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LastPass autofill exploit

labs.detectify.com

151–160 of 443 posts

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're using a *nix system: https://www.passwordstore.org/ I switched over from LastPass a few months ago. It uses gpg for encryption and supports git for password syncing between systems. Pretty simple to set up and use. There are quite a few third party apps for it already (both desktop and mobile)

I've been amazed by Pass, but couldn't find a thorough review between Pass and KeePass(x). Is one safer than the other?

pass is as safe as your gpg installation and your gpg key because that's the encprytion it uses.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#152
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think paying only $1000 for a potentially company-imploding bug like that is incredibly short sighted. It's far too low to motivate a lot of people to look for bugs, and to me suggests they're not serious about protecting their reputation if someone does find such a company-destroying bug.

HN has weird beliefs about the company-imploding properties of all sorts of bugs, from this to CSRFs that let you delete photos from Facebook. After all, a competitor could use it to erase all the photos on Facebook and then take over the market! That was an actual argument on a thread about Facebook underpaying bounties.

To be fair, this bug is pretty nasty because it allows anyone to get all your stored passwords. That's like the core business of LastPass. LastPass leaking your login credentials for e.g. online banking is really not comparable to deleting Facebook photos.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly this. I'm abandoning them now.

I want an alternative, got a good one?

Dashlane is really good. Running 100% in AWS and leveraging a lot of their security features.

Here is their security white paper : https://www.dashlane.com/download/Dashlane-Security-Whitepap...

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#154
post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The concern with the low payout is that it's supposed to be a way to compensate white hat hackers and dissuaded them from going to the black market with security problems like this. Given the business that LastPass is in wouldn't you agree that it's extremely crucial they make sure white hat hackers are aptly compensated for serious problems they find? In fact I'd think it'd be reasonable for them to pay more than Fa…

No, that is not at all what a bug bounty is meant to do. We are not expected to pay people to avoid them launching criminal conspiracies against us. The purpose of a bug bounty is to incentivize researchers to target specific pieces of software so that vendors can benefit from that attention.

I think it's a bit of bucket A and bit of bucket B. Still even if one accept the definition you put forth the argument that having such low bounties makes LastPass look bad/like they're not caring is still valid.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#155
post #152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HN has weird beliefs about the company-imploding properties of all sorts of bugs, from this to CSRFs that let you delete photos from Facebook. After all, a competitor could use it to erase all the photos on Facebook and then take over the market! That was an actual argument on a thread about Facebook underpaying bounties.

To be fair, this bug is pretty nasty because it allows anyone to get all your stored passwords. That's like the core business of LastPass. LastPass leaking your login credentials for e.g. online banking is really not comparable to deleting Facebook photos.

How does paying extra money address the underlying concern that LastPass has absolutely trivial regex bugs that entirely defeat the security of the product? I agree that the bug is terrible, but the bounty and the impact of the bug to the company are largely orthogonal, unless the bounty includes a confidentiality term.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#156

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, that is not at all what a bug bounty is meant to do. We are not expected to pay people to avoid them launching criminal conspiracies against us. The purpose of a bug bounty is to incentivize researchers to target specific pieces of software so that vendors can benefit from that attention.

I think it's a bit of bucket A and bit of bucket B. Still even if one accept the definition you put forth the argument that having such low bounties makes LastPass look bad/like they're not caring is still valid.

No, it is not at all "bucket A" and "bucket B", and suggesting otherwise is a grave insult to hundreds of researchers who would never dream of attempting (and, of course, inevitably failing) to "sell bugs to the black market". Finding interesting vulnerabilities in software makes you clever and talented, not sociopathic.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#157
post #69
post #12

Please correct me if I am mistaken, but couldn't this have been implemented into an iframe that when ran could send the passwords to another remote server? If so, I am a little taken back by LastPass only offering $1,000 to the researcher that found and reported it for fixing. He or she could have taken a different path and resulted in this being used in some complex targeted attack against tech corporations via shor…

Normally I like bike shedding about bug bounty payouts just about as much as complaints about paywalls. If you are going to go poking around someone's code for fun or profit, the terms of the bounty program are readily available [1] so you can't complain after the fact for earning the maximum payout. LastPass isn't Facebook, and they never claimed they would pay more than $1,000 even for a full compromise or RCE. On…

"On the other hand, using regexp to parse the URL when it's such an obviously security critical code path... just, why?!"

Why not? URIs are at least able to be tokenized perfectly well by a regular expression. You have to do it right, but there's little guarantee that your non-regexp code will do it right either. I glanced at that regexp and immediately recognized several potential problems with it... will I be able to do that with your non-regexp code?

To concretize the "several potential problems": 1. You generally don't want to parse arbitrary protocols, you should do something like (http|https|file) or whatever set of protocols you are ready to receive. Usually you're better off treating anything else as "not a URL", but consult your local security context for details. 2. Failing that, you want at the very least .⁎? to stop matching at the first :, or if your engine doesn't have that, the protocol ought to be matched with something much tighter like [a-z]+. And I do mean + and not ⁎, because you probably don't mean to support an empty protocol before the colon. (You may mean to permit URLs with no protocol, but that's (.⁎?:)? .) 3. Domains should be parsed more tightly than "not a slash". 4. Also, I have no idea what the @ was doing there. Perhaps it was trying to be $; URL parsing should always end with the "end of string" matcher to avoid problems similar to this. It should also start with the start-of-string matcher, which this one doesn't, for similar reasons. 5. Bonus critique, anything using regular expressions to URL-encode or decode is very suspicious; strongly prefer built-in functions that do this.

I literally saw all this faster than I could type it; does your non-regular-expression based code have this property?

Regular expressions aren't bad. They're hard to write properly, but still probably easier to write properly than anything else. It turns out the underlying problem is fundamentally hard.

(Had to use an alternate asterisk to get the RE expressions correct with HN trying to format it.)

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#158
post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with the cohort theory, but to me it's not so much about the risk of someone selling an exploit on the black market, all though it's still a risk. To me it's more about how it reflects on a company where security is key to their product. Low bounties kinda gives of a vibe of not caring about the security of their product and maintaining it. Personally I lost a lot of confidence in them when they got acquired…

Most companies, including companies far more security-sensitive than LogMeIn, pay no bug bounties at all. Meanwhile, the companies that pay the largest bounties are themselves routinely harangued online for underbidding the black market --- despite the fact that outbidding crime is in no way the purpose of a bug bounty. From my vantage point, the logical conclusion to the comment you just wrote is that companies shou…

It's true that not all companies pay bug bounties and you might very well be right that paying them, especially if they are much lower than other companies that operate bug bounties, might have a worse affect on public opinion then not having bug bounties at all. To me it's still concerning that Facebook pays 10x more for problems that are less severe and it does still make LastPass look like they don't care as much in comparison.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#159

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I want an alternative, got a good one?

Any good alternatives for LastPass Enterprise-style multi-user sharing? (Apart from "don't use services that require you to share passwords for a single account". Alas.)

Does it need to have Windows client? I'm guessing yes. If not there is [SFLVault](http://sflvault.org/)

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What he's saying is "raise the bid" Your rationale would be a valid rebuttal in your world no matter what the amounts in question were. $500? Incentive! $50? Incentive!

This is a non-sequitur response to my comment, whose whole purpose is to point out that a bug bounty is not a bid in an auction against organized crime.

In practice, in many cases, bug bounties are de facto a bid in an auction against organized crime. It doesn't need to be 1-to-1 equivalent bid, and it's not for all sources of found bugs, but the intent and the effect is definitely there.
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