Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Welcome To Life

tomscott.com

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

151–160 of 188 posts

Re: Welcome To Life

#151

Post by batista »

ingenium wrote: post #136
batista wrote: post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Whats the problem with that? How is it any different than what happens to your body on a day-to-day basis, now, anyway? Or how is it different that going into sleep and waking up?

Going to sleep does not cause the brain to actually power off. It's still running, your consciousness is just different. You still wake up from loud noises and light, and external stimuli can still influence your dreams.

>Going to sleep does not cause the brain to actually power off. It's still running, your consciousness is just different. You still wake up from loud noises and light, and external stimuli can still influence your dreams.

Anesthesia, then, or fainting. You cannot wake up from loud noises, and you have no consciousness.

One can also image a transfer process that is just like what naturally happens with regular body cells changing every 7 years or so.

E.g your brain is slowly, over a period of years, replaced cell by cell with new compatible neurons. One by one, your old neurons are replaced with the new, designed ones.

Those can read the state of the neuron they exchange AND exchange signals with your regular neurons, so before and after one is replaced, your brain is still functioning normally. No "power off" phase.

How about that?

Re: Welcome To Life

#152

Post by Dysiode »

sodiumphosphate wrote: post #36

While it does make for some entertaining fiction, and may provide some benefits to the living, I do not believe that 'uploading' is a desirable experience. In fact, I don't believe that one can experience it at all. Imagine the procedure (for a conscious person): your brain is connected to a computer interface and a copy of your mind is taken. Great. Now there is a digital copy of your mind. So what? You still get to…

I'm wholly relieved that someone else thinks this way too ( still aware of the fact that most thoughts aren't unique). I never came to the conclusion of metamorphosis, however.

Just felt a need to express my experience of camaraderie on the subject.

Re: Welcome To Life

#153

Post by nova »

gmaslov wrote: post #125
jterce wrote: post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, of course both are. But still, you're only ever going to be conscious from the perspective contained within the original you. The copy may be mathematically identical, but it does not make sense that there would be any kind of a magical transition of consciousness from one to the other. The other "you" would have its own consciousness entirely separate from yours. I.e., if you copy yourself and kill the original…

Well, I believe this line of thinking leads to the inescapable conclusion that consciousness is only an illusion.

Consciousness means different things.

If by consciousness you mean introspection or self-modeling or something like that then consciousness is definitely real. But it's just a property that some minds have, and that someday will probably be analyzed and replicated in silico.

But if you mean some kind of special conserved "essence" that makes you "you" in addition of your memories... then yes, it's probably just an illusion.

Which is a disturbing thought, I admit.

Re: Welcome To Life

#154

Post by nu23 »

sodiumphosphate wrote: post #36

While it does make for some entertaining fiction, and may provide some benefits to the living, I do not believe that 'uploading' is a desirable experience. In fact, I don't believe that one can experience it at all. Imagine the procedure (for a conscious person): your brain is connected to a computer interface and a copy of your mind is taken. Great. Now there is a digital copy of your mind. So what? You still get to…

In your metamorphosis example, is the finished project essentially be a robot? Would you have the same problem when a software agent is transferred from one computer to another?

Assume a negative answer. Then, the interesting implicit belief, is that there is something special about body composition. Whereas in physical law, there is nothing unique in principle about the body. So, the laws would have to be wrong or incomplete(fail to include consciousness) in an important way.

Re: Welcome To Life

#155

Post by nova »

koide wrote: post #135
nova wrote: post #115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Words fail me. Imagine I have a magical device with which I can "stop time", or more precisely, stop movement of all particles except mine. In the beginning I am at our right. I stop time, move leisurely to your left and resume time. What you see is me teleporting from your right to your left. You don't feel "trapped in a body who can't move", because your neurons are also magically frozen. Your consciousness feel co…

I will read what you suggest, but perhaps you can illustrate how would the sensation of identity will transfer from the physical body to the digital body? Because your example does not explain it.

The sensation of identity is part of your memories and goes with them when copied.

Re: Welcome To Life

#156

Post by DeepDuh »

unimpressive wrote: post #145
DeepDuh wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Welcome to "Death"/null.

This. It's all but explicitly stated on the screen. Notice the notice informing you that your "simulated personality" will be terminated upon refusal to accept the TOS. Not that it matters, clones don't have souls, like twins. [0] [0]: http://www.thinkwithportals.com/comic/#22

Thinking about it, OPs concept may have potential for a game. Something in the style of Introversion's "Darwinia" (I highly recommend it btw.), but with first person gameplay. The linked video could perfectly serve as an intro to the game. It could have a very immersive effect, e.g. no menus or splashscreen or anything. The gameplay could adopt some elements from the "Myst" series. The setup for these games could easily be a passage of the player's character to the netherworld anyways.

sigh damn. Too many ideas, not enough time. Imagine if you could program in your afterlife. Imagine all the projects you could do with infinite amounts of time. Humanity's progress would get another exponential factor attached.

Re: Welcome To Life

#157

Post by koide »

nova wrote: post #155
koide wrote: post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I will read what you suggest, but perhaps you can illustrate how would the sensation of identity will transfer from the physical body to the digital body? Because your example does not explain it.

The sensation of identity is part of your memories and goes with them when copied.

Yes, but it will create a new sensation of identity on the copy, which would be equal but separate to yours. That's the gist of the point. See my other answers around this subthread.

Re: Welcome To Life

#158

Post by olalonde »

notJim wrote: post #146
jterce wrote: post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, of course both are. But still, you're only ever going to be conscious from the perspective contained within the original you. The copy may be mathematically identical, but it does not make sense that there would be any kind of a magical transition of consciousness from one to the other. The other "you" would have its own consciousness entirely separate from yours. I.e., if you copy yourself and kill the original…

I think I might understand what you're saying. Let's say we can copy me. As in, we make another me (let's call him me* ) that is physically identical to me in every possible way. I believe your argument is that I will continue to be me, and me* will essentially be a different person. If I die, that's it. me* lives on, but I am not me* , I am me. The interesting question, which your parent (in the thread) posits an an…

Wouldn't me and me's consciousness diverge after a few hours experiencing different things in different places? If so, would me agree to suicide knowing that me is still alive?

Re: Welcome To Life

#159

Post by olalonde »

jlgreco wrote: post #88
gaius wrote: post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can a human solve the Halting Problem (without necessarily being able to express that solution as a program)? Does even recognizing the Halting Problem take us out of what is computable?

No, I see no evidence whatsoever for a human being able to solve the halting problem. "recognizing" it is irrelevant and poorly defined.

Could you describe an algorithm that a human would fail to decide wether it will halt or not?

Re: Welcome To Life

#160

Post by GreenNight »

nooneelse wrote: post #124
GreenNight wrote: post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You have an old car, and you want to renew it. If you buy it brand new and toss the old one, you are destroying the old one. If you keep changing pieces of it, testing them to see they work, and keep going until you have replaced the whole car, it's still the old car, just brand new. There's not much difference at the end, except that you can consider that the second way of doing things will let you still use the old…

I largely agree that gradual replacement has the far better claim to preservation of identity. I would have hardly any desire to be uploaded any other way. However, the car of Theseus example allows for a worrisome wrinkle. What if you kept all the old parts during the process you describe, and then after, you re-assembled them? Which car has the superior claim to being identical with the old car? I think it obvious…

Not for me. For me that's a brand new old car.

Yes, it has all the parts of the old car, and only those pieces, but it was assembled anew from zero.

A more difficult dichotomy would be: what if we exchange parts between two cars until each one is the other one. That's hard to decide.

Post reply on HN