FTP is close to such a thing, but it is somewhat archaic, slow and not sure about its security.
A currently maintained fork of SSHFS
141–144 of 144 posts
Re: A currently maintained fork of SSHFS
#142Is there a more security-oriented alternative to SSHFS, where the connecting client won't be given shell access on the server? I just want to share a directory from server to an untrusted VM over network, and have VM mount it, not give the VM shell access to the server. FTP is close to such a thing, but it is somewhat archaic, slow and not sure about its security.
Match Group sftponly
ForceCommand internal-sftp -l INFO -f LOCAL6
AllowTcpForwarding no
AllowAgentForwarding no
GatewayPorts no
X11Forwarding noRe: A currently maintained fork of SSHFS
#143Earlier quoted context omitted.
My favorite thing about using TRAMP is being able to cd to a directory on a remote system, and then cp a file either from my working directory to my local machine (or another remote!), or from my local machine to the current working directory. Before I started using TRAMP, my flow for this was: SSH to a remote system, locate where I want to copy a file to with cd + ls, kill my SSH session, and then scp or rsync the f…
> kill my SSH session, and then scp or rsync the file over, and then usually SSH back into the system. Naive question: why the need to kill the ssh session? Can't you just open another terminal window or tab (or tmux/screen tab if that's part of your workflow)
Re: A currently maintained fork of SSHFS
#144Is there a more security-oriented alternative to SSHFS, where the connecting client won't be given shell access on the server? I just want to share a directory from server to an untrusted VM over network, and have VM mount it, not give the VM shell access to the server. FTP is close to such a thing, but it is somewhat archaic, slow and not sure about its security.
If the user account is only supposed to have file transfer capabilities/no shell access, add it a to a specific group e.g. `sftponly`, and only allow this group to use the `internal-sftp` command in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` Match Group sftponly ForceCommand internal-sftp -l INFO -f LOCAL6 AllowTcpForwarding no AllowAgentForwarding no GatewayPorts no X11Forwarding no
Is there some way to specify that nothing except internal-sftp is allowed, as opposed to setting each option explicitly to "no"? The latter way seems error-prone, one is bound to miss some obscure option there.
And I wonder why do you suggest using the LOCAL6 log facility? In sftp-server, the default is AUTH...