Earlier quoted context omitted.
The original qMail author, Dan Berstein (DJB) was so convinced of the infallibility of his code that he put up a monetary reward for any exploits. This context came about because DJB, as a professor of Computer Science, maintained that it is completely within the realm of reality to write unbuggy, yet complicated and highly functional code. DJB welched on every claim at that bounty, and refused to pay out. He is an e…
DJB paid out $1,000 in 2009 to Matthew Dempsky for a djbdns security vulnerability. https://marc.info/?l=djbdns&m=123613000920446&w=2
I was a bit curious about this wording which seems quite weasel-wordy at first glance, so these are the snapshots of the page that have been saved by Archive here https://archive.vn/https://cr.yp.to/djbdns/guarantee.html
I did a rough diff of the two first saved snapshots (which span 2009), and got this:
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
The djbdns security guarantee
-I offer $500 to the first person to publicly report a verifiable security hole in the latest version of djbdns.
+I offer $1000 to the first person to publicly report a verifiable security hole in the latest version of djbdns.
@@ -14,17 +14,25 @@
-Bugs outside of djbdns, such as OS bugs or browser bugs, do not qualify. The vulnerability of DNS to forgery does not qualify. Denial-of-service attacks do not qualify. (An attacker can easily take down the Domain Name System, or selected parts of it; this is not news.)
+Examples of problems that do not qualify:
+
+
+
+ Bugs outside of djbdns, such as OS bugs or browser bugs. (People could seize control of BIND 9.1 through an OpenSSL buffer overflow, but that was a bug in OpenSSL, not in BIND.)
+
+ The vulnerability of DNS to forgery. (BIND's port reuse makes blind forgery much less expensive, but this is a quantitative difference, not a qualitative difference. The DNS architecture needs cryptographic protection.)
+
+ Denial-of-service attacks. (BIND 9's fragility makes denial of service completely trivial; but an attacker can easily take down the Domain Name System without using any of BIND's bugs. The DNS architecture needs to be decentralized.)
I don't think this looks unreasonable in terms of actual consequences/definitions, but it is interesting how much effort and verbiage he spends on pointing out the flaws of other DNS servers.