Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Can we agree that we both exist, but we have differing models for what the necessary constituents of that existence are? Of course, yes. > I can certainly imagine creatures with brain-driven consciousness but without a soul This would probably be the heart of the disagreement. I don't believe this is possible. Such a creature would not have qualia. And, as a species, I don't think we're any closer to resolving this…
> This would probably be the heart of the disagreement OK, sounds like we're agreed there. If souls are required for consciousness, then I guess we could try to decide which creatures are conscious by first deciding which have souls? Would that question be any easier to answer that way around?
I would probably say "consciousness is the soul" rather than "souls are required for consciousness," but either way I don't see how that helps the fundamental issue that it's impossible to physically prove another creature's interiority, including humans.