Earlier quoted context omitted.
> spent about $57M. I have no idea how many votes they were able to get for that money. With Quadratic Voting, they'd get 7,550. Doesn't that make it seem likely that they would prefer to continue with their current strategy rather than use the money to buy votes then? It seems likely that they ended up with more than 7550 votes for their 57M, especially considering that 7550 votes would be a smaller proportion of to…
This is a great point. We address it in great depth in the paper with Posner, Voting Squared ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956 ). QV helps here, a lot we hope, because most current expenditure on advertising is useful because it targets very indifferent swing voters who feel a duty to vote but do not care one way or the other. They can easily be swayed by noisy and wasteful advertising. But…
But donating to a PAC is a really inefficient way to have a political effect. The rules governing PACs are so loose that the people controlling them can do anything they want with the money, including flying a private jet to Tahiti and drinking MaiTais during the election. Even more responsible PACs will probably not spend the money exactly the way the donor would. They might, for example, concentrate their spending on certain "key" elections and ignore the donor's favourite candidate. Or they might support all the candidates from a given party, when the donor only really cares about one of them.
With QV, the donor can put his money to work in exactly the way he wants. That might leave PACs with much less money to spend.