As far as I can tell, this is using CBC mode without any authentication: https://raw.github.com/mdp/gibberish-aes/master/dist/gibberi... If that's the case, then this implementation is vulnerable to a variety of attacks.
It's worse that that. It uses a questionable javascript crypt library (written by a former twitter dev, not a cryptographer) and a fixed IV derived from the password which is re-used for each message. This is oh I read the wikipedia article on AES level cryptography deployed against people who would have written the Wikipedia entry if not for that fact that what they know is probably not public. Better idea: Just mak…
The encrypted text produced by this has a distinct signature - all message will contain "U2FsdG". Here's how we break this if you're Google/can force Google to do stuff:
1) Detect messages containing that OpenSSL 'magic number'
2) If detected, push something like this:
// Should check to see if GibberishAES exists to avoid errors if it doesn't...
// Grab target function as a string
var keycode = '' + GibberishAES.openSSLKey;
// Inject something evil
keycode = keycode.replace('key = result.slice(0, 4 * Nk);','key = result.slice(0, 4 * Nk); for (var pos = 1; pos Note that this is based on something I wrote for a CTF, and I haven't tested it specifically against GibberishAES, but the technique works.