Earlier quoted context omitted.
SSH Certs are not related to x509 PKI certs. SSH certs are created with ssh-keygen and is the result of one key signing another. The public portion of the signing key (ie. the “cert”) needs to be distributed separately.
Did you follow the link? The point was exactly setting up X.509 PKI for SSH authentication. Yes, it can be used with SSH, that was the GP's point.
SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
151–160 of 206 posts
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#152SSH over QUIC would be nice. I don't see any advantage of layering HTTP/3 here. It adds more friction, and the only advantage it brings is being able to "hide" the SSH server over a URL path. I guess x.509 certificates would be fine, but SSH hostkeys, SSHFP or TOFU is enough and far more secure (because it implicitly pins the server public key). It's a relatively new project from the looks of it, so I'd definitely no…
They list other advantages in the README such as tying into the web authentication model, which is pretty big for enterprise use as everything moves towards OIDC. If they could eventually use passkeys that’d be really nice.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#153This seems bad? - SSH3 is a bad name: this isn't a successor to SSHv2 and will only cause confusion - The authors don't seem to understand that SSHv2 predates all of their chosen technologies, and provides "robust and time-tested mechanisms" they claim to be adding - How is "hiding your server behind a secret link" a feature? This is, at best, security through obscurity, which can be layered on any network protocol (…
> Some SSH implementations such as OpenSSH or Tectia support other ways to authenticate users. Among them is the certificate-based user authentication: only users in possession of a certificate signed by a trusted certificate authority (CA) can gain access to the remote server [12]. Available for more than 10 years, this authentication method requires setting up a CA and distributing the certificates to new users and is still not commonly used nowadays.
Somebody had an agenda to make SSH look as bad as possible. You can implement OIDC authentication with keyboard-interactive, no need for HTTP/3 for that. However, it gets very tricky if you want automated / script access, so it doesn't solve the authentication problem.
As an aside, Tatu Ylonen, the original author of the SSH protocol, published a paper in 2019 titled "SSH Key Management Challenges and Requirements"[1], which is an interesting read. It would seem the authors of this paper should have at least read it.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#154Earlier quoted context omitted.
* depending on your web server/reverse proxy configuration [for instance, I run Kestrel and it really isn't designed to target more than one site; I do it, but it's like bending that Lego brick to make it fit where it shouldn't go]
Yes I suppose, although you can always put a web server that does support it (like nginx) in front of your web server that doesn't support it.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#155Earlier quoted context omitted.
They list other advantages in the README such as tying into the web authentication model, which is pretty big for enterprise use as everything moves towards OIDC. If they could eventually use passkeys that’d be really nice.
SSH supports passkeys: https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/#_fido2
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#156SSH over QUIC would be nice. I don't see any advantage of layering HTTP/3 here. It adds more friction, and the only advantage it brings is being able to "hide" the SSH server over a URL path. I guess x.509 certificates would be fine, but SSH hostkeys, SSHFP or TOFU is enough and far more secure (because it implicitly pins the server public key). It's a relatively new project from the looks of it, so I'd definitely no…
They list other advantages in the README such as tying into the web authentication model, which is pretty big for enterprise use as everything moves towards OIDC. If they could eventually use passkeys that’d be really nice.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#157Earlier quoted context omitted.
SSH supports passkeys: https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/#_fido2
With hardware tokens, yes, I use that. I was thinking that building it on a web server would be really handy with an integrated client you could use with iCloud, Windows Hello, etc.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#158SSH over QUIC would be nice. I don't see any advantage of layering HTTP/3 here. It adds more friction, and the only advantage it brings is being able to "hide" the SSH server over a URL path. I guess x.509 certificates would be fine, but SSH hostkeys, SSHFP or TOFU is enough and far more secure (because it implicitly pins the server public key). It's a relatively new project from the looks of it, so I'd definitely no…
Ssh hostkeys offer no solution for first connect to ephemeral hosts.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#159This seems bad? - SSH3 is a bad name: this isn't a successor to SSHv2 and will only cause confusion - The authors don't seem to understand that SSHv2 predates all of their chosen technologies, and provides "robust and time-tested mechanisms" they claim to be adding - How is "hiding your server behind a secret link" a feature? This is, at best, security through obscurity, which can be layered on any network protocol (…
"Security by obscurity" is only a thing if you're relying on that mechanism for security. People already configure SSH port knocking as you noted. It can be considered attack surface reduction and is a good feature given they're not using a secret link for any security control.
One benefit of their approach might be how you can use TLS pki now instead if setting up ssh-ca's. Potentially you would need to manage less pki.
But a criticism I have is how http* has much more vulns and new attack techniques being developed all the time unlike ssh. I can imagine LFI or request smuggling on the same http/2 web server causing RCE via their protocol.
Re: SSH3: SSHv2 using HTTP/3 and QUIC
#160Assuming one could connect to an SSH server this way and tunnel ports, could this allow for a means to bypass China's GFW?
China's firewall allows http and https connections through however VPNs, SSH and similar are detected upon connection and blocked on demand.
Hiding a VPN connection by tunneling to a remote SSH server over HTTP/3, forwarding the VPN port and connecting to it might fly under the radar as it could be perceived as regular web traffic.
Would be an interesting thing to try.