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The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

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Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#141

> A better idea might be to simply quarantine all attachments as they come into the enterprise, delete all the executables outright, and store the few file types you decide are acceptable on a staging server where users can log in with an SSL- enabled browser An odd suggestion in an otherwise relatively uncontroversial article. It implicitly trains your users in a bunch of unpleasant things: * clicking on some URL in…

I think this is a little less bad in context: in 2005 Gmail was a year old. Most people used a dedicated email client app such as Outlook or Mail.app so in your flow it would be far more defensible and his view was focused on corporate users. That makes the first point a little more reasonable:

1. Your desktop application shows a list of attachments in the navigation chrome where a message can't display content.

2. When you click on something in that list, Internet Explorer or Firefox seamlessly logs you into the server using Active Directory.

Storing things on a server was also more relevant in the era where space was limited and services like Exchange were famously difficult to scale or customize. If you didn't have good tools to retroactively yank a message out of everyone's inbox when your AV signatures were updated an hour after it arrived, storing it on a server you controlled had a certain practicality.

Your second and third points are spot-on, however, and really hit at a key principle too few security teams appreciate: normalization of deviance. This approach fails badly in the real world where IT security says “don't open attachments from people you don't know” and everyone's manager says “oh, it's totally normal to get passworded ZIP files from the HR services subcontractor. Open it, we have a deadline!”. The real lesson here should be defense in depth so your organization's security isn't jeopardized when one person opens the wrong email.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#142
post #46
post #10

I wonder how well we all think this article has aged? "Penetrate and Patch" is supposedly dumb. But what do we practically do with that? We've seen in the last decade or so a lot of long-lived software everyone thought was secure get caught with massive security bugs. Well, once some software you depend on has infact been found to have a bug, what's there to do but patch it? If some software has never had a bug found…

1. Default deny is one of the oldest best practices in security engineering; it barely needed saying in 1995 (but Cheswick & Bellovin said exactly that in Firewalls & Internet Security). 2. "Enumerating badness" is simultaneously an attempt to connect vulnerability research to antivirus (security practitioners have had contempt, mostly justified, for AV since the late 1980s) and an endorsement of the heuristic detect…

> 1. Default deny is one of the oldest best practices in security engineering; it barely needed saying in 1995 (but Cheswick & Bellovin said exactly that in Firewalls & Internet Security).

I agree with this as the theoretical grounding and certainly wouldn't say that this was especially insightful but I can understand why he said it if he was encountering a long tail of obsolete advice similar to what several places I worked were hearing at the time. I think one of the big problems was simply inertia: I remember the Cisco guys at one job saying they didn't want to do a default-deny policy because it was too much work to switch and they weren't sure if the hardware could handle that many rules.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#143
post #30
post #15

Related: The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security (2005) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28068725 - Aug 2021 (21 comments) The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security (2005) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14369342 - May 2017 (6 comments) The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12483067 - Sept 2016 (11 comments) The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security - http…

Yep, it’s worth repeating. Although I’d spin the issue about host vs network security differently. I’ve found that engineering teams prioritize security a lot more if they don’t feel like they’re safe in a cocoon of local network bliss behind network firewalls. I love “beyond corp” or “zero trust” precisely because you’re making it explicit that they’re on the internet and they’re a target.

> Yep, it’s worth repeating.

I don't know; I haven't really seen most of these things in the wild for a long time.

For "#4) Hacking is Cool" the zeitgeist has moved in the exact opposite direction with "white hat", bug bounties, etc. I think that section in particular is a pretty outdated view of things.

"#6) Action is Better Than Inaction" is probably the only one that still broadly applies today, and is actually a special case of "X exists, therefore, therefore we must use it ASAP, and any possible negativities are not our problem and inevitable anyway" attitude that seems the be prevalent among a certain types of people.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#144

I feel let down as a Dane that neither NemID or MitID deserve a mention. https://www.nemid.nu/dk-da/om-nemid/historien_om_nemid https://www.borger.dk/internet-og-sikkerhed/mitid full disclosure - I worked on the JavaScript implementation of NemID. My problems with it are not the implementation, but the whole concept.

The article is from 2005, while NemID and MitID were rolled out around 2010 and 2021, respectively. That nit-picking aside, would you be willing to elaborate on your problems with the concept of NemID/MitID as a whole?

And thank you for your work. The JS based NemID login was a huge improvement over the earlier, Java based implementation.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#145
post #132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

[flagged]

The point, I believe, is not about Linux kernel but rather "Linux userland". I'm sure you could replace "iOS" with "Android" and the meaning will stay the same: smartphone OSes go to great lengths to isolate apps and prevent them from messing with the user's data, while desktop Linux does not. I hope the situation will change once Flatpak becomes more widespread and polished. On paper, it offers a comparable experien…

If you like Flatpak's issues you'll love Snap! The point about smartphone userlands is a good one. If the desktop modus operandi were similar to how APKs are used then I imagine Linux would have much better security. For now I think that only something like Qubes provides the security and isolation you want without subtly breaking things.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#146
post #106
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My bank used client TLS certificates early on, while it is nifty it was a really bad idea without hardware security. (Paper OTP in their case) IMHO, client side certificates are a big failure even on server to server. The UX of doing it is error prone and insecure because of foot guns. It fails because there are so many different incompatible ways to use them. Mostly this idea of mine is based on never having had a g…

> The UX of doing it is error prone and insecure because of foot guns. Many people over the years have mentioned UX issues as a reason why client side TLS certificates aren't more widely used. The question is why hasn't there been an effort to improve the UX rather than re-inventing the wheel (either poorly with SMS/email 2FA or OTP, or in a way that's limited to a specific application level protocol like HTTP for we…

The problem is basically that it wasn’t a priority for application developers but you need to upgrade things everywhere before you can switch to a new protocol. Those clunky MFA options give CIOs the appealing promise that a bit of duct tape means they get some protection without needing to e.g. replace that old RADIUS server most people depend on to do their jobs.

It might be interesting to look at WebAuthn passkeys, as they do most of what you want. That took several important developments: the web ate desktop apps, Microsoft lost control of the web, and Google has some strong security people in their management. That does the public key exchange, has robust cross-device support which doesn’t require an internet connection, etc. and it has some features to improve the identity situation (e.g. it includes a device key & authentication info so my bank can say it only accepts transfer requests which came from a known device doing a biometric check, which is a nice edge over x509/SSH-style trust based solely on access to the private key).

This unfortunately does not work using other protocols but a not-uncommon flow would be using a browser session to issue your IMAP client a token. That’s not great (a compromise gives the attacker your email) but it can be less disastrous if the most important actions can’t be initiated purely from email.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#147
This describes the security industry as a whole.

We had a user click an email and get phished.

We tried training the users with tools like KnowBe4, banners above the emails that say things like THIS IS AN OUTSIDE EMAIL BE VERY CAREFUL WHEN CLICKING LINKS. Didn't help.

The email was a very generic looking "Kindly view the attached invoice"

The attached invoice was a PDF file

The link went to some suspicious looking domain

The page the link brought up was a shoddy impersonation of a OneDrive login

In just minutes, the users machine was infected, it emailed itself to all of their Outlook contacts...

So this means nothing in this list detected a goddamn thing:

    Next-generation firewall
    AI-powered security
    'MACHINE LEARNING'
    'Prevent lateral spread'
    enterprise defense suite with threat protection and threat detection capabilities designed to identify and stop attacks
    AV software that was advertised to 'Flag malicious phishing emails and scam websites'
    'Defend against ransomware and other online dangers'
    'Block dangerous websites that can steal personal data'
    the cloud-based filtering service that protects your organization against spam, malware, and other email threats
And the company that we pay a huge sum of money to 'delivers threat detection, incident response, and compliance management in one unified platform' didn't make a peep.

But, we are up to the standards of quite a few acronyms.

It's all a useless shitshow. And plenty of productivity-hurting false flags happen all the time.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#148
post #6

Looking back on that era, the hate towards hackers feels really misplaced. Yeah, at the time it was more local and more dominated by people doing it for the lolz but we kinda owe them a debt of gratitude. If they hadn't gotten everyone to stop being lazy about security we'd be in a very different place now, surrounded by rouge states and agencies launching hyper sophisticated attacks on infrastructure and data. That…

It wasn't misplaced...There were some horrific pieces of "hacker" software that were floating around in 05. Wasn't uncommon for a disgruntled employee to load malware onto a company's network and bring down operations for weeks. Case in point, douchebag loaded a maleware into this small financial company's network that I wound up working for. The virus infected the boot sector and forced the company to do low level formats on all of the company's hard drives. They lost immense amounts of money and respect in their industry and barely recovered. That virus was developed by some garbage hacker boy for laughs.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#149
post #46
post #10

I wonder how well we all think this article has aged? "Penetrate and Patch" is supposedly dumb. But what do we practically do with that? We've seen in the last decade or so a lot of long-lived software everyone thought was secure get caught with massive security bugs. Well, once some software you depend on has infact been found to have a bug, what's there to do but patch it? If some software has never had a bug found…

1. Default deny is one of the oldest best practices in security engineering; it barely needed saying in 1995 (but Cheswick & Bellovin said exactly that in Firewalls & Internet Security). 2. "Enumerating badness" is simultaneously an attempt to connect vulnerability research to antivirus (security practitioners have had contempt, mostly justified, for AV since the late 1980s) and an endorsement of the heuristic detect…

Agree with tptacek. His rant in Enumerating Badness is deeply intertwined with his rant against Default Permit (which as tptacek points out, was a bit of a strawman even then). I could agree that checking against all possible bad things is a flawed approach for security products and IT staff.

However, enumerating badness is hugely valuable in the security industry for two reasons:

1) It’s the backbone of security research, just as physiology and anatomy are to zoology and medicine. With enumeration (observation), we can classify, abstract, find trends, identify risky software and approaches, direct engineering resources, and create broad defenses (yay ASLR).

2) Attackers are lazy, too. I work at a security consulting firm, and routinely see attackers reuse the same TTP across different target companies. Enumerating badness not only offers detection opportunities (perhaps not the best, but higher level detection techniques are often built off understanding the enumeration of badness) but also denies attackers opportunity for reuse. “Impose cost,” as thoughtlords like to say.

Re: The six dumbest ideas in computer security (2005)

#150

This describes the security industry as a whole. We had a user click an email and get phished. We tried training the users with tools like KnowBe4, banners above the emails that say things like THIS IS AN OUTSIDE EMAIL BE VERY CAREFUL WHEN CLICKING LINKS. Didn't help. The email was a very generic looking "Kindly view the attached invoice" The attached invoice was a PDF file The link went to some suspicious looking do…

Have you tried threats and public humiliation?

"ATTN ALL employees: Dave Smith ignored security training and was phished into installing malware. He is now fired because he was an idiot."

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