Also Meshtastic.org is a cheap (various It supports strong encryption layer and over 1 km/mile per “hop” in most circumstances. Designed originally for off grid, it’s very flexible and pretty polished. Abstracts your phone into a UI. Has a whole ecosystem behind it. I’ve been using it for festivals and tracking my vehicles (high theft area) for years. Very handy should infra not be available. Should be great for prot…
The protester's guide to smartphone security
151–160 of 246 posts
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#152Also Meshtastic.org is a cheap (various It supports strong encryption layer and over 1 km/mile per “hop” in most circumstances. Designed originally for off grid, it’s very flexible and pretty polished. Abstracts your phone into a UI. Has a whole ecosystem behind it. I’ve been using it for festivals and tracking my vehicles (high theft area) for years. Very handy should infra not be available. Should be great for prot…
how have you been able to use it at festivals? I tried it once and maybe the default settings are terrible but no communication could be achieved. There were dozens of other nodes that it found in a tight space and I think the entire network was saturated with pings/messages that I couldn't get mine to work. Are there settings to change that get around network saturation issues?
If you just want to talk to a few friends, don't bother with the default public mesh config, setup your own with encryption enabled.
Don't use longfast, use a higher speed setting if possible. Longfast will go 10km+ in optimal conditions and in a city environment, won't go any further than medfast.
Don't use the default radio channel, pick another one.
MAKE SURE ALL SYSTEMS ARE CONFIGURED IDENTICALLY - meshtastic is picky about all the radio settings being the same for bits to go through. It cannot figure out that the sender is using a faster/slower bitrate than you are so you will just get nothing. Do not attempt to use them until you've verified that all systems reliably send and receive messages in an uncontested environment. It's very easy to misconfigure meshtastic but once you do, fixing it in the field is going to be very difficult.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#153Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#154Infact it's probably not the best idea to protest (in a crowd) anymore. The cops know how to kettle, and they have the tech edge. Activists need to think and act more asymmetrically.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#155Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#156Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well the whole point of hiding your tracks is evading law enforcement, why would you care if it’s illegal? Or is it because of the „only do one crime at a time“ thing?
Why do you assume this is about doing illegal things? This is about protests, many of which never turn into riots or illegal acts.
... but it benefits the state if people think it's the same ...
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#157Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why do you assume this is about doing illegal things? This is about protests, many of which never turn into riots or illegal acts.
I was thinking along the lines of „the state wants to oppress the protestors and makes it illegal“, but if you just want to avoid surveillance at a legal protest, yeah, you’re right.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#158Earlier quoted context omitted.
While this is good info, it should also be known that in the USA, a judge (maybe and police officer?) can legally command you to unlock your phone via biometrics, but they cannot legally command you to unlock via password or passphrase. “Legally command” = command you to do something with the force of law, and legally punish you if you resist
The reasoning behind this is that your fingerprints and face etc. are public knowledge. Whereas you can retain your right to remain silent (about your password/PIN), failing to provide these aspects of your person can be viewed as not cooperating.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#159Earlier quoted context omitted.
Burner phones aren't safe. Security through obscurity worked with the 1990s cell network but not with today's vast logging/geolocation tagging.
The idea is that they can’t tie the phone to a person. You also have to make sure you don’t get the burner phone some place with cameras.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#160Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, I think a key point here is recognizing that the law isn’t always aligned with morality, depending on the issue you’re protesting for/against.
How would you feel if your political opponents made similar justifications? Are they laws for the thee and not for me?
So yes, to answer your question, I think my political opponents should be able to protest. If the state doesn’t allow them to, I am fine with them using tools to protect themselves legally.
The line I draw this at is violence and looting from innocents.
It seems you phrased your response as a “gotcha” but I’m really not sure what point you’re trying to make?