Earlier quoted context omitted.
> To someone like me with hobby-level serving needs, the 90 day certificate life is pretty inconvenient I's only inconvenient because it isn't properly automated. That's by design. When this can be a acme.sh script cronjob, there isn't much of an excuse. Even my Raspberry Pi dedicated to my 3D printer is happily renewing certificates. At least with this thing breaking every 90 days you have it fresh on your mind. One…
What does your 3D printer Pi serve such that it needs a cert? Do you have ports 80 and 443 open and forwarded to it?
Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
151–160 of 166 posts
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#152Earlier quoted context omitted.
I cannot say that this works as flawless as some would advertise, with just as script running every 90 days. Some services do not load certificates while running and must be restarted. That alone can be a hassle. Some software now uses short lived certificates and even with decent configurations, there is an elevated level of problems specifically because of certificates. Especially in networks that use a lot of segm…
It is not just a script running every 90 days. It's also monitoring that the script didn't break, cron didn't break (you know, cron sometimes breaks after the PAM package update), your account didn't get banned, and that your domain name is not affected by a mass revocation.
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#153Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you have multiple hosts the set should not be the same, no? From the linked page the comparison is a set comparison: one host at hosta.example.com and one host at hostb.example.com each with their own cert bot won't conflict.
You never host the same website on two servers?
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#154I don't disagree with anything they say here: https://letsencrypt.org/2025/01/16/6-day-and-ip-certs/#short... But... How often do these types of compromises happen? I can't say I've ever seen or heard of it happening.
I had to revoke the certs and in anticipation I pulled together customer support, engineering, legal, various security orgs in the event that revocation would cause outages from cached certs from middle boxes of which there were plenty or other weird b2b setups.
It turned out to be a nothing-burger. None of the browsers or MitM proxies actually did anything with revocation and happily used the revoked certs without even a single warning from tens of millions of end users and system. This was around 2014. Curious if that has changed and if anyone here has tested revocation in a staging environment that has devices that cache certs.
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#155Earlier quoted context omitted.
Unsurprisingly the 100% true comment in here is gray: PKI is breaking the Internet and because the PKI folks have literally no guardrails of any kind, they're committed to breaking it further despite still virtually zero benefit from constantly making the Internet more fragile . But hey, there's an upside: When they finally break this toy badly enough, everyone will finally evict the CAB from their lives and do somet…
> They're committed to breaking it further despite still virtually zero benefit from constantly making the Internet more fragile. I think that shorter cert lifetimes and the push for more automation is a valid direction to look in and work towards. But at the same time that means that there's a certain skill floor and also certain tech that you need to have in place to be able to work with all of that. Back in the da…
Second, I think the statistic is that 81% of businesses have had an outage due to certificate expiry. So you need to understand that making certs expire more is inherently damaging. Automation breaks so even automated shorter-lifetime certificates will still accelerate and increase this damage.
And finally, nobody who's ever tried justifying the CAB's behavior has actually been able to demonstrate the CAB is solving real world problems. I want someone from the CAB to show me a real world exploit that happened that was because someone got a hold of a certificate between 7 and 90 days old and was able to use that maliciously.
If someone from the CAB can't do that, the entire CAB should be disbanded.
Regarding your "skill issue" comment, it really only demonstrates you have some growing up to do. There's a lot of real world complexity in operating business-critical and life-critical services, and it's obvious you lack experience with both.
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#156While we're on the subject of cert lifetimes. Is there a longer lived, public CA-issued cert for TLS client purposes? I sometimes deal with a relying party that insists on public CA issued certs for TLS client use, and then makes rotation very painful behind a portal with 2FA etc. This would be fine if public CAs issued certs for 5 years but they seem to be limited to 1 year now because of browser policy.
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#157Earlier quoted context omitted.
> They're committed to breaking it further despite still virtually zero benefit from constantly making the Internet more fragile. I think that shorter cert lifetimes and the push for more automation is a valid direction to look in and work towards. But at the same time that means that there's a certain skill floor and also certain tech that you need to have in place to be able to work with all of that. Back in the da…
So first and foremost, nearly every enterprise organization is still shifting a few files every 11 months thanks to the CAB. This isn't the past, it's the present. Second, I think the statistic is that 81% of businesses have had an outage due to certificate expiry. So you need to understand that making certs expire more is inherently damaging . Automation breaks so even automated shorter-lifetime certificates will st…
I believe that this is out of place and perhaps a result of reading things with an uncharitable interpretation.
The skill floor part of the comment isn't me attempting to blame someone, but rather point out that needing this sort of automation complicates things and adds friction. If the only certificates that you get for free (e.g. Let's Encrypt) are short lived, then you can't just sit down once a year and move some files around, you need certbot / mod_md / Caddy and all that comes with it. Of course, you still have the longer lived commercial certs, but it's odd to see how the trend is shifting towards ACME. Not the end of the world for most, but also something that a mom & pop shop might prefer not to deal with. Or, you know, environments with specific requirements.
> So you need to understand that making certs expire more is inherently damaging.
For this, I make no claims one way or the other. To me, concerns about long lived certificates seem valid, as do those about short lived ones, both have risks associated with them. Which is the better approach? You decide for yourself. Except most people don't get to decide and just have to roll along with whatever the industry at large settles on.
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#158Earlier quoted context omitted.
So first and foremost, nearly every enterprise organization is still shifting a few files every 11 months thanks to the CAB. This isn't the past, it's the present. Second, I think the statistic is that 81% of businesses have had an outage due to certificate expiry. So you need to understand that making certs expire more is inherently damaging . Automation breaks so even automated shorter-lifetime certificates will st…
> Regarding your "skill issue" comment, it really only demonstrates you have some growing up to do. There's a lot of real world complexity in operating business-critical and life-critical services, and it's obvious you lack experience with both. I believe that this is out of place and perhaps a result of reading things with an uncharitable interpretation. The skill floor part of the comment isn't me attempting to bla…
In any good risk management scenario you have to weigh the cost/benefit of a change in terms of what benefits it offers and what tradeoffs it has. The CAB has repeatedly demonstrated complete inability to consider the risk profile of their behavior. They are unqualified for the job, and unfortunately, accountable to noone.
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#159While we're on the subject of cert lifetimes. Is there a longer lived, public CA-issued cert for TLS client purposes? I sometimes deal with a relying party that insists on public CA issued certs for TLS client use, and then makes rotation very painful behind a portal with 2FA etc. This would be fine if public CAs issued certs for 5 years but they seem to be limited to 1 year now because of browser policy.
Server certs will be losing the clientAuth EKU this year, so those will be out. SMIME certs may start to drop it too. I don’t know many CAs that will do a clientAuth only cert from a public CA, largely because it’s unnecessary. If it’s for auth, use a private CA.
Is this documented anywhere?
Re: Six day and IP address certificate options in 2025
#160What are reasons to use a certificate for an IP? Why wouldn't you use a name? Someone already mentioned that it's needed for Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR) for DNS-over-HTTPS. Anything else?