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Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

kaspersky.com

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Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#141

Post by [deleted] »

PretzelPirate wrote: post #103
kosherhurricane wrote: post #94

My #1 argument against the feasibility of cryptocurrency: Can my parents not their get money stolen?

Can crypto currency be used easily? Yes, through centralized entities like where your parents currently store their money. Some people may forgoe ease and aim for self-custody because they value decentralization over convenience. Others will choose a middle ground where they and a centralized entity both hold part of the key, ensuring that the 3rd party can't move their funds without permission.

[deleted]

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#143

Post by pjc50 »

lottin wrote: post #137
mattdesl wrote: post #133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s not that hard to build your own wallet software, or if you really want, a paper wallet using dice and a pen. But frankly it’s not that different than cryptography as a whole: nobody implements ECDSA themselves, or builds the computer that runs it, or smelt the metal and assemble transistors that runs the computer, or whatever. There is no such thing as “absolute lack of trust” but some protocols can be “less tru…

How does a "paper wallet" work? I thought a wallet in order to work had to interact with other wallets?

Surprisingly, no. All a "wallet" has to do is compute a signature using a private key. Then the resulting transaction has to be sent to a "mining" node (or the "mempool" of a group of nodes) and wait until one of them incorporates it into a transaction, computes fourty trillion hashes and then throws all but one of them away, and broadcasts the resulting signed block to the network.

Because there is no confirmation on sending bitcoin "into" a wallet, no action is required at all to receive and store it. It's only cashing out where it gets difficult. It also makes it possible to send to inaccessible or nonexistant wallets.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#144

Post by grumple »

lxgr wrote: post #113
grumple wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From 2018: https://blog.trezor.io/psa-non-genuine-trezor-devices-979b64... From their forum earlier this year: https://forum.trezor.io/t/protect-from-getting-a-fake-trezor...

None of the methods proposed by Trezor would frustrate the attack mentioned in the article: Validate the holograms: Most users aren't forensic experts and don't have an authentic physical sample to compare their evaluation target to, only photos of one. Only buy from authorized resellers such as the official Amazon shop: Fake products have been introduced into Amazon's supply chain before [1]. The bootloader validate…

From that article, it sounds like this wouldn't be commingled inventory, as it's both private label and an opt in process.

That said the obvious way to avoid amazon commingling conclusively is to buy it directly from the Trezor shop.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#145

Post by friend_and_foe »

dools wrote: post #100
lxgr wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You have to trust somebody when it comes to hardware devices. If you don't do anything, that includes the OEM, their supply chain, your delivery courier, an evil maid etc. If you have the choice of reducing that list to only the OEM, isn't that a win? That's what attestation does.

> You have to trust somebody I know, all the time, and thus the entire premise of crypto is flawed, as are the libertarian ideals that birthed it.

I wouldn't say that.

So pure trustlessness start to finish is impossible. All information exchange requires shared protocols, and this necessitates trust. The idea here is to design protocols which, once the initial setup is complete, trust is no longer a factor.

This isn't just limited to cryptocurrency, it applies to all cryptography, and more broadly, to all security measures of any kind. Key exchange requires initial trust. The idea is that you do the due diligence to get set up, then you don't have to sweat it after. To say the entire system is flawed because setup requires trust is to say that all security measures are pointless.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#146

Post by friend_and_foe »

drexlspivey wrote: post #89

What would have prevented this attack is the following: Use a little bit of python (there are libraries for this or you can do it yourself) to make sure that the addresses generated in the HW wallet by the 12 word mnemonic are indeed the correct addresses. For example the first segwit address using your private key and the derivation path 49h/0h/0h/0/0 should be deterministic. This way you know your 12 words are the…

That would not have stopped this attack. I think youre misunderstanding the attack, the seed is pregenerated.

The only thing that would have stopped this attack would be to generate your seed off the device. And then, since the device is counterfeit and there may very well be a way to exfiltrate seeds from it, to use a genuine device, but that's a different attack.

What youre saying though is a good idea, provided the device youre running this on (and therefore entering your seed into) is secure. Since this cannot really be guaranteed it is often advised to never enter your seed into a computer, for good reason.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#147

Post by friend_and_foe »

Philadelphia wrote: post #139
RalfWausE wrote: post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is an argument against any form of direct payment... i mean, you can get your cash stolen very easily...

Yes. And so cryptocurrency is a reversion to a model of payment that’s been rejected by most people for its poor security.

Cash has been rejected by most people due to its poor security? I have to ask for a source on that. Cash is still the most popular form of money, and if you have low trust in your government or institutions/live in a corrupt society, is more secure than other options.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#148

Post by mattdesl »

lottin wrote: post #137
mattdesl wrote: post #133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s not that hard to build your own wallet software, or if you really want, a paper wallet using dice and a pen. But frankly it’s not that different than cryptography as a whole: nobody implements ECDSA themselves, or builds the computer that runs it, or smelt the metal and assemble transistors that runs the computer, or whatever. There is no such thing as “absolute lack of trust” but some protocols can be “less tru…

How does a "paper wallet" work? I thought a wallet in order to work had to interact with other wallets?

Wallets tend to have two main features: A) generate random private keys and B) given some private key, sign a transaction and broadcast this message to the network.

Pen, paper, and some dice (and a bit of work) can generate a private key for step A, which you can input into a hardware wallet, and which would have prevented the problem in the OP.

It’s also possible to write your own wallet software or use a “trusted” tool (eg: openssl or node) to create a private key, rather than rely on a random app or device off eBay to generate it for you.

The B) part is harder to do with pen and paper or an off-the-shelf tool as it involves a fair bit of protocol specific math—but it’s also harder to target in a hardware wallet supply chain attack.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#149

Post by drexlspivey »

friend_and_foe wrote: post #146
drexlspivey wrote: post #89

What would have prevented this attack is the following: Use a little bit of python (there are libraries for this or you can do it yourself) to make sure that the addresses generated in the HW wallet by the 12 word mnemonic are indeed the correct addresses. For example the first segwit address using your private key and the derivation path 49h/0h/0h/0/0 should be deterministic. This way you know your 12 words are the…

That would not have stopped this attack. I think youre misunderstanding the attack, the seed is pregenerated. The only thing that would have stopped this attack would be to generate your seed off the device. And then, since the device is counterfeit and there may very well be a way to exfiltrate seeds from it, to use a genuine device, but that's a different attack. What youre saying though is a good idea, provided th…

> That would not have stopped this attack. I think youre misunderstanding the attack, the seed is pregenerated.

HW support entering any mnemonic, you don’t have to generate it on the device itself. So if you create a mnemonic yourself and check what addresses it should generate with a third party tool and then enter it in the wallet and see different addresses something is fishy.

Re: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet

#150

Post by lottin »

mattdesl wrote: post #148
lottin wrote: post #137

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does a "paper wallet" work? I thought a wallet in order to work had to interact with other wallets?

Wallets tend to have two main features: A) generate random private keys and B) given some private key, sign a transaction and broadcast this message to the network. Pen, paper, and some dice (and a bit of work) can generate a private key for step A, which you can input into a hardware wallet, and which would have prevented the problem in the OP. It’s also possible to write your own wallet software or use a “trusted”…

So clearly pen and paper doesn't work, since it isn't possible to sign a transaction and broadcast the message to the network using only a pen and a paper.

Writing a software wallet would involve using third-party compilers, operating systems and hardware, which means it isn't "trustless".

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