Earlier quoted context omitted.
Pledge is a bad example, it isn't applied to a lot of packages in the ports tree and it's infeasible to do it for every program. In the end you'll find you end up with the same situation as Linux: another layer on top with daemons implementing blanket security policies using pledge on behalf of the programs. Kind of like... a sandbox. SELinux is also a bad example, even if you decide you're using that as the underlyi…
>SELinux is also a bad example No why? If you have the right (and correct) rules, SELinux absolutely act's as a "sandbox", that's exactly what i meant, a sandbox don't need's to be another layer of software. Run in your "namespace", can just create/access/execute/read your port, files, memory..that's it, that's a sandboxed application. For example that "namespace-sandbox" is standard in Plan9/9front...without any add…
>For example that "namespace-sandbox" is standard in Plan9/9front...without any additional software, just the filesystem and 9p.
This is what I mean, Plan9 style mount namespaces are also available in Linux and are preferable to SELinux for containers and sandboxes because they're actually simpler and less trouble.