the problem of Tor being very, very, very slow, this will never happen. End users will definitely notice a difference and likely won't care about their privacy. They'll just see Firefox being way slower than Chrome and switch.

This would be a privacy option for Firefox, not the default. But yes, Tor introduces latency and reduces bandwidth. For traffic to the open Internet, traffic uses circuits through three relays: entry guard, middle and exit. So there are four hops between users and websites, instead of one. The Earth's circumference is about 40 thousand km. So the longest path is arguably ~20 thousand km. And rtt for that would be about 300-500 msec, according to my measurements.[0] It's only ~130 msec at lightspeed, but there are some copper links, plus switching time and caching.

So with four hops, rtt would at most be 1200-2000 msec, if every hop were the maximum length. In practice, rtt for Tor is at most half that, and often even less. But latency is actually good if your goal is anonymity. Because it reduces the accuracy of traffic analysis.

With traditional onion sites, there are two three-relay circuits, one for the user and one for the site, plus a rendezvous relay. So rtt is much greater. However, sites can opt for one-relay circuits, sacrificing anonymity, so overall rtt isn't that bad.

Bandwidth is also reduced with Tor. Increased latency is part of that. But also, many relays have low-bandwidth uplinks, especially ones that people run at home. The Tor client does pick faster relays, but there's a tradeoff, in that doing so reduces anonymity. Increased investment in high-bandwidth relays would help a lot.

Also, with more relays, it would be workable to implement multipath circuits. Especially for onion sites, where precious exit relays aren't needed. Using MPTCP, I managed ~50 Mbps throughput for bbcp transfers between onion sites (with gigabit uplinks).[1] I was getting ~36 subflows per tcp connection.

0) https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/how-to-verify-physical-l...

1) https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmUDV2KHrAgs84oUc7z9zQmZ3whx1NB6YDPv8ZR...

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#164
post #145

Hi all. I am a Tor Project Developer and work at Mozilla on this project. We appreciate everyone's enthusiasm and feedback. Our ultimate goal is a long way away because of the amount of work to do and the necessity to match the safety of Tor Browser in Firefox when providing a Tor mode. There's no guarantee this will happen, but I hope it will and we will keep working towards it. If anyone is interested in assisting…

> You can also run Tor relays and help us improve the health of the network by working with Tor's new Relay Advocate Since I've seen this come up before in many previous discussions of Tor I think it's worth emphasizing/clarifying up front: Tor relays are not the same as Tor exit nodes. Relays do not talk to the public internet, they serve only the full encrypted internal Tor virtual network. So they won't ever send…

That said, plenty of providers use the list of tor relays (which is also public) to block traffic.

Sites such as https://www.dan.me.uk/dnsbl then help people do this.

That site in particular may "warn":

> This DNS blacklist contains ALL tor nodes (entry, transit and exit nodes) - think carefully before choosing to use this list for blocking purposes.

but anyone who doesn't understand tor simply won't understand the decision and choose ALL.

Running a relay on your own address isn't sensible because of this. Nevermind an exit node.

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So long as Tor depends on volunteers to maintain exit nodes, and with that the risk of being arrested for all sorts of criminal activity by non-tech-savvy law enforcement, this is how it'll be.

Tor is slow because every packet has to be routed through several random servers distributed all over the world with multiple layers of crypto at every pass. Even with plenty of top-of-the-line inner and exit nodes you will still see substantially more latency than just sending packets directly.

No, IPSec tunnels to remote headquarters have indistinguishable latency impacts for normal users browsing (<150ms). The bad latency is because of congestion, not crypto and multiple hops.

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#166
post #145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You can also run Tor relays and help us improve the health of the network by working with Tor's new Relay Advocate Since I've seen this come up before in many previous discussions of Tor I think it's worth emphasizing/clarifying up front: Tor relays are not the same as Tor exit nodes. Relays do not talk to the public internet, they serve only the full encrypted internal Tor virtual network. So they won't ever send…

That said, plenty of providers use the list of tor relays (which is also public) to block traffic. Sites such as https://www.dan.me.uk/dnsbl then help people do this. That site in particular may "warn": > This DNS blacklist contains ALL tor nodes (entry, transit and exit nodes) - think carefully before choosing to use this list for blocking purposes. but anyone who doesn't understand tor simply won't understand the d…

Yes, this is a common complaint from relay operators. Running relays at home, or on work networks, is risky.

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#167
post #145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You can also run Tor relays and help us improve the health of the network by working with Tor's new Relay Advocate Since I've seen this come up before in many previous discussions of Tor I think it's worth emphasizing/clarifying up front: Tor relays are not the same as Tor exit nodes. Relays do not talk to the public internet, they serve only the full encrypted internal Tor virtual network. So they won't ever send…

That said, plenty of providers use the list of tor relays (which is also public) to block traffic. Sites such as https://www.dan.me.uk/dnsbl then help people do this. That site in particular may "warn": > This DNS blacklist contains ALL tor nodes (entry, transit and exit nodes) - think carefully before choosing to use this list for blocking purposes. but anyone who doesn't understand tor simply won't understand the d…

As someone who has run a relay on my home network for years now this has never come up. At least not that I've been able to discern.

I think it might be a problem if I also ran a mail server from home, but almost nobody does that anymore.

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#168
post #126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Likely actual result: Firefox will become increasingly irrelevant. If Tor is going to be a built-in feature of Firefox, most employers are going to flag it as malware. This is a ridiculously dumb thing on so many levels -- promote privacy by directing your network traffic to "volunteer" proxy services?

You already don't know what proxies your traffic is going through. Using Tor might increase the odds of a bad actor a bit but end-to-end security is something the web is getting better at right now.

The risk now is that some bad actor is replacing TLS certificates, which is an uncommon and tamper-evident event. Tor is handing your traffic to an unknown 3rd party.

Plus, users do not understand what Tor is or how to use it.

Fighting political battles with software is dumb — the end result is going to be a permanent loss of freedom, as governments force the use of platforms with trusted app stores.

Re: Mozilla Project Fusion: Tor Integration into Firefox

#170

Hi all. I am a Tor Project Developer and work at Mozilla on this project. We appreciate everyone's enthusiasm and feedback. Our ultimate goal is a long way away because of the amount of work to do and the necessity to match the safety of Tor Browser in Firefox when providing a Tor mode. There's no guarantee this will happen, but I hope it will and we will keep working towards it. If anyone is interested in assisting…

You suck at what you do. The idea of about:config flags is ridiculous. You do nearly nothing to improve users privacy and browsers defenses against fingerprinting.

You do not even have the basics (effective cookie control, user agent control, referrer control), which means your priorities are wrong and thus you will never achieve anything.

Step aside.

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