Earlier quoted context omitted.
The assumption of this sort of argument, if I understand it correctly, is that consciousness is just an ordinary byproduct that appears (or grows gradually) somewhere on the spectrum of complexity. If that’s true, mastering language is basically orthogonal to being conscious (as you’d maybe expect, GPT-2 was pretty good at language, but had a relatively tiny amount of “neurons”). The same is arguably true for world m…
Likewise, what reason do we have to assume that any given human is conscious?
A rock is outwardly pretty similar to me; in that it exists in the world, has obvious physical boundaries, and is affected by the passage of time. But it is not so outwardly similar that I assume consciousness.
An LLM is also outwardly similar to me, in that it can express itself in language, and seems to ‘contain’ notions about the world. But it is again not necessarily so similar to me, outwardly, that inward similarity is obvious (to me)