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Scramble.io: secure email for everyone

dcposch.github.io

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Re: Scramble.io: secure email for everyone

#141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your partner, just upthread, explained why you tabled the idea of using a browser extension to house all the logic for your app. I think your argument is with them, not me.

You falsely accused us of refusing to offer a browser extension for fear of losing users. Again, that is false.

[deleted]

Re: Scramble.io: secure email for everyone

#142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Re: 1. Yuck - that leaves a window of vulnerability as long as "recent". It also opens up the possibility of hijacking "recent" via NTP to change the client's clock for just the duration of the HTTP GET to the update server - this is not as difficult as it sounds. A better approach would be to have the client pull a list of revoked certs along with the JS source/hash. You'll need a majority wins system for the revoca…

Thanks for the feedback! >> A better approach would be to have the client pull a list of revoked certs along with the JS source/hash. That's not much better, as the client will have to pull a list from somewhere, and that somewhere could have been compromised to serve a bad list. At least with a window you always need an absolute majority. I'm not liking any of these solutions, so you make a good case for packaging a…

> That's not much better ...

Yes it is. As I said you'll need a majority-wins system, i.e. the list of revoked certs is signed by a majority of the signature committee members. Using a window is wide open to attack, it has no redeaming features.

> It's enough for me ...

Unfortunately, "it works on my computer" is not going to cut it. I use a few browser extensions, but now those extensions' own update mechanisms can be used to attack your cryptosystem - even a "good" extension could be hijacked this way. That gives me a lot to worry about...

My point with bookmarklets was that many bookmarklets pull down code from an external server and inject it into the local page, so if the user makes use of any booklets as part of their email workflow then those bookmarklet sites now become attack vectors for your cryptosystem. Likewise, browser 0-days are also attack vectors for your cryptosystem which would not be present in say, a stand-alone client. The attack surface area of a browser is huge.

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