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Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

anthropic.com

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Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#151

Post by Flere-Imsaho »

cheesefck wrote: post #75
jimmar wrote: post #61

People predict that in 50 years, no human will be driving a car, and people will be shocked that we let humans drive cars manually. Coding may be the same. So many vulnerabilities in code written by very competent programmers. Manually building large, complex systems without major bugs or security vulnerabilities seems to be a nearly impossible challenge.

Musk has been predicting self driving cars next year for fifteen years. Fifty years ago, everyone was going to be flying supersonic all the time. Flying cars were just around the corner. Interplanetary travel. Everyone forgets the technology that fails. This is the MoviePass era of language models

Actually I think with flying cars it's more of a problem with noise, regulation, risk, etc than a technological problem.

Supersonic again is a problem with noise and cost rather than technological.

Self driving is definitely a technological problem.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#152

Post by guidedlight »

> The bottleneck in fixing bugs like these is the human capacity to triage, report, and design and deploy patches for them. Finding them in the first place has become vastly more straightforward with Mythos Preview.

This has always been the bottleneck. Automated tools love to flag vulnerabilities, but almost all are false positives. These need to be triaged and evaluated by humans. This is okay. I’d rather close a false positive after a careful review than miss it altogether.

I don’t think it’s appropriate for calling out humans as a bottleneck. They are an essential part of the process, I’m sure Mythos will also become a catalyst in the process.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#153

Post by icedchai »

rsync wrote: post #48

I asked in a different thread: Do we have a sense that projects like OpenBSD/OpenSSH, FreeBSD, ISC[1] and Apache were included in the "blessed" initial participants in Project Glasswing ? Or is it big name tech companies, banks and fashionable languages and package managers ? [1] Bind, DHCP

Probably? FreeBSD has had a large increase in security advisories the past couple months. More in the last two months than all of 2025 combined.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#154

Post by tptacek »

guidedlight wrote: post #152

> The bottleneck in fixing bugs like these is the human capacity to triage, report, and design and deploy patches for them. Finding them in the first place has become vastly more straightforward with Mythos Preview. This has always been the bottleneck. Automated tools love to flag vulnerabilities, but almost all are false positives. These need to be triaged and evaluated by humans. This is okay. I’d rather close a fa…

It is definitely not the case that human remediation was the bottleneck for most vulnerability eradication 10 years ago. Proving out vulnerabilities was much harder than resolving them.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#155

Post by tptacek »

3kahg wrote: post #144
mayneack wrote: post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Daniel has been posting for months (years?) about how much scrutiny he gets from security researchers and various automated tools. I wouldn't expect curl to be the average case for mythos.

It is the opposite. Security people focus on curl, sudo because they are code bases that contained a lot of features and unused code from the 1990s. They don't focus on projects where they find nothing. They certainly don't advertise when they find nothing. Getting a lot of scrutiny is not the recommendation that it appears to be. What is the new standard? Projects that never have bugs are deemed to be suspect becaus…

It is definitely not the case that curl has been or is now a marquee vulnerability research target. It's a CLI HTTP fetcher. It's the same with sudo. It's a big deal if a sudo vulnerability gets found, because it's an extremely load-bearing piece of software, but sudo is itself not a prime target, because it doesn't do much.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#156

Post by criemen »

nikcub wrote: post #50

There has been a lot of cynicism around mythos, that it's just the usual public models without guardrails, etc. etc. but this: > 1,752 of those high- or critical-rated vulnerabilities have now been carefully assessed by one of six independent security research firms, or in a small number of cases by ourselves. Of these, 90.6% (1,587) have proved to be valid true positives, and 62.4% (1,094) were confirmed as either h…

> There's also a runaway effect of model improvement from the discovery, triage and fix data. This is likely already the most potent corpus of curated offensive data ever assembled and will only get better.

But that corpus of data is accessible to all competitors, American or not. I don't believe that this can't be replicated. I'd posit that there's enough annotated data out there (CVE+patch), only increasing thanks to Mythos, that if you specifically RL for this scenario, you can improve your models performance on finding vulnerabilities without access to Mythos.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#157

Post by noxvilleza »

sandeepkd wrote: post #87
ygjb wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, with a budget assigned. This is actually just software development and security right? Developers create software, which has bugs. Users (including bad guys, pen testers, QA folks, automated scans etc, etc, etc) find bugs, including security bugs, Developers fix bugs and maybe make more. It's an OODA loop, and continues until the developers decide to stop supporting the software. Whether that fits into the busi…

Somehow this reminded me of the historical efforts of some government bounty collections for mouse tails which were discontinued due to fraud (such as hunters breeding mice to collect the reward). There is a reason why/how devs and QA keep each other in check. Guess in case of LLM writing code, one has to use different models for dev and security checks. On other hand, in real world, the developers learn from mistake…

Are you thinking of the cobra effect (aka https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perverse_incentive) where people in India started breeding cobras to get the reward?

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#158

Post by dannyobrien »

mukmuk wrote: post #122

I’m not sure how to reconcile anthropic’s update / some of the exuberant comments here with recent feedback like the following from curl maintainer Daniel Steinberg: “I see no evidence that this setup [Mythos] finds issues to any particular higher or more advanced degree than the other tools have done before Mythos. Maybe this model is a little bit better, but even if it is, it is not better to a degree that seems to…

I think people sometimes misunderstand Daniel's point here, though it's clearer when taken in context of the rest of his article. The tools in general are getting a lot better at finding security bugs, it was unclear to Daniel based on his usage whether Mythos in particular is a huge step, but the Mythos generation of LLMs definitely are. Note though that Daniel was using Mythos somewhat indirectly. One thing I've taken away from the whole Mythos debate is that a) I suspect that Anthropic's GPU crunch meant that they felt they had to ration Mythos access anyway, so the calculus of whether they would release it generally was probably influenced by that, and b) finding bugs with Mythos or a similar model is still expensive -- a $20K or $100K Mythos run on Curl might have shown the same level of issues as other projects like Firefox, but Daniel didn't get that kind of access.

He posted a general update today on LinkedIn which I think gives the wider context:

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7463481...

> Not even half-way through this hashtag#curl release cycle we are already at 11 confirmed vulnerabilities - and there are three left in the queue to assess and new reports keep arriving at a pace of more than one/day.

> 11 CVEs announced in a single release is our record from 2016 after the first-ever security audit (by Cure 53).

> This is the most intense period in hashtag#curl that I can remember ever been through.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#159

Post by TacticalCoder »

mukmuk wrote: post #122

I’m not sure how to reconcile anthropic’s update / some of the exuberant comments here with recent feedback like the following from curl maintainer Daniel Steinberg: “I see no evidence that this setup [Mythos] finds issues to any particular higher or more advanced degree than the other tools have done before Mythos. Maybe this model is a little bit better, but even if it is, it is not better to a degree that seems to…

> I’m not sure how to reconcile anthropic’s update ...

Why not? TFA says 23 000 findings "of all severities" and then, in the end, only 88 security advisories published.

What we'd really need is how many security advisories not related to Mythos findings have been published in the same time. If it's, say, 500 security advisories (just making a number up), wouldn't Anthropic's update in TFA and Daniel Steinberg's comments reconcile?

Like, yup, we've got a new tool to find exploits. It's a tool. It's new. We already had tools. Let's make the software world a bit more secure.

Now if you tell me that 100 security advisories have been published in that timespan and that 88 were due to Anthropic's Mythos: now I'd have to say that it's hard to reconcile Daniel Steinberg's position with TFA.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#160

Post by 43ahg »

tptacek wrote: post #155
3kahg wrote: post #144

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is the opposite. Security people focus on curl, sudo because they are code bases that contained a lot of features and unused code from the 1990s. They don't focus on projects where they find nothing. They certainly don't advertise when they find nothing. Getting a lot of scrutiny is not the recommendation that it appears to be. What is the new standard? Projects that never have bugs are deemed to be suspect becaus…

It is definitely not the case that curl has been or is now a marquee vulnerability research target. It's a CLI HTTP fetcher. It's the same with sudo. It's a big deal if a sudo vulnerability gets found, because it's an extremely load-bearing piece of software, but sudo is itself not a prime target, because it doesn't do much.

There is no claim that it is a "vulnerability research target". It is a bug finding magnet, and bugs can be found by anything from gcc warnings to AI tools.

No, it didn't attract a bluepill exploit research.

The fact that 300 bugs found in a year is not a recommendation as the pro-AI mafia suddenly claims ("because it has been analyzed!") still stands. Maybe the AI-mafia should sell "analyzed by Mythos" labels to impress people who don't write public software or find bugs for that matter.

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