Earlier quoted context omitted.
> My moral code was compromised because I no longer felt the guilt and shame that normally inhibits unscrupulous behavior. Hope I am not out of bond but I think this demonstrates why a moral code also has to be an intellectual thing and not just an instinct thing.
Morals are about as far from instinct as one can get. They're also entirely subjective, fwiw.
Is morality "entirely subjective"? When someone says, "Torturing children is immoral", do you really want to reply "That's entirely subjective". The very reply itself seems morally compromised, even immoral.
A good philosophical argument for the objectivity of morality is the "companions in the guilt" argument. Most people accept the objectivity of rationality, even those who deny the objectivity of morality. And yet, when we examine the two in detail, we can find a great many similarities between rationality and morality – morality says "don't do X", where X might be torturing a child, rationality says "don't believe X", where X might be the QAnon conspiracy theory; morality values states of affairs positively or negatively (moral vs immoral), rationality does the same (rational vs irrational) – in light of these similarities, how is it not special pleading to affirm the objectivity of one yet deny it of the other? To justify treating them differently, you'd need to give a good reason for doing so – but rarely is any reason given at all, and I don't think any of them are good. Rationally, we must either affirm the objectivity of morality or deny the objectivity of rationality. I think, to affirm the objectivity of morality is the better horn to take – we might even conclude it is the more rational one, if we believe that rationality itself requires belief in its own rationality. Hence, morality is objective.