Earlier quoted context omitted.
Locating data outside the US is in no way a defense against US intelligence agencies. There are theoretically controls on domestic spying, and some possibility that Congress could make it illegal. They have a mandate to spy on foreign networks. If they haven't cracked your European email provider, then they're not doing what we pay and order them to do.
> If they haven't cracked your European email provider... The difference is that European email providers are not cooperating, because they aren't obliged by your laws, whereas US companies are not only obliged to comply with requests, but they are also coerced to keep it a secret. > ... then they're not doing what we pay and order them to do That's a good thing to know, plus this is reason enough to pressure our gov…
Apple’s approach to privacy
151–160 of 172 posts
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#152I was reading their guidelines for law enforcement requests: https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/emeia_le_guidelines_final... Interesting note: "P. FaceTime FaceTime communications are end-to-end encrypted and Apple has no way to decrypt FaceTime data when it is in transit between devices. Apple cannot intercept FaceTime communications. Apple has FaceTime call invitation logs when a FaceTime call invitation is initiat…
Knowing that most phone lines are essentially considered tapped by the NSA/FBI... So is privacy a good reason to use FaceTime Audio over say, a standard voice call?
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#153Earlier quoted context omitted.
Police use parallel construction when they don't want to reveal their methods. I seriously doubt law enforcement would engage in parallel construction if it had access to iMessage but Apple asked it to.
> I seriously doubt law enforcement would engage in parallel construction if it had access to iMessage but Apple asked it to. Why? They've been using parallel construction to avoid violating NDAs and giving up their capabilities for years. http://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingray-nda/
1) Police don't care that APPLE doesn't want to reveal its methods, and 2) Unlike the Stingray, it wouldn't be illegal for them to use iMessage evidence in court if Apple provided it to them (especially with the use of a warrant!)
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#154Earlier quoted context omitted.
Source?
Stuff like gotofail took a while to get patched (weeks?), and things like https://github.com/kpwn/tpwn has been around for a while which is still not patched in any public, non-beta release of OSX.
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#155Earlier quoted context omitted.
> to explicitly lie about it. Maybe I'm dense or naive, but I don't think there's any precedent for that. A gag order is one thing (and there are certainly places for it), but forcing someone to lie would hopefully violate the First Amendment.
> Maybe I'm dense or naive, but I don't think there's any precedent for that. It's well know about. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/warrant-canary-faq
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#156To my understanding, an NSL could mean "give me everything you have". And the NSLs have no disclosed accounts linked to them. Edit: Why the downvote? If my understanding is false, please indicate so.
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#157Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I seriously doubt law enforcement would engage in parallel construction if it had access to iMessage but Apple asked it to. Why? They've been using parallel construction to avoid violating NDAs and giving up their capabilities for years. http://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingray-nda/
That's exactly the case I was thinking about with my comment 1) Police don't care that APPLE doesn't want to reveal its methods, and 2) Unlike the Stingray, it wouldn't be illegal for them to use iMessage evidence in court if Apple provided it to them (especially with the use of a warrant!)
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#158Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#159Apple is in a good position in the market to do this, but it is just really hard to trust any US company. They say they will never give anyone access to their servers but how can they make that promise when they don't make the laws? As an aside I am finding it really difficult to delete my iCloud account, in fact it seems that is impossible.
Re: Apple’s approach to privacy
#160https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prism_slide_5.jpg https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PRISM_Collection_Det...
What describes the obvious discrepancy between what Tim Cook wrote and signed his name to, and the content on those slides?
The slides imply Apple gives access to data on customers. Tim Cook says Apple does not give access to their servers. Is that really the point you're trying to make?
That's just semantics and weasel words, nothing more.