Earlier quoted context omitted.
You cannot build a secure container runtime (against malicious containers) because underlying it is the Linux kernel. The only way to make Linux containers a meaningful sandbox is to drastically restrict the syscall API surface available to the sandboxee, which quickly reduces its value. It's no longer a "generic platform that you can throw any workload onto" but instead a bespoke thing that needs to be tuned and rec…
One can definitely build a container runtime that uses virtualization to protect the host For example there is Kata containers https://katacontainers.io/ This can be used with regular `podman` by just changing the container runtime so there’s no even need for any extra tooling In theory you could shove the container runtime into something like k8s
True, by "container" I really meant "shared-kernel container".
> In theory you could shove the container runtime into something like k8s
Yeah this is actually supported by k8s.
Whether that means it's actually reasonable to run completely untrusted workloads on your own cluster is another question. But it definitely seems like a really good defense-in-depth feature.