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Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com

141–150 of 165 posts

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#141
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you're talking about a very naive normative interpretation of moral relativism, the fundamental argument, as I understand it, is actually that societies do reach some form of moral consensus, but that this consensus has cultural and historical roots (and possible other contingent factors), it will vary and change over nations and time. I won't throw a segfault if I take a descriptive moral relativistic positi…

I think you're talking about the anthropological meaning of moral relativism (and we probably agree there). But the rest of us are talking about the philosophical sense. There's a very good overview of that here: http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/ Among other things, one of the potential consequences of metaethical moral relativism is that you and I can't actually say anything meaningful to one another about honour kil…

Obviously we disagree about what exactly that entails (at a glance, the article you cited seems to describe multiple modes of moral relativism, not all as logically muddled as the one you describe).

I'd be curious to know what grounds you would argue against a topic you find morally objectionable. What would you say are the proper foundations for moral axioms?

Update: and to answer your question, I'm not sure I have good reasons beyond "I feel they are bad", I do aim for coherence and consistency even when I'm not confident that I have a solid logical foundation, but it's hard to feel committed to any particular consensus. For background, I was raised in two different countries with two different cultures and languages, my politics were diametrically opposite those of one of my grandfathers who I still loved, I never met the other because he was an abusive alcoholic that thankfully abandoned the family. I am a bit of a Camusian outsider I guess.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#142
post #17

The article doesn't provide anything to back the claim that moral opinions may be universally, non-subjectively true. The cartoonist example is deeply flawed. We're outraged because this event violated our deepest beliefs and values we hold dear, not because it violated some universal eternal moral law. We also know that there were people that weren't saddened by this event too. This is the problem I have with many p…

The point of the article is not to prove that values are objective. Rather, the point is to undermine the fact/opinion distinction. If moral sentiments were mere opinion, then there'd be no point to arguing over whether some action is right or wrong. When you tell me that you really like the taste of sushi, I don't argue with you - I just accept that that's your taste. But that we don't simply accept as 'taste' other…

"If moral sentiments were mere opinion, then there'd be no point to arguing over whether some action is right or wrong."

...who says there is? Whether that makes you uncomfortable or not has no bearing on whether it is the case.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#143

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Moral relativism is incompatible with judgements that other's moral judgements are wrong. How so, as long as you accept that those meta-judgements are still subjective?

Under moral relativism, you can accept that other people have different moral tastes, just as you can accept that other people have different tastes for food. But you cannot accept that such tastes are subject to normative assessment, making them 'right' or 'wrong' in any meaningful way. So a moral relativist can say something like "I dislike your approval of female genital mutilation", but this is not a claim about…

I don't see why. A person's morality, even if completely subjective, is still one frame of reference under which actions, thoughts, etc can be judged. Therefore, it's perfectly possible to judge the approval of female genital mutilation as wrong - just as long as I realize that the judgment is subjective.

Or to put it in another way, meta-ethical moral relativism doesn't require normative relativism.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#144
post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Really? Self-sacrifice and penance are almost the basis of one the most popular moral theories in the world. Just go ask the closest Christian you might have.

> Self-sacrifice and penance are almost the basis of one the most popular moral theories in the world You can't make those objective, though. That is my point. (It's not like I haven't actually heard of Christian morality before.) Ultimately, the only thing that actually matters for any living organism is pleasure. Thus, only pleasure, ultimately, can be good or bad for an organism. I mean "pleasure" in the broadest…

Ultimately, the only thing that actually matters for any living organism is pleasure.

How so? Why can't subjective things matter to a living organism? You're jumping some logical steps there, I think.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Interesting comment. I don't care where it leads, it's a personal thing. I don't feel the need to hold a position that applies to everyone. Taking it to something I understand better, like coding standards. I could care less what people decide the rules are, they seem completely arbitrary to me. I'm happy to go with what's gone before, and if people want to fight about new ones I'll leave them to it.

But you accept that people can fight and decide what the rules are? That you can have a meaningful discussion about which coding standard is the best, and why, and reach a conclusion you all agree on? Because metaethical moral relativism wouldn't accept that. It says you might as well have a discussion about which colour is the best and try to reach a conclusion everyone agrees on.

well you changed a word out there. the first question is you accept that people can fight. the second question is you can have a meaningful. i accept that people and can fight but i don't accept their discussion is meaningful and i don't accept that they can reach a conclusion i agree on.

i don't see how accepting that people can fight and decide on rules, means that i think there's any meaning in it and why that means i agree, disagree or care about the conclusion.

> It says you might as well have a discussion about which colour is the best and try to reach a conclusion everyone agrees on.

that seems pretty close to how i feel about it.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#146

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not saying it's binary; I just don't see in what way is my position not relativist.

Your position is relativist. And you asked why relativism was so hard to accept. Well, like I said way upthread, it's because if you take a relativist position to its conclusion, you generally end up somewhere people find hard to accept. (Or less politely, you end up somewhere dumb). And this case is a perfect example. In this case, you've pretty quickly ended up having to argue that "laws can be/are built on moral a…

> Which contradicts the observed facts of moral development, aside from all the other problems with it.

Well I contradict your observed facts. Look at all the major religions, legal systems, there the similarities and differences are many.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your position is relativist. And you asked why relativism was so hard to accept. Well, like I said way upthread, it's because if you take a relativist position to its conclusion, you generally end up somewhere people find hard to accept. (Or less politely, you end up somewhere dumb). And this case is a perfect example. In this case, you've pretty quickly ended up having to argue that "laws can be/are built on moral a…

> Which contradicts the observed facts of moral development, aside from all the other problems with it. Well I contradict your observed facts. Look at all the major religions, legal systems, there the similarities and differences are many.

Comparative religion disagrees with you. And you'll struggle to prove that the differences fit a random distribution or anywhere like it.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#148

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But you accept that people can fight and decide what the rules are? That you can have a meaningful discussion about which coding standard is the best, and why, and reach a conclusion you all agree on? Because metaethical moral relativism wouldn't accept that. It says you might as well have a discussion about which colour is the best and try to reach a conclusion everyone agrees on.

well you changed a word out there. the first question is you accept that people can fight. the second question is you can have a meaningful. i accept that people and can fight but i don't accept their discussion is meaningful and i don't accept that they can reach a conclusion i agree on. i don't see how accepting that people can fight and decide on rules, means that i think there's any meaning in it and why that mea…

> i don't see how accepting that people can fight and decide on rules, means that i think there's any meaning in it and why that means i agree, disagree or care about the conclusion.

"Fight" is probably the misleading point. People can and will fight about meaningless things, yes. Perhaps "debate" would be better, because that implies meaning in the discussion.

I think you can reasonably debate, compare and judge coding styles -- "which is more readable?", "which aids understanding better?", etc -- in a way you can't reasonably debate "which is the best colour?".

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That was my only goal.

You'll love the article he linked to: http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/education/item/372-mor...

Hey! My eyes had just recovered! Stop that. To paraphrase, "In place of science, I present to you a digitally-leather-bound edition of the founding fathers (minus that Jefferson stuff about not being a Christian nation)! and a warning to not enter into serious argument with modern or post-modern thought and life. Best just to avoid winning that battle we always win (amongst ourselves) than to deal with the cognitive dissonance that we may all be desperately protecting the new version of that old Zeus stuff."

I sense a fear that many people don't know how to deal with the realization that their 5-8 year-olds, who have internalized "the golden rule" in a freedom-chasing culture, seem confused by their loving parents testing their openness to religious and/or social bigotry.

Where they see the loss of their sacred talisman, I see hope that our new generation is about to bring great levels of peace and joy to the world. I see the dawning of a bright future where people fluidly form communities instead of calcifying into tribes.

Re: Why Our Children Don't Think There Are Moral Facts

#150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Under moral relativism, you can accept that other people have different moral tastes, just as you can accept that other people have different tastes for food. But you cannot accept that such tastes are subject to normative assessment, making them 'right' or 'wrong' in any meaningful way. So a moral relativist can say something like "I dislike your approval of female genital mutilation", but this is not a claim about…

I don't see why. A person's morality, even if completely subjective, is still one frame of reference under which actions, thoughts, etc can be judged. Therefore, it's perfectly possible to judge the approval of female genital mutilation as wrong - just as long as I realize that the judgment is subjective. Or to put it in another way, meta-ethical moral relativism doesn't require normative relativism.

While we can distinguish between first-order moral relativism and metaethical relativism, it's widely accepted that the former implies the latter.

So it's not uncontroversial to say that you can be an objectivist moral relativist. In any case, this discussion has been about metaethical relativism.

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