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A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

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Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> One of my first questions of the bank was: who issued their certificate …what did the certificate say? > whole process was based upon blind trust If I offer someone a ride and they start quizzing me on what differential I’m driving, I’m going to ignore them. That isn’t requiring blind trust, it’s just the wrong place and way to get the information you’re asking for.

The problem with that analogy is that the cert issuer isn't a mere component of the car, but the entire car in this instance. That cert being trustworthy is the entire point. When I was in schooling getting filled in on Web of Trust, I about ground that particular day's class to a halt because I couldn't imagine the world was that cavalier on such a thing. Lo and behold, I realized shortly afterward it absolutely was…

[deleted]

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#152
post #85

Tangentially related: The system is deeply flawed, which is something I realized fifteen years ago when I was put into a situation where I had to use online banking. (Had to being the nearest branch of any bank was an hour long flight away, though there was an ice road you could use in the winter.) One of my first questions of the bank was: who issued their certificate. They didn't have a clue what I was talking abou…

How does knowing the issuer of the certificate tell you anything if any CA can make certificates for your bank domain? If the answer was „sure, we use GlobalSign“, is that good or bad? If the Brazilian CA is malicious, they can still MITM you, right?

(Assuming certificate pinning doesn’t exist, which was the case 10 years ago and is true now, too)

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#153
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whomever has this fake certificate can run a server and say it's google.com and windows will say "yep you are" with the little green lock.

Where? In Edge you mean?

And everything that uses the OS trust store, when run on Windows, I assume.

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#154
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whomever has this fake certificate can run a server and say it's google.com and windows will say "yep you are" with the little green lock.

The certificate is for a specific IP address, no? And without DNS pointing google.com to that IP address, it's pretty useless.

> And without DNS pointing google.com to that IP address, it's pretty useless.

On the internet itself maybe, but you can still MITM people on some network, right?

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Microsoft is many things but not incompetent.

From a security standpoint that's debatable. Multiple RCEs and critical CVEs cannot be fixed because Microsoft "lost" the source code. So they disclosed those RCEs but without any solution or fix. (Not kidding, sadly, look it up, there also have been occasional binary patches because of the same reason) [1] https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide

Do you have a link for the „lost sourcecode so we won’t patch“ claim? The link you gave just gives me a long list of patches.

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#156

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> an even worse look for Microsoft. Microsoft have a terrible reputation for security, which they've earned through doing stuff like this. It's not likely to get any better any time soon either, as their trajectory is still pointed downwards.

I don’t know enough to comment on that reputation, but this surprises me. They’re known for being great at serving and selling to the enterprise, frequently at the expense of end users, and big enterprises/govts care a lot about security usually. Even if much of that caring is box ticking rather than actually looking into the security (hello ISO27001), you’d expect it to result in generally a security conscious cultu…

> but this surprises me

Unfortunately, it's true. People used to relying on Microsoft understandably don't want it to be so, so they're in for a rough time trying to figure out actually workable alternatives. :(

This has been an ongoing problem for years, and every time some new problem is found Microsoft just trots out the PR promises that they'll do better. Without then doing any better.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/10/how-a... (2022)

https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/08/microsoft-cloud-sec... (2023)

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/04/micro... (2024)

For the US government's official perspective on Microsoft's security competence, there's the federal Cyber Safety Review Board report released in April this year:

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/CSRB_Review... (2024)

  "Throughout this review, the board identified a series of
  Microsoft operational and strategic decisions that collectively
  points to a corporate culture that deprioritized both enterprise
  security investments and rigorous risk management," the report
  reads.
And so on.

Note that the problems didn't start in 2022, that's just the earliest I could be bothered looking with minimal effort. ;)

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#158

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> One of my first questions of the bank was: who issued their certificate …what did the certificate say? > whole process was based upon blind trust If I offer someone a ride and they start quizzing me on what differential I’m driving, I’m going to ignore them. That isn’t requiring blind trust, it’s just the wrong place and way to get the information you’re asking for.

The problem with that analogy is that the cert issuer isn't a mere component of the car, but the entire car in this instance. That cert being trustworthy is the entire point. When I was in schooling getting filled in on Web of Trust, I about ground that particular day's class to a halt because I couldn't imagine the world was that cavalier on such a thing. Lo and behold, I realized shortly afterward it absolutely was…

> problem with that analogy is that the cert issuer isn't a mere component of the car, but the entire car in this instance

I'm critising OP for castiglating a bank employee for not knowing who their CA is. That's not something a line employee needs to know. And that's not the appropriate way to ask that.

If I want to know who issued HN's certificate, I don't e-mail a YC associate. I look at my browser and see it's Let's Encrypt.

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#159
post #52
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unlike web browsers, digital signature use cases should perform revocation checks, so revoking the google.com certificate should solve that.

The problem here isn't really that one mis-issued certificate, but rather the general problematic behavior of that CA reported in TFA. If a CA can be convinced to issue a server certificate for google.com, would you feel very comfortable trusting their contract/deed/... signing certificates?

If the government says you need to use their CA, you may feel the feelings, but you will still use them

Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com

#160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> an even worse look for Microsoft. Microsoft have a terrible reputation for security, which they've earned through doing stuff like this. It's not likely to get any better any time soon either, as their trajectory is still pointed downwards.

I don’t know enough to comment on that reputation, but this surprises me. They’re known for being great at serving and selling to the enterprise, frequently at the expense of end users, and big enterprises/govts care a lot about security usually. Even if much of that caring is box ticking rather than actually looking into the security (hello ISO27001), you’d expect it to result in generally a security conscious cultu…

That's the problem, the only security culture it produces is thinking of security as annoying box ticking.
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