udisks, not counting its dependencies, has 265,334 LoC. pmount, in contrast, has 19,978 LoC, or >13x less. sudo, another setuid binary with a lot of policy code, has 210 CVEs / 430.150 kLoC = ~0.5 CVE per kLoC. 57.5% of CVEs have a CVSS >= 7, so 0.5 * 0.575 = 0.2875 CVE7/kLoC. As a back-of-envelope estimate, udisks: 0.2875 CVE7/kLoC * 265.334 kLoC = ~76.28 critical CVEs; pmount: 0.2875 CVE7/kLoC * 19.9780 kLoC = ~5.7…
Ubuntu is switching to a Rust implementation of sudo: https://www.phoronix.com/news/Ubuntu-25.10-sudo-rs-Default Repo here: https://github.com/trifectatechfoundation/sudo-rs It's permissively licensed, unfortunately. Wonder why. It's not a library. But it ought to improve security in the long run.
New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
141–150 of 287 posts
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#142Awww. I was just about to gloat about Slackware avoiding another round of security holes due to its long avoidance of PAM, but it got introduced in 2020. :-( It looks like some software projects are now entirely reliant upon PAM for authentication and don't support shadow passwords anymore. What a travesty. It's sort of like what happened with Systemd, where so many apps now entirely depend on Systemd, you can't run…
PAM supports a shadow password file as its default configuration. Did you mean something else?
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#143As someone who has been using linux quite happily on the desktop for more than 20 years now, I have to say it remains an eternal experiment, feature wise as well as security wise.
Let us not pretend other OS are flawless as well. Microsoft is constantly patching and Apple has been the source of so many hacks that thousands of VIPs were affected and a person was murdered.
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#144Local privesc, don't care. If anyone still thinks that they can draw a security boundary anywhere with a shared kernel, they should really look at kernel CVE database (and be horrified). For every fancy titled exploit there are twenty that you've never heard of. You can sort of do it if you carefully structure your program to restrict syscall use and then use some minimal and well audited syscall filtering layer to h…
Given this. Why is every linux device not rooted then.
Also just because syscall A might be vulnerable to a particular type of attack, it doesn’t mean that service B uses that syscall, let alone calls it in a way that can be exploited.
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#145Awww. I was just about to gloat about Slackware avoiding another round of security holes due to its long avoidance of PAM, but it got introduced in 2020. :-( It looks like some software projects are now entirely reliant upon PAM for authentication and don't support shadow passwords anymore. What a travesty. It's sort of like what happened with Systemd, where so many apps now entirely depend on Systemd, you can't run…
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#146Local privesc, don't care. If anyone still thinks that they can draw a security boundary anywhere with a shared kernel, they should really look at kernel CVE database (and be horrified). For every fancy titled exploit there are twenty that you've never heard of. You can sort of do it if you carefully structure your program to restrict syscall use and then use some minimal and well audited syscall filtering layer to h…
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#147Earlier quoted context omitted.
OpenDoas, a portable version of OpenBSD's doas, has 4260 LoC while doing most you'd expect. Sudo just has a lot of policy tools that most don't even know about, but add to its surface area.
OpenDoas is used by default by Alpine linux for example.
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#148Earlier quoted context omitted.
Average/most popular distros, maybe. The full range of distros are very different from each other. Consider Void, Alpine, Gentoo, Chimera, NixOS..... Different C libraries, init systems, different default command line utilities....
That's nothing. Alpine can run Glibc binaries with compat libraries. Try running a FreeBSD binary under OpenBSD.
Re: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#149Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it's all the stuff to do with using a shared sudoers across a network of hosts. They could really clean up the language if they removed all of that gunk, as it's not reflective of how sudo is deployed these days.
There's also full sudo session logging and a logging server now, along with binaries to replay all those logs. Whether those LOC reflect the logging server, I don't know. It literally replays in the terminal like a movie. It's nice, but I worry too much about the security implications (passwords captured, etc) to roll it out. edit: Ah yes, sudoreplay. You can see this video a playback via it. That's not the guy typin…
script --log-timing file.tm --log-out script.out
# do something in a terminal session ...
scriptreplay --log-timing file.tm --log-out script.out
# replay it, possibly pausing and increasing/decreasing playback speedRe: New Linux udisks flaw lets attackers get root on major Linux distros
#150Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yet people use container based isolation all the time in practice and the sky doesn't fall. Also, every security domain in an Android systems shares a kernel, yet Android is one of the most secure systems out there. Sure, it uses tons of SELinux, but so what? It still has a shared kernel, and a quite featureful one at that. I don't buy the idea that we can't do intra-kernel security isolation and so we shouldn't care…
Wouldn't Android's kernel have most of the hardening steps / disabled features described in GP's comment?